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A bstract
This thesis contributes to the understanding of alcohol prohibition by examining the causes 
and effects of prohibition policy in Indian states over 1957-2001.
Chapter 2 examines the political economy of prohibition by using a state-level dataset 
to estimate the determinants of prohibition legislation. The analysis finds prohibition to be 
associated with the electoral cycle, legislature identity, lower relative strength of the alcohol 
industry, and the composition of state finances -  in particular the share of central union 
excise.
Chapter 3 focuses on the impact of prohibition on alcohol consumption using a series of 
cross sections of the National Sample Survey. Unit value analysis is conducted to estimate 
the impact on prices by alcohol group and uncover the demand and supply dynamics in the 
market. The relationship between alcohol, tobacco, and pan is examined using prohibition 
as an exogenous instrument, and the spill-over effects of policy on the demand for these 
goods are calculated. Prohibition is estimated to decrease alcohol participation by 26% 
with the effect varying by alcohol type and extent of prohibition. While both supply and 
demand shifts drive the decrease in consumption, the evidence suggests the deterrent effect 
of prohibition is significant. Tobacco and pan are found to be complements to alcohol and 
prohibition is associated with a fall in their demand.
Chapter 4 focuses on the impact of prohibition on intrahousehold resource allocation by 
estimating Engel curves for broad categories of expenditure. The results indicate prohibition 
increased outlays for food and fuel with the magnitude of change being consistent with the 
reduction in alcohol estimated. The negative private and social effects of alcohol use are 
also examined. Prohibition led to a decrease in spurious liquor consumption and incidence 
of burglaries. However, it is associated with an increase in liver disease deaths and homicide 
rates.
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“The reign of tears is over. The slums will soon be a memory. We will turn 
our prisons into factories and our jails into storehouses and comcribs. Men will 
walk upright now, women will smile and children will laugh. Hell will be forever 
for rent. ”
Reverend Billy Sunday speaking at the beginning of Prohibition, 1920.
“Prohibition goes beyond the bounds of reason in that it attempts to control 
a man’s appetite by legislation, and makes a crime out of things that are not 
crimes. ”
Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865) 16th US President.
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Chapter 1
An Overview of the Thesis
1.1 Introduction
Alcohol prohibition has been a popular and contentious policy tool for curtailing alcohol 
consumption in both developed and developing nations. As the quotes in the previous page 
highlight, the spectrum of opinion over prohibition is broad. Prohibitionists argue that 
alcohol use is associated with significant private and social negative effects which prohibi­
tion alone can address. Libetarians and others view prohibition, by restricting individual 
choice, as being an extreme manifestation of a paternalistic state and the imposition of the 
puritanical preferences of a few over the rest of society.
This thesis contributes to the debate on prohibition by undertaking an econometric 
analysis of the determinants and effects of alcohol prohibition in Indian states over 1957- 
2001. In doing so, it aims to understand what precipitates prohibition policy, particularly 
whether prohibition is implemented as a response of benevolent governments to market 
failures and errors in individual decision-making, or to further the goals of self-motivated 
political agents. The thesis also focuses on the effects of prohibition on alcohol consumption, 
and examines the spillover effects on demand for addictive and general goods in the house­
hold consumption bundle. In addition, the relationships between prohibition and private 
and social negative effects generally associated with alcohol use are analysed.
The main contribution of this thesis is a systematic empirical analysis of prohibition 
policy, which provides a basis for the unbiased assessment of the various arguments for and
13
against alcohol prohibition. This in turn contributes to a better understanding of prohibition 
policies with respect to their effectiveness in controlling consumption, their spillover effects 
on other markets, and their impact on alcohol-related negative effects.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the historical 
background of alcohol prohibition and motivates the thesis. Section 1.3 gives an overview 
of each chapter and is followed by the main results in Section 1.4. A glossary of terms is 
included at the end of the thesis.
1.2 Background and M otivation
1.2.1 H istory o f Prohibition Policy
The prohibition of bads like alcohol and other drugs has had a long and varied history, with 
prohibition existing, in one form or another, in most societies. In general, prohibition tends 
to involve the restriction or prevention of the consumption or production of a particular 
item, although the particular form prohibition takes can vary. For example, prohibition 
may entail the prevention of the sale, production and consumption of the good in question; 
it may cover only particular sub-groups of the good such as hard liquor in the case of 
alcohol prohibition; it may restrict the permitted quantity of consumption; or it may be 
implemented on a specific section of the population such as persons under a given age.
Prohibition of alcohol in the developed world is associated mainly with the Temperance 
Movement in the Protestant countries. In the US, prohibition has been present since the 
1750s when the consumption and sale of liquor, particularly to slaves and Red Indians, was 
strongly discouraged. The first US state-level prohibition was passed in Maine in 1851, and 
by 1855 13 of the 31 states had passed similar laws. This broad trend towards abstinence 
together with the growth of the Prohibition Movement1 culminated in National Prohibition 
of Alcohol in the US over 1920-19332. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth
1 The Prohibition Movement comprised mainly of the Anti-Saloon League, who viewed alcohol as a vice 
that would lead to moral degradation if consumption was unchecked, and the Womens’ Christian Temperance 
Union, an alliance of state movements for prohibition who viewed prohibition as part of a wider set of reforms 
linked to womens’ suffrage and electoral reform.
2 National Prohibition of Alcohol in the US was enacted by the Volstead Act in 1919 which enforced the 
Eighteenth Amendment to the US Constitution. This was later repealed by the Blaine Act of 1933 with the
14
century, prohibition was also present in Norway, Sweden, Finland, Russia and Canada3. In 
some countries prohibition was enacted in particular localities. For example, in Scotland 
citizens were given the right to vote out drinking establishments within their towns and 
villages after 1920.
The prohibition movement stymied in the 1930s with the onset of the Depression and 
the lifting of national prohibition in the US. By the Second World War alcohol prohibition 
legislation had been repealed in most western countries, with prohibition being enforced 
mainly in local jurisdictions4. In the contemporary period, the most notable episode of 
prohibition occurred in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s during Perestroika. This entailed, 
President Gorbachev prohibiting the sale and consumption of liquor in an attempt to reduce 
the high incidence of alcohol related deaths and disease.
In developing countries, prohibition has been traditionally associated with religious pref­
erences and women’s welfare groups, similar to the US prohibition movement. Countries 
with a large proportion of Muslims have tended to have alcohol prohibition due to the ban 
of any form of alcohol consumption stipulated in Islam. In non-Muslim countries the main 
impetus tends to be the negative effects associated with alcohol use, in addition to moral 
considerations derived from religion5. In India, which is the country of study for this thesis, 
prohibition is strongly encouraged in the Constitution, influenced partly from the empha­
sis placed on abstinence by Gandhi and partly from the religious principles of Hinduism. 
However, alcohol policy is the jurisdiction of the state, with each state having full control of 
alcohol legislation, state excise rates and the organization of production and sale of alcohol. 
In fact, since Independence most states have enacted some form of prohibition resulting in 
significant variation in the implementation of prohibition policy across states and over time.
Twenty-First Amendment to the US Constitution which lifted national prohibition.
3In Sweden, the temperance movement had been strong since the 1830s and after 1922 the government 
nationalized the alcohol industry and restricted sales to 1 liter per family per week. In Norway, a referendum 
outlawed the sale of drinks with an alcoholic content of more than 12 percent in 1919 which was subsequently 
reversed in 1932. The Finnish government banned the sale of any drink of more than 2 percent alcohol in 
1932. During World War One, the Tsar in Russia enacted national prohibition against hard liquor including 
vodka. During the early 20th century Canada was dry in all provinces.
4 For example, while national prohibition has been lifted in the US, prohibition is still present in some 
counties of Texas and Salt Lake City,Utah.
5 For example, Hinduism believes alcohol to be an impurity and thus prohibits the priestly caste from 
consuming any form of alcohol.
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This makes India an optimal choice in studying the causes and effects of prohibition policy 
while controlling for country-level fixed effects such as a culture of abstinence.
Despite the contentious history of prohibition, it is relatively under-researched in the 
economics literature, both in terms of the underlying causes which determine it and its 
impact on consumption and alcohol-related externalities. The substantial social science 
literature on prohibition, in particular the US National Prohibition, is limited mainly to 
sociological and political history analysis. This thesis attempts to add to this literature by 
undertaking an econometric analysis of prohibition and systematically examining its main 
determinants and consequences. Given the qualitative nature of many of the determinants, 
the analysis is by design limited and should be viewed as a complement to the sociological 
and political literature on alcohol prohibition.
Understanding the determinants of prohibition is strongly linked to understanding what 
drives government policy choices, in particular state regulation and paternalism. The help­
ing hand view assumes governments intervene to improve market efficiency in the wake of 
externalities, missing markets, or errors in individual decision-making abilities. An alternate 
view takes government regulation as the outcome of opportunistic policy makers aiming to 
maximise individual welfare. The analysis identifies several factors which are hypothesized 
to cause prohibition and estimates their relative importance in driving prohibition and their 
inter-relations. In doing so, it sheds fight on what causes governments to regulate and in 
particular, enact prohibition policies.
The effects of prohibition on alcohol consumption axe poorly understood, in part due 
to a lack of data on alcohol consumption during prohibition periods. The relatively recent6 
experience of prohibition in India allows the use of household surveys which includes alcohol 
consumption and expenditure variables in prohibition and non-prohibition years across all 
states. From a theoretical standpoint it is not clear, a priori, whether prohibition affects 
consumption and, if so, in which direction and through which mechanisms. Temperance 
movements claim that prohibition reduces consumption by cutting off supply. However, in 
practise, while the illegal nature of production may reduce supply initially, the availabil­
ity of large rents for extraction may induce an increase in supply and the growth of black
6 India has had significant periods of prohibition since Independence in 1947 to the present period.
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markets in liquor. Moreover, while the illegal nature of consumption may reduce demand, 
prohibition may also lead to a “glamorization” of alcohol and hence increase consumption 
amongst certain groups. In addition to the limited understanding of the direction of ef­
fect of prohibition on alcohol consumption, little is known about the mechanism by which 
prohibition affects demand. If the main channel is through price changes, then taxation is 
a viable alternative policy tool. On the other hand, prohibition may also affect demand 
by increasing the fixed costs of consumption due to deterrence effects or the higher cost of 
acquiring illegal alcohol. In this case, it is not clear that taxation would be able to bring 
about a similar demand response.
The association between alcohol use, alcohol prohibition and the negative effects asso­
ciated with alcohol use requires further study. While the effect of taxes on alcohol-related 
negative effects have been examined in the economics literature, there is limited work on 
the impact of prohibition on these variables. If the main channel through which policy 
affects negative outcomes is via reducing alcohol consumption, then prohibition, in so far as 
it affects consumption, should have a similar effect as taxation. However, prohibition may 
affect alcohol-related negative outcomes in other ways. With regards to the private health 
effects of alcohol, prohibition may induce consumption of spurious liquor which has its own 
associated detrimental effects on health. Prohibition may also give rise to certain types of 
criminal behaviour on part of the consumer by increasing the cost of alcohol consumption 
and thereby lowering the relative risk of crime. There may also be effects on organised 
crime as its expands to control black markets in liquor or offer enforcement services to 
bootleggers in the absence of state regulation. Aside from these, prohibition may have 
wider implications for society by fostering a culture of hypocrisy and disregard for the law. 
This is captured in A1 Capone’s famous quote: “When I sell liquor, it’s called bootlegging; 
when my patrons serve it on Lake Shore Drive, it’s called hospitality”.
Understanding the determinants and consequences of prohibition is therefore important 
as it is not clear, a priori, what these actually are. In addition, there is limited empirical work 
on how effective a tool prohibition is for alcohol control, which is imperative in assessing 
the trade-off of individual rights given that prohibition is an extreme form of paternalism. 
This is particularly important as prohibition is associated with certain costs such as the
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loss of tax revenue form alcohol, the possible increase in black markets and organised crime, 
higher risk of corruption of law enforcement agents and politicians, and greater risk of 
alcohol-related health problems as individuals consume illegal liquor. Finally, the study of 
alcohol prohibition may shed light on understanding what drives prohibition of other goods 
such as opium, cocaine, and marijuana and how effective a strategy it is to curtail their 
demand.
1.2.2 P rohibition  and O ther Policy Tools
Traditional policy tools to reduce alcohol consumption include measures to affect price 
directly such as taxation; or legal enactments to prevent consumption such as prohibition, 
which have a more indirect effect on the implicit price. The most common methods have 
been taxation, minimum age requirements, and restrictions on drinking hours. Aside from 
preferences for paternalism, the choice of prohibition versus other policy levers depends on 
various factors including patterns of alcohol consumption and the efficacy of each tool in 
attaining the desired level of consumption. The argument for prohibition versus other policy 
levels is therefore not clear cut, particularly as there is substantial evidence linking alcohol 
taxation with alcohol consumption and the negative effects of alcohol use. Taxation may 
have a limited impact on price when the demand function is price inelastic, which may be 
the case at the mean or for particular segments of the curve like for alcoholics. Policy choice 
will also depend on the type of alcohol predominantly consumed, which in itself may affect 
elasticities, and the drinking culture for example, whether the emphasis is on intoxication 
as opposed to enjoying the taste of the beverage. In addition, taxation may be ineffective 
in affecting alcohol price in economies with under-developed taxation systems and poor 
institutional environments. In such settings, prohibition may be more effective in reducing 
alcohol consumption and be a more feasible policy to implement. Finally, prohibition may 
be more effective if consumption in the whole of the population versus a subset is being 
curtailed.
Prohibition may be a more effective policy tool relative to taxation, if the policy objective 
is to drastically reduce alcohol consumption as opposed to influencing consumption choices 
at the margin. This may occur if policy-makers, and society at large, believe alcohol use
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is intrinsically wrong due to, for example, moral considerations or religious preferences. 
In fact the early history of prohibition in the Protestant countries was driven largely by 
such factors, particularly the view that elite groups in society were better equipped to 
decide about moral choices for the uneducated, uncivilised masses7. Prohibition may also 
arise if the associated negative externalities axe sufficiently large in scale or extreme in 
nature such that the trade-off of consumption is considered a small price to pay. This is 
an important reason why alcohol may be subject to greater calls for prohibition relative to 
other addictive goods such as cigarettes. The main spillovers associated with alcohol are 
motor vehicle accidents and first-degree crimes such as murder, assault and rape. As such, 
these are regarded as more detrimental and harder to contain than the negative effects of 
smoking, which is mainly associated with private harm.
Aside from the possible relative efficacy of prohibition versus taxes, prohibition may be 
enacted due to its alleged association with specific positive side effects. Women’s movements 
against liquor have argued that prohibition shifts the power balance within the household 
by enabling women to have greater say in the allocation of household resources. This, it is 
argued, increases household welfare as consumption of essentials increases and resources are 
directed to child-related items. Prohibitionists have also claimed that, in addition to lower­
ing crime and alcohol-related externalities through its effects on consumption, prohibition 
has additional effects on crime and violence. In particular, it limits the power of the local 
mafia by drastically limiting the power of liquor barons, who are linked with the criminal 
underworld and organised crime.
1.3 Description o f Thesis
This thesis aims to contribute to the economic understanding of the determinants and 
effects of prohibition policy. In particular it focuses on the effects of prohibition on alcohol 
consumption, the demand for economic bads, and the intrahousehold allocation of resources. 
The analysis also examines the impact of prohibition on private and social negative effects
7 As noted above prohibition in the US first began with the restriction of consumption for slaves. To some 
extent the impetus behind partial prohibition in India, where arrack - the drink of the working poor - is 
prohibited may reflect such tendencies.
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associated with alcohol use. The country of focus is India, which has significant variation 
in prohibition policy across states and over time. This together with a rich source of data 
on alcohol consumption, during both prohibition and non-prohibition periods, makes India 
an optimal choice for studying prohibition policy.
Paternalistic policies, such as alcohol prohibition, have been a feature of most govern­
ments throughout time. Despite this, there is little econometric literature on what drives 
paternalism, both across states and with respect to the focus of government regulation. 
Chapter 2 contributes to this literature by examining the determinants of prohibition pol­
icy. As noted above, prohibition has had significant support in several countries, yet little is 
known about what factors are important in bringing about prohibition policy. The analysis 
focuses on whether governments enact prohibition in order to correct market failures or 
whether the role of the state in the economy is less benign and serves to fulfil the objectives 
of politicians and bureaucrats.
The measure of prohibition used is compiled from State Local Acts on prohibition policy 
and therefore captures legislated, as opposed to enforced, prohibition. There have been 
several types of prohibition enacted in India including complete prohibition and partial 
prohibition. Complete prohibition of alcohol is when production, sale, and consumption 
of any alcohol is restricted, while partial prohibition is when specific alcohol types are 
prohibited. In the case of the latter, the alcohol in question is usually arrack (the local 
distilled brew) or toddy (the local home brew). Legislated prohibition is measured in 
terms of the proportion of population under prohibition as in the period up to the 1970s, 
prohibition was enforced on particular districts and not across the whole state. After the 
1970s prohibition tended to be enacted across the whole state and the variable is effectively 
a dummy variable.
The econometric strategy specifies legislated prohibition as a function of political econ­
omy variables including the timing of the electoral cycle, proportion of seats in the state 
parliament by political party grouping, political competition, and the sex and caste of legis­
latures. Next, the effect of the alcohol industry is analysed to assess the power of lobbying 
in influencing prohibition. This together with the analysis of state finances and the pro­
portion of other states enacting prohibition sheds light on whether states use prohibition
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to compete with each other for central resources. The effect of mimicry is examined by 
including measures of the proportion of states at the All-India level that have enacted pro­
hibition in the previous period. The last set of variables examines the association between 
the negative private and social effects of alcohol consumption and prohibition policy to infer 
whether there is any basis for the helping hand view of government regulation. The results 
from this exercise are extended to examine the inter-relationships between the estimated 
determinants of prohibition, understand the impetus behind prohibition policies, and assess 
the evidence for the two main theories of regulation.
Chapter 3 assesses the impact of alcohol prohibition on alcohol consumption by type of 
alcohol and adds to the significant economic literature on alcohol demand and the impact 
of policy in curtailing demand. Alcohol prohibition is modelled as increasing both the fixed 
costs of consumption and the consumer price in a static model of household demand. The 
analysis first examines the determinants of alcohol budget shares in Indian households by 
controlling for household per capita expenditure, household size, caste, sectoral location, and 
the sex, age, literacy, marital status and occupation of the household head. The empirical 
effect on alcohol participation and the magnitude of demand is then estimated using a 
Heckman selection model of alcohol quantity and budget shares controlling for a large set of 
household characteristics. The effects on the supply side and, in particular, producer prices 
are inferred through a careful analysis of the effect of prohibition on alcohol unit values. 
Robustness of the results from these two analyses are checked by decomposing the effect 
of total alcohol by type and examining the cross-demand effects between alcohol groups. 
The significant variation afforded by Indian state prohibition policy and its correlation with 
alcohol provides a useful instrument to examine the relationship between alcohol and other 
“bads” such as leaf tobacco, cigarettes, bidis, and pan. The nature of this relationship is 
important to assess the magnitude and nature of spill-over effects of alcohol policy, and 
provide some insight on how consumption of these items can also be curtailed.
The analysis in Chapter 3 improves our understanding of alternative alcohol policy han­
dles, while the developing country focus expands the empirical literature beyond economies 
with well-functioning markets and institutions. Its main contribution is a systematic analy­
sis of prohibition policy using household data on consumption which mitigates data problems
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faced by other studies of prohibition. The analysis also adds to the body of work assessing 
the nature of demand functions for alcohol, tobacco, and pan and their inter-relationships in 
developing country settings. In doing so, it offers insight into the spillover effects of alcohol 
policies on these markets.
The relationship between alcohol consumption and other variables is further explored 
in Chapter 4. This chapter examines the effect of alcohol prohibition in India on indicators 
of negative private and social effects of alcohol use and the intrahousehold allocation of re­
sources. In doing so, it goes some way to test prohibitionists’ claims that alcohol prohibition 
improves social welfare by reducing the negative consequences of alcohol consumption. The 
analysis first examines detailed information on the intrahousehold allocation of resources to 
ascertain whether prohibition resulted in an increase in the consumption of other household 
items, and if so which particular groups of items. Particular emphasis is given on child- 
and sex-specific goods to ascertain whether prohibition differentially affects consumption for 
particular household members. In order to tackle endogeneity concerns, the effect of prohi­
bition on alcohol for particular groups of households are examined together with the effects 
on other household consumption items. This is to show that households with higher con­
sumption of alcohol were differentially affected by prohibition and in turn show differential 
effects on intrahousehold allocations.
The private negative effects of alcohol are studied by examining rates of alcohol-related 
illnesses such as treatment of liver-diseases, and alcohol-related deaths including deaths from 
liver-disease, liver cirrhosis, spurious liquor, poisoning, and general accidents. The effect of 
prohibition on alcohol-related social externalities are inferred by examining road accident 
fatalities and crime rates by type of crime including murder, rape, burglary, robbery, theft 
and dacoity.
1.4 R esults and Contribution
The primary contribution of this thesis is a better understanding of the empirical determi­
nants of prohibition policy and the estimatible effects on alcohol consumption.
The analysis in Chapter 2 finds limited support for the helping hand view of government
22
regulation and finds evidence which suggests paternalism, in the form of alcohol prohibition, 
is politically motivated and serves the objectives of opportunistic government agents. The 
results show that prohibition is unrelated to the negative private and social effects of alcohol 
consumption or efficiency of the tax system. Instead prohibition is positively related to the 
electoral cycle suggesting that political economy considerations play an important role in its 
enactment. There is strong evidence that the size of the alcohol industry negatively affects 
prohibition as implied by theories of lobby power and regulatory capture. Furthermore, the 
financial capacity of the state government, in particular its dependence on alcohol-related 
receipts and ability to elicit central transfers, is a key factor in determining prohibition. 
There is no association with party identity, characteristics of the electorate, or political 
competition but a strong association with the caste and sex of the legislature. This implies 
that prohibition policies do not reflect party or voter preferences for paternalism but that 
of legislatures, preferred constituents, or lobby groups.
Together, these results suggest that prohibition may be determined by tendencies to 
extract rent from central governments by non-alcohol producing states with large rural 
populations. In particular, it appears that prohibition is used as a vote-winning strategy 
to coalesce voters against alcohol producing states with the promise of improved health, 
welfare, and higher central transfers. The results also indicate limited support for the view 
that governments pursue paternalistic policies to correct market failures or errors in rational 
decision-making. Rather they provide grounds for a more opportunistic view of governments 
where regulation, and in turn, paternalistic policies, are pursued to fulfil the objectives of 
politicians and bureaucrats.
The descriptive analyses of alcohol consumption patterns in Chapter 3 find that alcohol 
participation varies by household characteristics with most households consuming a partic­
ular type of alcohol. There is also significant variation across states and rural and urban 
households. Engel curve analysis finds that alcohol is a normal good with the expenditure 
elasticity of participation varying by alcohol type. However, the expenditure elasticity of 
alcohol budget shares is negative, which suggests that among households who consume alco­
hol, proportionate increases in income result in less than proportionate increases in alcohol 
budget shares.
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Overall, rural and landed households have a greater preference for alcohol. Alcohol 
participation is, in general, significantly lower in female-headed households and in house­
holds with a higher proportion of females. It is also lower for households headed by older 
individuals, but significantly higher in households with married heads. Literate household 
heads drink less of the traditional liquor types like arrack, but have a strong preference for 
factory produced distilled liquor like IMFL. Scheduled caste and scheduled tribe households 
are more likely to consume all alcohol types relative to general castes. This may be because 
as members of the lower castes in the caste system they are less bound by the Hindu princi­
ples of temperance which are most strictly enforced on the priestly (Brahmins) and higher 
castes. The pattern of alcohol consumption also varies across occupation of the household 
head with all occupations, except for service workers, consuming significantly less alcohol 
than labourers.
The effect of prohibition on alcohol demand differs by the type of policy enacted (partial 
versus complete prohibition) and the alcohol type in question. Overall, complete and partial 
prohibition decreased alcohol participation by 26% with the greatest effects on arrack in 
both cases. Unit value analysis shows that complete prohibition significantly decreased 
alcohol unit values, while partial prohibition significantly increased them. The reduction 
in consumption during complete prohibition therefore resulted mainly from the deterrent 
effect of prohibition on demand although supply shifts also occurred. During periods when 
only one type of alcohol is prohibited, supply shifts are the dominant mechanism in reducing 
alcohol participation. While total alcohol participation decreased, prohibition increased 
consumption for certain types of liquor which are more likely to be home-brewed like toddy. 
Partial prohibition also increased alcohol demand for non-prohibited close substitutes.
The use of prohibition to identify the relationship between addictive goods finds that 
alcohol and tobacco, and alcohol and pan are complements. However, the relationship 
varies between disaggregated tobacco and alcohol items. The positive relationship also 
holds for bidis and leaf tobacco but not for cigarettes which is strongly negatively associated 
with all types of alcohol participation. Prohibition policy therefore had spillover effects on 
the demand for these goods, with complete and partial prohibition significantly decreasing 
participation in total tobacco and pan consumption as expected given their complementary
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relationship to alcohol8.
There has been limited econometric work on the effects of alcohol consumption and pol­
icy on negative private and social harm, in the context of India’s experience with alcohol. 
Chapter 4 contributes to this literature by undertaking an econometric analysis of the effects 
of prohibition on the intrahousehold allocation of resources and the negative consequences 
of alcohol use. The main results from the econometric analysis on intrahousehold alloca­
tions are that prohibition had statistically significant effects, both positive and negative, on 
household expenditure patterns. Prohibition significantly increased food and fuel budget 
shares, the former mainly due to increases in consumption of pulses, fruits and vegetables, 
and dairy products. It also shifted resources towards amusement services, perhaps as a sub­
stitution for alcohol. On the other hand, prohibition decreased budget shares of education 
goods, household appliances and utensils, and household toiletries. These broad effects hold 
for child and sex-specific goods. Prohibition increased shares of baby food and milk but 
decreased child education expenditures. The allocation of resources does not follow sex-lines 
with both male and female clothing increasing and sex-specific toiletries decreasing. The 
estimated effects of prohibition on intrahousehold resource allocations are small on average, 
as expected given the small share of alcohol in the household budget.
Given that prohibition had an impact on other household consumption and the varied 
direction of the effect, underreporting, in the sense that items are declared missing or less 
than actually spent, is not endemic in driving the results. The incentive for underreport­
ing related to prohibition in household consumption-expenditure surveys is limited but its 
absence cannot be guaranteed. With respect to the endogeneity of prohibition policy, the 
interactions with household characteristics indicate that the estimated changes in the con­
sumption bundle are being driven by changes in alcohol consumption due to prohibition 
rather than vice versa. In addition, they lend support to the argument of limited spurious 
correlation as prohibition policy appears to have impacted household expenditures most in 
households consuming alcohol.
8 Across tobacco types, prohibition increased bidi participation and decreased leaf tobacco consumption 
by approximately 26%. It also increased cigarette consumption by 8%. The impact of partial prohibition 
was to decrease tobacco participation by 18%, mainly by decreasing leaf tobacco consumption by 34%. The 
effect of complete and partial prohibition on pan was to significantly reduce participation by 12% and 28% 
respectively.
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The private negative effects of alcohol are studied by examining rates of alcohol-related 
illnesses such as treatment of liver-diseases, and alcohol-related deaths including deaths from 
liver-disease, liver cirrhosis, spurious liquor, poisoning, and general accidents. The analysis 
finds that prohibition in the early 1960s and 1970s is associated with a significant increase 
in liver disease deaths; while from the 1980s onwards it is associated with a significant 
decrease in spurious liquor and liver cirrhosis deaths. Social externalities examined include 
road accident fatalities and crime rates by type of crime including murder, rape, burglary, 
robbery, theft and dacoity. While prohibition reduced total crime by reducing the number 
of burglaries, it also increased the homicide rate significantly. Prohibition was found not to 
have any impact on road accident fatalities.
Taken together the main contribution of this thesis is a more nuanced understanding of 
prohibition policy. Prohibition in India was not driven by market failure considerations but 
used as a political tool to further the ends of political agents. In particular, the evidence 
suggests prohibition is driven by the relative size of the alcohol industry, and the ability 
for central-revenue rent extraction by state governments. While prohibition did have large 
effects in curtailing alcohol consumption and increasing the budget share of food and fuel, 
it increases the consumption of particular types of liquor and of substitutes to alcohol like 
cigarettes. The fact that consumption of alcohol does not decrease to zero, indicates the 
presence of black markets during prohibition which can have negative effects on crime and 
law enforcement. This is reflected in the increase in homicide rates during prohibition. The 
positive consumption also implies a higher risk of drinking spurious liquor and encountering 
serious liver problems which increased during prohibition periods. Overall the findings 
therefore suggest that while prohibition may have significant positive effects, it may also be 
associated with negative side-effects and should therefore not be seen as a panacea to the 
problems induced by alcohol use.
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Chapter 2
The Determinants of Government 
Paternalism: A Study of Alcohol 
Prohibition in India
“Government exists to protect us from each other. Where government has gone 
beyond its limits is in deciding to protect us from ourselves. ”
Ronald Reagan, (1911-2004) 40th US President
2.1 Introduction
Understanding what causes governments to regulate economic activity is important in as­
sessing the optimal role of the state in the economy. Of particular importance is the regula­
tion of individual behaviour via paternalistic policies which constrain consumer sovereignty 
by forcing, or preventing, choices for the individuals’ own good (Camerer et al (2003)). 
Paternalistic policies to influence demand are valid from an economists’ point of view if 
consumption results in externalities in the form of antisocial behaviour or increased health 
care costs, or are the result of erroneous decision-making processes either due to bounded 
rationality or self-control problems1. The existing literature on government paternalism has
1 Recent research in behavioral economics has identified a variety of decision-making errors. These studies 
conclude that individuals realistically display bounded rationality, bounded willpower, bounded self-interest,
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focused mainly on the rationale for policy and the design of interventions to limit the in­
fringement of individual choice. There has also been extensive work on the effectiveness of 
particular paternalistic policies for example, the effect of taxation in reducing demand for 
"bads” such as alcohol and cigarettes. However, there is limited work on the determinants 
of paternalism from a political economy perspective, in particular what motivates govern­
ments to pursue such policies. This chapter adds to the empirical literature on paternalism 
and government regulation by examining the determinants of a relatively under-researched 
type of paternalism - prohibition of alcohol in India. In particular, the analysis focuses 
on whether governments regulate in order to correct market failures or whether the role of 
the state in the economy is less benign and serves to fulfil the objectives of politicians and 
bureaucrats. The analysis finds limited support for the helping hand view of government 
regulation and finds evidence which suggests paternalism, in the form of alcohol prohibition, 
is politically motivated and serves the objectives of opportunistic government agents.
Alcohol prohibition is an interesting policy to examine for several reasons. Firstly, 
prohibition, by preventing consumption, lies at one end of the paternalistic policy spectrum. 
Therefore, whether it is effective is imperative in assessing the trade-off of individual rights. 
Secondly, prohibition has had significant periodic support in some countries (most notably 
in the 1930s in the United States) but is relatively under-researched, both in terms of 
its impact on consumption and alcohol-related externalities, and on the underlying causes 
which determine it. While the former is important, and is the subject of the next Chapter, 
understanding the factors which precipitate prohibition may shed light on how effective and 
efficient a strategy it is for alcohol control, particularly as prohibition comes with certain 
economic costs. These include the significant loss of state excise revenue2, expansion of 
illegal production and smuggling, and higher probability of spurious liquor consumption. 
Thirdly, prohibition may be a suitable alternative policy handle in economies with under­
developed taxation systems and poor institutional environments, or where alcohol demand 
is inelastic such that taxation does not affect alcohol consumption. Finally, the study of
and frequently fail to maximize their expected utility (Camerer et al (2003); Jolls et al (2001); Korobkin 
and Uleh (2000)).
2 This results in sharp falls in government finances which, if unstemmed, have drastic effects on other 
elements of government expenditure.
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alcohol prohibition may shed light on understanding what drives prohibition of other goods 
such as opium, cocaine, and marijuana and how effective a strategy it is to curtail their 
demand.
The analysis in this chapter examines alcohol prohibition policy in Indian states over 
1957-2001. The focus on India is motivated by the emphasis placed on prohibition by 
state governments to control alcohol demand and the alarming increase in adult per capita 
alcohol consumption of 115% between 1980 and 20013. Prohibition policy in India is strongly 
encouraged in the Constitution, influenced partly from the emphasis placed on abstinence 
by Gandhi4, a key proponent of prohibition, and the religious principles of Hinduism5. 
However, alcohol policy is the jurisdiction of the state with each state having full control 
of alcohol legislation, state excise rates and the organization of production and sale of 
alcohol. There is thus significant variation in the implementation of prohibition policy 
across states and over time within states as illustrated in Figure 2.1. This cross-sectional 
variation afforded by Indian states makes it an optimal choice in studying the causes and 
effects of prohibition policy while controlling for country-level fixed effects such as a culture 
of abstinence and a predisposition towards large government. In addition, the relatively 
long time-period of analysis enables the identification of the long-term determinants of 
prohibition policy.
The results show that similar factors determine the main types of prohibition enacted 
in India. In particular, prohibition is unrelated to the negative private and social effects of 
alcohol consumption or efficiency of the tax system. Instead prohibition is positively related 
to the electoral cycle suggesting that political economy considerations play an important 
role in its enactment. In addition, it tends to occur in states with high rural population 
shares. There is strong evidence that the size of the alcohol industry negatively affects 
prohibition as implied by theories of lobby power and regulatory capture. Furthermore, the 
financial capacity of the state government, in particular its dependence on alcohol-related
3 WHO Alcohol Database.
4 According to Gandhi "Drugs and drinks are two arms of the devil with which he strikes his helpless 
slaves into stupefaction and intoxication". (Abraham (1995)).
5 The Hindu scriptures generally disapprove of alcohol consumption but seem to condone its occasional 
use by certain classes of people such as kings, nobles, warriors, and manual workers. It prohibits its use for 
priests, students and those seriously following a religious way of life.
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receipts and ability to illicit central transfers, is found to be a key factor in determining 
prohibition. There is no association with party identity, characteristics of the electorate, or 
political competition but a strong association with the caste and sex of the legislature. This 
implies that prohibition policies do not reflect party or voter preferences for paternalism 
but that of legislatures, preferred constituents, or lobby groups.
Together, these results suggest that prohibition is used as a strategy to extract rents 
from the central governments by non-alcohol producing states with large rural populations. 
Prohibition is therefore used as a vote-winning strategy by politicians to coalesce voters 
against alcohol producing states with the promise of improved health, welfare, and higher 
central transfers. This finding corroborates research on the effect of partisan politics on 
intergovernmental transfers (Khemani (2003a); Khemani (2003b)) and adds to it by showing 
that the ambiguity of such transfers often results in strategic state policies. The results 
also indicate limited support for the view that governments pursue paternalistic policies to 
correct market failures or errors in rational decision-making. Rather they provide grounds 
for a more opportunistic view of governments where regulation, and in turn, paternalistic 
policies, are pursued to fulfil the objectives of politicians and bureaucrats.
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides the background to prohibition 
policy in India and discusses the pattern of alcohol production and consumption in India. 
Section 3 discusses the methodological framework and econometric strategy. The results 
are discussed in Section 4 and analysed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Prohibition Policy in India
The 1949 Indian Constitution granted Indian states complete control of alcohol policy with 
respect to the taxation of alcohol, the structure and regulation of the alcohol industry, 
and the prohibition of production and consumption. Particular emphasis was given to 
prohibition in Article 47 of the Directive Principles of State Policy which states:
"The state shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and standard of living of its 
people as among its primary duties and, in particular, the state shall endeavour to bring
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about prohibition of the use except for medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks and of 
drugs which are injurious to health."
Despite the central ideological stance on prohibition, the transfer of responsibility from 
the federal to state entities gave rise to significant variation in prohibition across, and 
within, states over time. Appendix 1 lists State Local Acts enacting prohibition over 1957- 
2001 in the 16 major states studied in this paper. There are three main types of prohibition 
policy: complete prohibition of production and consumption of all alcohol types; partial 
prohibition where a subset of liquor (usually arrack or toddy) is prohibited; and dry days 
where consumption is prohibited for certain days of the week or month. Legislation is 
broadly similar across states with prohibition enacted on both production and consumption. 
However, enforcement focuses mainly on producers who are subject to more severe penalties 
than consumers6.
The analysis focuses on the determinants of prohibition as defined by the passage of 
legislation as opposed to the actual enforced level of prohibition. Legislation is the correct 
variable to focus on as the vast majority of prohibition in India is imposed by the state as 
opposed to self-imposed which is limited to selected villages and blocks. Legislation and 
enforcement may diverge as a government may enact prohibition but not deploy sufficient 
resources to enforce it due to a lack of funds or simply because prohibition was a hollow 
act to fulfil election promises. Furthermore, once legislation is in place, legislatures may 
be more likely to revert effective, as opposed to ineffective, prohibition legislation if it runs 
counter to their ideology or the interests of associated lobby groups. Consequently estimates 
from legislated prohibition will be a lower bound to estimates from actual prohibition and 
will be downwards biased.
Prohibition is measured as the proportion of population under prohibition within a given 
state and year compiled from enacted state legislation7. A proportion was used as, before 
1970, prohibition policy was not implemented uniformly within states but was district-, 
and in some cases block-, specific. However, the decision-making process with regards to
6 For example, in Kerala during prohibition, production of liquor was subject to at least 6 months impris­
onment or a fine of RslOOO, while consumption of liquor was subject to at least three months imprisonment 
or a fine of Rs500.
7 The proportion of area under prohibition was also used as a further check.
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legislation occurred at the state level with state legislatures putting forward, debating and 
voting on prohibition bills. This makes it reasonable to use state-level variables as the main 
explanatory variables for determining prohibition policy. Three measures of prohibition are 
examined: complete prohibition, all periods of arrack prohibition, and partial prohibition8. 
In order to assess whether prohibition across the state is driven by different factors to 
prohibition in selected parts of the state, the analysis was repeated using a dummy variable 
for periods of each prohibition type across the whole state. Results are reported only for 
proportion of population under complete prohibition with the other results being discussed 
if different.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the significant variation in prohibition across states over 
the sample period. The time-line reflects the central emphasis on prohibition in the pre-, 
and immediate post-, Independence era. This was stemmed by the mid-1960s when several 
states with long-standing prohibition policies lifted prohibition orders. Since then there has 
been no sustained central effort to encourage prohibition, except for complete prohibition 
imposed during the National Emergency of 1977-789. The incidence of complete and partial 
prohibition across the sample is 23% and 9% respectively (Table 2.1). Complete prohibition 
periods last, on average, 6.4 years and partial prohibition for 1.5 years. Aside from Gujarat, 
which has had complete prohibition since Independence10, complete prohibition policies 
have been concentrated in the Central and Southern states11. Partial prohibition typically 
has occurred preceding or following complete prohibition and has also been concentrated in 
the Southern States.
8 Partial prohibition periods are mainly years when arrack was prohibited but there was not complete 
prohibition of other alcohol types. In a small number of cases partial prohibition includes periods of toddy 
prohibition.
9 This was due to the influence of Prime Minister Morarji Desai - a key proponent of prohibition (Vyasulu 
(1998)). It is only since trade liberalization in 1992/93 that the negative attitude of the central government 
towards alcohol has really changed. Since then, growing pressures from the alcohol industry has resulted 
in the relaxation of restrictions on production quotas, capacity utilization, raw materials (molasses versus 
grain), and market structure.
10Interestingly, Gujarat is the birth place of Gandhi.
11 Central States with prohibition policies include Haryana and Orissa; Southern states include Tamil 
Nadu, Kerala, and Andhra Pradesh.
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2.2.2 A lcohol Production and C onsum ption
Historically, the alcohol industry in India has been concentrated in six states—Maharashtra, 
U ttar Pradesh, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and West Bengal. Together 
these states produce the majority of alcohol consumed in India12. The location of industry 
is strongly influenced by the availability of raw materials for alcohol production (molasses, 
grain and sugar cane) aside from the extent of government regulation of the alcohol sector, 
which is also an important factor. The industry comprises of three distinct components 
related to the production, packaging, and retail sale of alcohol. Distilleries and breweries, 
and bottling and labelling plants tend to be located together, often near urban centres. 
Retail outlets for the distribution of alcohol typically take the form of liquor shops, where 
bottled alcohol can be purchased, and bars, where alcohol is served. These are dispersed 
geographically across all Indian states and not confined to alcohol producing states.
Alcohol consumption does not appear to be systematically related to alcohol production. 
Data on consumption rates for the entire sample period is limited and hence the extent of the 
relationship is examined over 1983-2000. Figures reported in Chapter 3 from the National 
Sample Survey, a large consumer-expenditure household survey, suggest that consumption 
rates13 do not track production patterns across states. The Spearman rank correlation 
between reported participation and industry size is low (-0.006) and the null hypothesis of 
independence cannot be rejected. Furthermore, industry size is insignificant in determining 
alcohol participation in reduced-form estimates of alcohol industry on reported alcohol 
consumption. These results also hold for the four alcohol sub-groups for which data was 
available14. This is corroborated by evidence from government studies, which highlight that 
consumption is related, not to the level of production within a state, but to the number 
of retails shops15. They cite that while Uttar Pradesh produces more alcohol relative to 
the Punjab, Orissa, and Haryana, the recorded level of consumption is significantly lower.
^International Wine and Spirits Record (2000).
13 See Table 3.2 of Chapter 3.
14These are reported arrack, IMFL, toddy and beer participation. Spearman correlations for participation 
of each with respect to the alcohol industry are: arrack (-0.077), IMFL (0.306), toddy (0.303), and beer 
(0.338). For all the null hypothesis of independent variables could not be rejected.
15 See, for example, the “Report of the Committee for Examining the Issues Related to Auction System of 
Country Liquor Shops”, Government of Maharashtra (1988).
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The corresponding figures for reported consumption are 6% for Uttar Pradesh compared to 
17%, 13% and 11% in Punjab, Orissa, and Haryana16.
2.3 M ethodological Framework
2.3.1 Theories o f  G overnm ent R egulation
The economic literature contains two main theories of government regulation which can be 
applied to analyse the determinants of prohibition policy -  the helping hand view (Pigou 
(1938)) and the grabbing hand view (Tullock (1967); Stigler (1971); Peltzman (1976); 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998))17. The helping hand view postulates that government regu­
lation is the reaction of an efficiency optimizing government to market failures arising in 
unregulated markets. Applied to alcohol control policies, this view holds that governments 
curtail alcohol demand due to the negative externalities of alcohol consumption. These 
imply that consumers optimizing individual welfare overconsume and cannot attain the so­
cially optimal level of consumption. This view also implies that regulation may ensue if 
there are errors in individual decision-making, due to bounded rationality or problems of 
self-control, such that individuals are unable to choose the optimal level of consumption 
themselves.
Within this framework prohibition policies would be pursued if these problems are suf­
ficiently large, or if they are unaffected by taxation or other less restrictive policies such 
as minimum age requirements. Prohibition should therefore be observed when the nega­
tive effects of alcohol consumption, both private and social, axe high. The former includes 
greater incidence of alcohol-related illnesses, deaths from alcoholism, and problems of spu­
rious liquor consumption. The latter includes direct externalities, such as high crime rates 
and motor vehicle accidents caused by drunk driving, as well as indirect effects such as in­
creases in tax burdens due to higher costs of treating alcohol-related diseases or an increase 
in insurance premiums due to increased incidence of motor vehicle accidents. Prohibition 
may also be enacted in the absence of irrational individual decision-making if tax systems
16 Derived from the data in Chapter 3.
l7Djankov et al (2002).
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axe weak so as not to be able to directly affect alcohol demand, even at high marginal tax 
rates. If this were to hold, we would observe prohibition in states and periods with relatively 
weak taxation regimes.
The grabbing hand view holds that regulation is socially inefficient and that the govern­
ment’s objective function includes other elements aside from optimizing efficiency. There 
are two main variants -  Stigler’s (1971) theory of regulatory capture, and the tollbooth view 
(McChesney (1987); De Soto (1990); Shleifer and Vishny (1998)). The theory of regula­
tory capture contends that “regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and 
operated primarily for its benefit” -  i.e. industry incumbents acquire regulations to create 
artificial barriers to entry which reduces competition and increases rents to the detriment 
of consumers18. With respect to prohibition, if regulatory capture is viewed as the ability 
to escape regulation, we should observe prohibition occurring in states and during periods 
when the alcohol industry is relatively small19. Regulatory capture may also manifest itself 
in the form of the alcohol industry lobbying for the restriction of specific alcohol types not 
produced by large distilleries.
The tollbooth view asserts that regulation is pursued for the benefit of politicians and 
bureaucrats and not necessarily to increase market efficiency. In particular Djankov et 
al (2002) state that "Politicians use regulation both to create rents and to extract them 
through campaign contributions, votes, and bribes". Taken together with the broader 
political economy literature, this suggests that politicians may propose prohibition policies 
in order to win political favour by reflecting the preferences of the electorate, preferred 
constituencies, political parties, or of popular social movements such as women’s movements 
against drinking20. We should therefore expect to observe prohibition being enacted shortly 
after elections and possibly be related to the party identity of politicians. If one assumes 
Besley and Coate’s (1997a) citizen-candidate model of the political process, we would also
18 The alcohol industry in India is subject to a vast amount of state regulation, even in the relatively liberal 
states. These range from officially set production quotas, lengthy and strict procedures for the issuance of 
producer licenses, complex regulations on pricing and the mechanism of alcohol delivery (for example bottles 
versus sachets), and at the extreme, the production of alcohol by state-owned breweries.
10 This is not a sufficient condition for regulatory capture to hold as a negative relationship may also exist 
if, for example, states chose to regulate the industry via taxation rather than prohibition.
20 The most well known of these is the Anti-Arrack Movement in Andhra Pradesh which was spearheaded 
by women’s groups in the Telangana area (Reddy and Patnaik (1993); Kumari and Salaam (1997)).
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expect prohibition to be related to characteristics of politicians.
Policy-makers may also pursue prohibition due to rent-seeking activities such as payoffs 
from lobby groups21 or preferences for bureaucratic “empire building”22. The former would 
imply a negative relationship between the strength of the alcohol industry and prohibition 
as per the regulatory capture prediction. Empire-building may result in prohibition if 
bureaucrats seek to create “Prohibition Departments” or expand the scope and size of 
the police force. In fact, the qualitative evidence suggests that Prohibition Departments 
tend to exist long after the end of prohibition. This inertia results in strong incentives for 
bureaucrats to increase the size of government via policies like prohibition which are often 
short-lived.
The enactment of prohibition may be conditional on several other variables. Specifi­
cally, prohibition (and the type enacted) may depend on the ability of State Treasuries to 
withstand the fall in state excise revenue without jeopardizing other elements of government 
expenditure. An important factor in determining this is the relationship of the state with 
the centre and its ability to elicit centre-state transfers. For example, non-alcohol produc­
ing states may enact prohibition policies as the financial constraint of lower state excise 
is not binding for them, and as it may enable them to receive more centre-state transfers. 
In addition, as prohibition effectively closes markets for alcohol in non-producing states, it 
reduces state excise revenues of the producing states.
Prohibition enactment may also depend on its perceived efficiency or popularity. If 
more states enact prohibition legislation there may be increased impetus for prohibition 
as individual preferences change or its actual effectiveness/inefficiency is witnessed. On 
the other hand, the relative gains from prohibition may also shift as more states enact 
alcohol controlling policies. If the latter induces the alcohol industry to move to non­
prohibition states, the marginal benefit of prohibition versus taxation decreases. In addition, 
if prohibition is related to central extraction, as more states enact prohibition, the marginal 
benefit from prohibition decreases as the magnitude of the rent left to extract falls. On the
21 It may also be the case that prohibition is used as retaliation by politicians against alcohol producers 
who refused to pay bribes.
22 Note that the grabbing hand view does not necessary imply inefficiency. Rather the creation of rents for 
bureaucrats and politicians leads to inefficiency due to bureaucratic red-tape and because pursued policies 
to create rents are distortionary (Djankov el al (2002)).
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other hand, as the relative share of central rents fall more prohibition may ensue as states 
compete to maintain existing central transfer shares.
2.3.2 Econom etric Strategy
The above hypotheses are analysed by estimating models of the following form:
P at =  o  +  fiXgt +  7  Zat +  S s  +  St +  Eat (2*1)
where Pst is the measure of prohibition policy, X at is a vector of potential determinants 
of prohibition, Z8t is a vector of state controls, s3 and St are state and year fixed effects, 
and Eat is the error term. State fixed effects are included in the specification to control for 
state-specific time-invariant variables which may affect prohibition legislation such as static 
preferences for prohibition versus other forms of alcohol control, or a greater incidence 
of alcohol-related problems. Year fixed-effects control for federal-level variables varying 
annually which may affect prohibition policy. These include central government ideology 
such as the Gandhian stance on prohibition, and changes in political ideology such as a 
shift towards libertarian or market-based views. State-year effects were not included as 
this would effectively eliminate much of the variation in the data. Given this, the strategy 
does not control for changes within states over time which drive support for or against 
prohibition. As such, the main identification is from within states over time, and hence 
the exercise addresses the question of what determines prohibition policy within states as 
opposed to across states.
Equation 2.1 was estimated using generalized least squares (GLS) allowing for het- 
eroskedasticity with each state having its own error variance. The error term, e8u was mod­
elled as an AR(1) disturbance term with state-specific autocorrelation i.e. s8t = pE8t~ \+ ust. 
In light of the potential simultaneity bias all right hand side variables were lagged to the 
previous election for political variables (such as party identity and proportion of female 
legislatures), and to the previous year for variables such as the crime rate and number of 
accidental deaths.
The analysis was repeated using the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator with Huber-
37
White estimates of the standard error clustered at the state level. The GLS AR(1) estimates 
are efficient if the panel heteroskedastic and error correlation assumption are correct. On 
the other hand, OLS robust cluster estimates are always consistent though not fully efficient. 
The two models also have differing asymptotic properties. With GLS one estimates variance 
parameters for each panel (and/or covariances between panels) - the estimates therefore 
require many time-periods for consistency. The OLS robust clustered estimator treats each 
cluster as a superobservation in its contribution to the variance estimate. This requires 
many cluster/panels to fulfil the rank condition of the variance matrix. For the dataset 
used in this analysis the number of panels is relatively small (16) and time period large 
(44). Therefore, the GLS is assumed to be the more suitable estimator with respect to its 
asymptotic properties.
GLS AR(1) estimates are reported as both estimators give similar results for the ma­
jority of models estimated in this Chapter. However, in one case, the OLS robust cluster 
estimator gave slightly different results, indicating tha t the GLS AR(1) model may be mis- 
specified with respect to its assumptions. In an attem pt to resolve this discrepancy, the 
error assumptions in the GLS AR(1) model were re-examined to better fit the data but 
some differences remained. These are noted in the discussion of the results for the party 
variables which the OLS robust cluster model found to be jointly significant but the GLS 
AR(1) did not.
Table 2.2 reports summary statistics for the main variables in the analysis. The dataset 
is drawn from a wide variety of sources detailed in the Data Appendix. The main sample 
is a state-level panel dataset of the 16 major Indian states23 over 1957-2001. The empirical 
strategy is to estimate Equation 2.1 using a basic set of controls and then include theorized 
determinants of prohibition, as captured in X at , separately. The first set of determinants 
examined capture standard political economy variables. These include the timing of the 
electoral cycle, proportion of seats in the state parliament by political party grouping, politi­
cal competition, and the sex and caste of legislatures. Next, the effect of the alcohol industry 
was analysed to assess the power of lobbying in influencing prohibition. This together with
23These are Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, 
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. 
Together they cover over 95% of India’s population.
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the analysis of state finances and the proportion of other states enacting prohibition shed 
light on whether states use prohibition to compete with each other for central resources. 
The last set of variables examine the association between the negative private and social 
effects of alcohol consumption and prohibition policy to infer whether there is any basis for 
the helping hand view of government regulation. The basic results from this exercise were 
then extended to examine the relationship between the major determinants of prohibition, 
understand the impetus behind prohibition policies, and assess the evidence for the two 
main theories of regulation.
2.4 Results
Table 2.3 shows estimates of Equation 2.1 including state controls only. The results show 
that richer states are less likely to pass complete prohibition legislation and more likely to 
pass partial prohibition. However, state income per capita is not significant in determining 
alcohol prohibition in any specification. On the other hand, urbanization is significantly and 
negatively associated with prohibition -  i.e. more urban states are less likely to enact pro­
hibition24. This suggests that urbanization, which ranges from 33% in Tamil Nadu to 10% 
in Assam, may be related to factors negatively associated with prohibition. Chapter 3 will 
show that urban households have lower participate in, and consume less, alcohol than rural 
households. In addition, prohibition affects urban consumption significantly more relative 
to rural households. Urbanization may therefore be correlated with lower alcohol-related 
negative effects as well as higher preferences for libertarian policies. Urbanization may 
also indicate a more developed or efficient tax administration system such that regulation 
of alcohol consumption occurs via taxation as opposed to prohibition. It is interesting to 
note that alcohol factories tend to be located near urban centres which suggests that urban 
constituencies’ preferences may be shaped by economic dependence on the alcohol industry 
or targeted campaigning by alcohol factories. Urbanization is not significant for proportion 
of population under arrack prohibition or partial prohibition which is expected given that
24 State income per capita was excluded from the analysis which follows as the F-test for per capita state 
income and urbanization is significant only at the 10% and the inclusion of per capita state income would 
reduce the sample by 55 observations. As a robustness check, all estimates reported were replicated including 
per capita state income as a control - the results reported were found to hold.
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preferences for arrack are lower in urban households (see Chapter 3). This suggests that 
factors such as tastes may be important in driving the type of prohibition enacted25.
2.4.1 T he Electoral Cycle
If prohibition is due to politicians seeking to win political favour, one would expect en­
actment to be related to the electoral cycle. In particular, we would expect a policy like 
prohibition, which significantly changes production patterns in the economy and receives 
considerable media attention, to occur in the post-election phase when the winning party 
has relatively strong support and is introducing reforms in other spheres. This would also be 
the natural timing of policy if parties stood, and won, on prohibition platforms. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests this may be the case, for example in Andhra Pradesh in the mid 1990s. 
The Telegu Desam Party (TDP), the opposition party, worked with a large grass-roots 
movement for complete prohibition. When the TDP won the state elections with a signif­
icant majority overthrowing Congress, within one month of elections it enacted complete 
prohibition across the state.
Table 2.4 corroborates this hypothesis - the year of election is found to be a positive 
and significant determinant of complete prohibition legislation. This result holds once the 
endogeneity of election year is instrumented using a variable based on election cycle rules26 
(Columns 3 and 4). The analysis was repeated for pre-election years of 1-5 periods, and 
the immediate post election year but none of the coefficients were found to be significant. 
These results for complete prohibition also hold for arrack and partial prohibition.
25 In addition to state controls, the effects of potential shocks to food production on prohibition were 
examined. Measures include dummy variables for droughts and floods, food grain production per capita, 
and measures of flood damage (real value of crops affected per capita, real total value of damage per 
capita, and real total value household goods affected per capita). None of these variables were found to be 
significant in determining prohibition. Measures of poverty (headcount ratio) and income inequality (income 
gini coefficient) were also analysed and were found to be insignificant.
26 Election year in this specification is endogenous as elections can be called by the state government in 
any year within five years of the last election. Consequently it could be argued that elections are held when 
incumbent popularity is high enabling policies like prohibition to be passed. Alternately, if voters want 
prohibition, incumbents may pass prohibition legislation and then call elections. I instrument for the year 
of election following Khemani (2004) and define the fifth year after every election, starting from the first 
year when state elections were held, as an election year regardless of whether an election occurred or not. 
This has the advantage that it is more likely to be exogenous to state-level policies and gives greater weight 
to events that occurred earlier in time. The instrument is fairly correlated with the actual election variable 
with a correlation coefficient of 0.35.
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2.4.2 Political Parties
Party identity may be an important determinant of prohibition due to ideology or historical 
association with voters along sex, religious or class lines. During much of the period of study, 
Congress was the main political force in power - both in federal and state governments. How­
ever, the political scene has fragmented in recent decades with the emergence of important 
left, Hindu nationalist, and regional parties. Prohibition does not appear to be closely as­
sociated with a specific party or part of the political spectrum. It is also difficult to identify 
libertarian parties, who would be relatively opposed to paternalism, from the available party 
manifestos and qualitative literature. Furthermore, rural constituencies, which the previous 
results suggest are correlated with prohibition, are not clearly segmented along party lines. 
W hat can be inferred is that while Congress has broad support amongst the rural poor 
across India, the left and Janata parties also have strong support in selected states. In 
addition, Hindu nationalist parties have popular support amongst scheduled castes. Urban 
constituencies are similarly difficult to categorize along party lines. Although, Congress has 
strong support among the urban working class who form the urban voting majority, the 
preferences of urban constituencies are often influenced by the urban middle-class whose 
party delineation is unclear. These observations regarding the non-specificity of prohibition 
with respect to parties is confirmed by a cursory glance at the data. They show that over 
the sample period, prohibition has been implemented by a wide variety of political groups 
and have often being reversed by the same parties at a later date27.
The issue of party identity was analysed by including the lagged share of seats of dif­
ferent groups in the state legislature in Equation 2.128. The results show no significant 
difference in enacting complete prohibition legislation between national parties, who com­
pete federally across multiple states, and regional parties, who compete in specific states or
27Naidu and Banu (1992).
28 An alternative approach to party identity is to aggregate parties by ideology irrespective of whether 
they are national or state parties. So, for example, all Congress parties were amalgamated such that Indian 
National Congress (INC) and the Kerala Congress (KEC) were treated as one. This approach controls for 
party-level decision-making regarding ideology irrespective of the political goals of the party segments. It 
also accounts for the possibility that splinter-groups and closely associated parties may choose to undertake 
the policies of the "mother" party. The latter may be particular important in states with a history of 
coalition governments. Aggregating parties via ideological lines corroborates the insignificant association of 
party identity with prohibition.
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regions (Column 1, Table 2.5). National parties were then disaggregated into the following 
five categories29: (i) Congress Party (Indian National Congress +  Indian Congress Socialist 
4- Indian National Congress URS +  Indian National Congress Organization), (ii) Janata 
Party (Janata Party -f Janata Dal +  Lok Dal Party), (iii) Hard Left parties (Communist 
Party of India +  Communist Party of India Marxist), (iv) Soft Left parties (Socialist Party 
+  Praja Socialist Party), and (v) Hindu parties (Bhartiya Janata Party +  Bhartiya Jana 
Sangh). The results show no statistical difference between the party groups with respect to 
their disposition towards prohibition legislation (Column 2). Party identity was also found 
to be insignificant for arrack and partial prohibition.
In so far as party ideology is concerned, alcohol control policies such as prohibition may 
be more prevalent in parties formed along religious lines. In particular, given that Islam 
prohibits alcohol consumption for its followers, "Muslim” parties may be more inclined to 
have prohibition relative to others. To this end I separate out the parties with "Islamic" 
names from both the national and state groups as they were the most explicit religious 
group (aside from the Hindu parties) which could be distinguished from the party name30. 
Party formation along religious lines does not appear to positively determine prohibition 
(Column 4, Table 2.5). In fact, the share of Muslim party seats is negative and significantly 
different to all parties (including independent) in driving prohibition, implying Muslim 
parties have lower preferences for prohibition. The negative result is likely to be due to 
spurious correlation in that Muslim parties are represented in states which have had limited 
prohibition periods for other factors e.g. Jammu and Kashmir. This is not to say that 
religion itself does not affect prohibition either in the form of party policies or political 
pressure, but that given the disaggregation of party ideology available and the small sample 
of religion-based parties, it is not possible to detect the causal impact of religion. In fact, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that religious groups often compete politically simply to stand 
on the prohibition platform. This is the case of the coalition of "Sadhus, Maulanas, and
29 Note that state parties are not further disaggregated as common groupings amongst them are rare. 
When state parties are disaggregated into main state parties and other registered state parties there is no 
significant difference between them in enacting prohibition.
30 Although subjective, this was the simplest way of identifying Muslim parties as there are hundreds of 
parties in the other registered and non-registered grouping, not all of which have manifestos easily available. 
The approach taken therefore identifies a subset of Muslim parties as only parties with Islam or Muslim in 
their name were included.
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Bishops for total liquor ban" - a small group of Hindu, Muslim, and Christian clergy who 
campaign for total prohibition across Indian states31.
Given the shift towards coalition governments in many states and the predominance 
of the Chief Minister in determining party policy, the party identity of Chief Ministers32 
was also examined (Column 5). The results show that overall party identity of the Chief 
Minister does not reflect significant distinctions in prohibition preferences between parties, 
relative to each other or to independents. The exception to this are Hard Left parties who 
are (weakly) less likely to be associated with prohibition relative to Congress, Janata, Hindu 
and Regional parties. In addition, Congress is found to be less likely to be associated with 
prohibition relative to the Janata Party.
In all the estimates in Table 2.5 the F-test of joint significance of party variables is 
insignificant implying that party identity is not an important factor in determining prohi­
bition policy. However, OLS robust cluster estimates (Column 3) find the party variables 
to be jointly significant at the 1% level33. In spite of this result, there are no significant dif­
ferences between the main party groups in determining prohibition for the OLS estimates, 
although most parties were found to be pro-prohibition relative to Other parties. F-tests for 
the joint significance of Chief Minister’s party were insignificant for both GLS AR(1) and 
OLS robust cluster estimates. The lack of an identifiable association between party identity 
and prohibition policy may be due to several factors. There may be limited variation in the 
political groups as Congress dominated the political scene up to the late 1970s. Secondly, 
the rise of coalition governments during the 1990s, implies that unless prohibition was one 
of the main issues in the party mandate, enacting prohibition policy would be much harder 
if this was solely on the basis of party ideology. This, together with the rise of regional par­
ties and personality politics, meant that the identity of the Chief Minister, rather than the 
party itself, was the key factor in pushing policies through. Bearing these caveats in mind 
the results, together with the qualitative evidence, indicate that prohibition is not part of
31 Asian Age, 6th July 1998.
32 In coalition governments Chief Ministers are usually appointed from the majority party or the strongest 
in the coalition of parties. In cases where there are two dominant parties in the coalition, the position of 
Chief Minister usually alternates.
33 F-tests (and P-values) of joint significance of the party variables using the OLS robust cluster estimator 
for the other models in Table 2.6 are 2.82 (0.075), 5.69 (0.002), and 0.84 (0.560) for Columns 1, 4, and 5 
respectively.
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the core mandate of political parties in Indian state politics and point to the possibility that 
it is a policy enacted in response to particular circumstances. The following sections further 
explore what these circumstances may be by assessing the relationship between prohibition 
and political competition, characteristics of legislatures, and lobby group pressure.
2.4.3 Political C om petition
The result on year of election indicates that prohibition is related to politicians seeking to 
win votes. The political economy literature notes that political competition may enhance the 
responsiveness of political agents to voters’ preferences by making incumbents less secure. 
The extent of competition may therefore affect the probability of prohibition policy being 
enacted such that it is enacted more during periods of low political competition. For 
incumbents, more competition in the form of a larger consolidated opposition may make 
it harder to pass legislation per se, and prohibition legislation in particular, if this reflects 
party ideology rather than the campaign manifesto.
Following Besley and Burgess (2000) I measure political competition as the absolute 
difference between the number of seats held by the majority party and its main competitor34. 
The extent of political competition in the legislature does not significantly affect the passage 
of prohibition policy (Columns 1 and 2, Table 2.6). This further strengthens the result that 
prohibition is not related to party ideology but is included in the campaign manifesto as a 
measure to win votes. This follows as the results show that when parties win, prohibition 
platforms cannot be easily blocked by the opposition. Whether parties respond differently 
to political competition with respect to enactment of prohibition was examined by including 
interactions of the proportion of party seats with political competition. Overall when the 
power of the main opposition party is low, the higher the proportion of seats won by other 
parties, the more prohibition legislation is observed. In particular, the interactions show 
that given a specific level of competition, Hard Left parties are less likely to have prohibition 
relative to all parties except the Soft Left grouping. These results suggest that when the
34 This is slightly different from the Besley and Burgess measure who take the absolute difference between 
the number of seats held by Congress, which was the dominant party over 1958-1992 (their period of study), 
and its main competitor. This approach was not used in the analysis as since 1992, there have been several 
states where Congress is no longer the dominant party in power. Nevertheless, the original Besley and 
Burgess measure was used as a robustness check to corroborate the results presented.
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opposition is more fragmented it is easier for incumbents to pass prohibition legislation, 
perhaps due to greater ease in passing legislation in general.
If prohibition policy is factored in at the campaign stage it may be illustrative to exam­
ine electoral competition further. The analysis of political competition above can be seen 
as a proxy for both legislature competition (difficulty of majority party in enacting reforms) 
and electoral competition (the threat of the opposition when campaigning for votes). In 
addition, it is useful to examine the number of parties running in elections as a measure of 
the dispersion of political ideology. One might hypothesize that the greater the number of 
parties running the more likely prohibition policies are to be part of campaign manifestos 
as parties attempt to differentiate between each other. On the other hand, electoral compe­
tition may induce the major parties to converge to similar policies as no one wants to take a 
risk on a new policy (given no link between prohibition and ideology). Columns 3 and 4 of 
Table 2.6 show that the party choice spectrum is not significant in determining prohibition 
policy corroborating the earlier result on political competition. Table 2.6 also includes the 
number of contestants per seat as a measure of political competition. Although this measure 
is more diffuse compared to the previous two, it may be indicative of competition partic­
ularly from independent candidates. This may be more relevant in the first three decades 
since Independence when district level politics were dominant and where personality politics 
may have overridden the influence of state level party ideologies. The implication is that 
individuals could more easily adopt prohibition stances in particular locals. However, the 
number of contestants per seat is also found not to be significant in determining prohibition 
policy.
2.4 .4  Legislature Identity
The characteristics of politicians, in particular gender and caste, may be an important deter­
minant of state policy. In a standard political economy model (for example, Downs(1957)) 
where politicians are vote maximizers and can pre-commit, politician’s policy choices should 
reflect the preferences of the electorate and not be related to their individual characteristics. 
However, research by Kalt and Zupan (1984) and Levitt (1996) shows that legislature ide­
ology is a key determinant of policy outcomes even after controlling for the party line and
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voter preferences. There is also evidence of legislature composition effects on policy choice. 
Pande (2003) finds that caste reservation in Indian states has in turn increased targeted 
transfers to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (SC/STs). This is further corroborated 
by Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2001) who find that female legislatures in local governments 
in rural India behave differently relative to men such that their policy choices appear to 
better reflect female preferences. Together these findings lend support to recent politi­
cal economy models such as Besley and Coate’s (1997) citizen-candidate approach where 
legislature identity influences policy outcomes over and above voter preferences.
Sex of Politicians
The sex of elected officials may be particularly important with respect to prohibition as the 
qualitative evidence indicates that women on average tend to favour prohibition policy (Ku- 
mari and Salaam, (1997); Pathak (1985); Reddy and Patnaik (1993)). A key proponent of 
the prohibition movement since the 1980s was NGOs working with women’s welfare groups 
who collaborated with anti-liquor movements to campaign for stricter alcohol regulation. 
That women may have difference policy preferences to men is not a new hypothesis and 
has been observed widely in previous work in the US by Shapiro and Mahajan (1986), Lott 
(1999), Alesina and La Ferrara (2002), and Edlund and Pande (2003). If these preferences 
spill over to politician’s preferences, as in citizen-candidate models, then female legislatures 
are more likely to be associated with female-oriented platforms simply because it reflects 
their own ideology35. A similar argument emphasizes that, regardless of the legislature’s 
preferences over prohibition, if prohibition policies were bundled with other family-oriented 
policies which female politicians may have a preference for, we would find a positive relation­
ship between the proportion of female politicians in the state government and prohibition 
policy.
Female politicians or state legislatures with a high proportion of females may be more 
associated with female-centric policies for several other reasons. If there is imperfect in­
formation about voter preferences, a high proportion of females elected may signal a high
35 Note that voter perception of politician’s type simply by their sex will not in itself produce the same 
result as in this framework politicians cannot commit to a policy choice misaligned to their preferences.
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preference for female-oriented policies by the electorate. Therefore, the legislature as a 
whole may pursue such policies regardless of the preferences of any individual female politi­
cian. In addition, women’s welfare lobby groups may differentially target female politicians 
as a more legitimate vehicle to voice their concerns over family welfare and health issues. 
As the proportion of female legislatures increase this may have a magnifying effect as the 
perceived legitimacy of such concerns increases over the whole legislature.
Table 2.7 reports estimates of the effect of the proportion of state government female 
legislatures on complete prohibition. As female representation may be driven by party 
ideology - parties with a higher proportion of female candidates may also be parties with 
more liberal policy platforms -  party controls were included in Column 2. The basic esti­
mates indicate that the sex of the legislature has no effect on prohibition policy, although 
in some specifications there is a weak positive coefficient. When the share of female seats is 
instrumented using female literacy rates to ameliorate endogeneity concerns36, the results 
show that legislatures with more female politicians significantly favour less prohibition of 
all types. Interactions of the share of party seats with those of female legislatures show that 
women in the Congress party are less likely to enact prohibition relative to women in Hard 
Left parties.
There are several possible reasons for this observed negative effect. If one believes 
that female politicians reflect female preferences then their correlation with less prohibition 
would imply that the female electorate has a lower preference for paternalism relative to 
men. However, the proportion of voter turnout that is female is not significantly associated 
with prohibition which is hard to reconcile with the qualitative evidence on the role of 
women in advocating prohibition in India and in the US in the 1920s37. Furthermore, 
interactions of the sex of the turnout with legislature characteristics are not significant in 
determining prohibition.
36 Female politicians may be endogenous as prohibition platforms or past prohibition may have increased 
the chance of females being elected. The identifying restriction is that female literacy is highly correlated 
with female politicians in the state legislature but orthogonal to prohibition policy. While overidentification 
tests are not possible, reduced form estimates of female literacy on prohibition find insignificant results. This 
indicates that the channel through which female literacy works is via female legislatures which is consistent 
with an empowerment story.
37 The proportion of the female electorate which voted was also found to be insignificantly related to 
prohibition.
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An alternative explanation is that female representation is proxying for higher state-level 
female empowerment. Given the literature on the political gender gap (Edlund and Pande 
(2003), Alesina and La Ferrara (2002)38, one would expect periods of greater empowerment 
to be correlated with less government as women no longer require the state to intervene in 
the case of missing markets. Within such a framework, women would no longer patronize 
prohibition as they would not require such paternalistic policies to gain greater control of 
household resources or improve their individual welfare.
The observed negative result may arise as female legislatures may be less inclined to 
promote radical policies like prohibition. Female politicians may be less secure in their 
constituencies due to shorter tenure and/or more political competition and may be dis­
proportionately elected in legislatures with less effective power (the so-called desirability 
hypothesis)39. We would therefore expect to observe the negative relationship between 
female politicians and prohibition policy if this effect is not controlled for. The effect 
of the desirability hypothesis was explored by including the population per constituency 
seat40as a measure of the effective power of the state legislature. While the quality of seat 
is negatively related to the proportion of female politicians it is insignificant in affecting 
prohibition, hence the negative effect on female politicians on prohibition remains.
Caste of Politicians
Another identifiable characteristic of legislatures is whether they belong to the scheduled 
caste or scheduled tribe group. Given Pande’s (2003) result and that Chapter 3 finds 
alcohol consumption to be significantly higher for SC/STs, we may expect preferences for 
prohibition to differ along caste and tribe lines. Table 2.8 shows that scheduled legislatures
38 Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) find that women in general have a higher preference for redistributive 
policies, a proxy for larger government and general government intervention in markets. This differential 
may be due to lower income, greater risk adversity or a lower equality of opportunity. Edlund and Pande 
(2003) find that female preferences for the Democratic party, and hence liberal redistributive policies, is 
higher when there is greater prevalence of divorce which is posited to be correlated with falls in women’s 
income.
39 The desirability hypothesis states that female politicians are overrepresented in legislatures of poorer 
quality or with less effective power either due to lack of male competition or due to electorate bias in voting 
women disproportionately into positions of less importance (MacManus and Bullock (1995)).
40 There is substantial variation in this variable - from 49 to 385 adults per seat. Population controls were 
included in the models using this variable.
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have a preference for prohibition policies, and that this effect is driven by SC politicians41. 
This effect does not vary by sex of scheduled caste politicians. The differential effect by 
SC and ST legislatures is interesting - drinking is significantly higher for both groups, so 
one would expect the associated preferences for prohibition to be similar. One reason for 
the divergence may be that alcohol consumption comprises an integral part of the social 
custom and norm of many scheduled tribes42 which is not the case for SCs in general. This 
cultural aspect of alcohol consumption may temper prohibition preferences amongst STs.
The finding that female and SC legislatures are associated with prohibition policies 
despite no significant preferences for prohibition amongst voters43 or party groups suggests 
that prohibition is not enacted to reflect the preferences of the average electorate. It may 
therefore arise due to politicians reflecting the views of preferred constituencies, individual 
preferences, or those of lobby parties such as alcohol factories or anti-liquor groups.
2.4.5 A lcohol Lobby Power
Under the grabbing hand view of government regulation, the role of the alcohol lobby in 
the policy process is an important determinant of prohibition policy. The literature on 
pressure group politics purports that lobbying affects policy choices in three main ways. 
In the menu-auction approach (Grossman and Helpman (1996a)), lobby groups compete to 
influence policy decisions by offering policy-makers policy conditional favours e.g. transfers 
or patronage. Alternately, lobbies can affect the possible policy spectrum by contributing 
to election campaigns and hence influencing the probability of election for the candidate 
or party. Lobbies can also align themselves with particular parties or form parties based 
on their group ideology. Within this framework, campaign contributions buy the votes of 
impressionable voters or act as a signal of candidates’ positions on particular policy issues 
(Austen-Smith (1986), Baron (1994), Grossman and Helpman (1996a)). Finally lobbying 
activity can be interpreted to provide information to policy-makers regarding voter prefer­
41 The proportion of scheduled tribe seats is weakly significant in Column 2 but loses significance once 
population controls for total SC/ST population are included. These are not included in every specification 
as data re available only up to 1991.
42 For example, toddy is served at all important events such as marriage, birth, and divorce and an 
important part of the rituals connected with death (Saldanha (1995)).
43 Caste of voters was not available.
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ence intensity (Lohmann (1994)).
Pressure groups in India are inextricably linked to the political decision-making process 
by way of party finance or party ideology despite legislation banning direct political dona­
tions44. Amongst them, business interest groups, such as the Federation of Indian Chambers 
of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), are widely regarded as being the most influential45, 
playing an active part in India’s Constitutional Reforms, Five Year Plans, and numerous 
government Advisory Boards and Parliamentary Committees46. In the context of alcohol 
policy, business groups such as the All India Distillers Association and All India Breweries 
Association play an important role in lobbying state governments and promoting the ob­
jectives of the alcohol business community. In addition, in most states, “liquor lobbies”, 
comprising of the main regional alcohol companies, are heavily involved in party campaign 
finance and policy influence. For example, in June 2003 the Samata Party president de­
clared that much of Karnataka politics was driven by the policy preferences of liquor lobbies 
and urged party leaders to avoid their influence47; in Kerala the United Democratic Front’s 
(UDF) election manifesto declared it would scrap the incumbent Left Democratic Front’s 
(LDF) strict liquor policy if it came into power due to its alleged connection with the al­
cohol industry48; while in Madhya Pradesh Chief Minister Digvijay Singh and the Excise 
Minister allegedly received kickbacks of RslO crores and Rs2 crores respectively from the 
owners of Som Distilleries49.
The main attempts of the Indian alcohol industry at policy influence focus on creating 
artificial barriers to entry, indiscriminate issue of licenses and permits, lower state excise
44The Companies Act of 1913 and 1956 did not initially allow for political donations in cash. However, in 
1960 a new section (Section 293A) was added which permitted a company to contribute to political parties 
(or political purposes) Rs25000 or 5% of its net profit in the last three financial years, whichever was higher. 
This was as long as the details of such donations were shown in the companies’ profit and loss accounts. In 
1969 there was total ban on political donations initiated by the lack of implementation of the previous act. 
Companies by-passed this ban by contributing heavily for high-rate advertising space in party newspapers 
and periodicals, or purchasing party souvenirs. This resulted in significant contributions for example, in 
1977, 882 companies contributed approximately Rs8 crores to political parties.
45 For example, the FICCI saw that the provision in the Representation of People Bill (No.2, 1950) which 
disqualified a trader or businessman from being elected as a Member of Parliament or State Legislature was 
deleted. This later became an Act.
46These include Advisory Committees on Capital Issues, Board of Trade, Export Promotion, and Customs 
and Central Excise amongst others.
47Times of India, 8th June 2003.
48The Hindu, 29th April, 2001.
49“Mr Clean fights back”, The Week, 16th September 2001.
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rates, and biased alcohol regulation. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the alcohol industry 
frequently lobbies for the prohibition of home and locally brewed alcohol, such as toddy, to 
increase market shares of factory-produced alcohol such as arrack and IMFL50. We should 
therefore expect states and/or periods with powerful alcohol lobbies to be associated with 
lower periods of complete prohibition and potentially lower partial prohibition insofar as 
this is prohibition of alcohol produced in large distilleries. I estimate the effect of the 
alcohol industry on prohibition using the number of state alcohol factories which includes 
all registered distilleries, beer and wine manufacturing plants. The mean for this variable is 
10 factories across the sample but varies widely across states from an average of 18 in the 6 
alcohol producing states to 5 in the remaining. As such, the number of alcohol factories is 
a proxy for the power of the liquor lobby as no data on the extent of lobbying activity, and 
hence influence, is available. However, it is likely to be correlated with the overall size of 
the alcohol industry (as measured by production or profits) and thereby alcohol lobbying 
activity.
The estimates in Table 2.9 show that alcohol factories are weakly and negatively related 
to the proportion of population under complete prohibition policy51. However, the model 
in Column 1 suffers from endogeneity bias as past prohibition may influence the size of 
the alcohol industry. To correct for this, the alcohol industry variable was instrumented 
with a measure of labour regulation which identifies pro-worker, neutral, and pro-employer 
labour regulations from State Amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act and accumulated 
over time (Column 4) 52. The estimates show that the size of the alcohol industry is not 
significantly related to the proportion of the population under complete prohibition (Column 
2) but is significantly associated with periods of complete prohibition across the whole state 
(Column 5). This result also holds for arrack and partial prohibition. The alcohol industry 
therefore lobbies more strongly against prohibition enacted across the whole state rather
50 “Coconut Punch”, The Week, 28th October 2001.
51 Whether certain parties are more receptive to lobby group power was also investigated. I find that the 
alcohol lobby is party neutral in influencing the state legislature. This may be because lobbying is carried 
out across all party lines irrespective of identity, as one would expect if the lobby wanted to maximize the 
chances pro-alcohol legislation.
52This measure was derived by Besley and Burgess (2004). Given that accumulated legislation may 
indicate a more active state, and hence one more prone to enact legislation, the analysis was repeated using 
non-cumulated measure of labor regulation. All results were found to hold.
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than in selected regions. This follows given the effect state-wide prohibition has on the 
market for alcohol.
The effect of manufacturing on prohibition was examined as a robustness check to as­
certain that it is the alcohol industry specifically which is driving the negative result and 
not industrial development as a whole (Columns 3 and 6). The insignificant result provides 
strong evidence that the negative result on alcohol prohibition is being driven by alcohol 
producers. As an additional robustness check all the independent variables were lagged one 
election period to control further for the effects of past prohibition on alcohol industry size. 
All the above results were found to hold under this specification.
The result that prohibition policies axe enacted in states where there is a smaller alcohol 
industry confirms Munger and Schaller’s (1997) finding for the US National Prohibition that 
prohibition was, in part, due to alcohol producers’ interests failing to mobilize effectively 
in 1919. By 1933, the alcohol lobby, despite suffering significant economic losses, managed 
to organise into an effective, and powerful, lobby to precipitate the repeal of the Eigh­
teenth Amendment which enacted prohibition. This result, together with the finding that 
prohibition occurs in election years, indicate strong support for the grabbing hand view of 
government. Given that alcohol production is not significantly related to consumption, it 
cannot be argued that this negative effect is due to higher alcohol consumption and hence 
higher negative effects of alcohol. Under one interpretation of the grabbing hand view of 
government, regulation is pursued by political actors to extract rents from lobby groups in 
the form of campaign contributions or bribes. While the analysis could not measure this 
directly, the finding that alcohol policy is weaker in alcohol producing states suggests that 
alcohol industry lobbying is a crucial factor in ensuring that prohibition legislation does not 
occur.
2.4.6 The R ole o f S tate Finances 
State Tax Systems
The helping hand view of government regulation implies, amongst other things, that in 
the presence of market failures prohibition may be efficiency improving if taxation systems 
are weak and unable to affect alcohol demand functions. We should therefore expect to
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observe prohibition during periods of weak tax administration or in states where the tax 
base is small. A simple indicator of the development of the tax system is the ratio of tax 
revenue to gross domestic product (GDP). This is found to be insignificant in determining 
prohibition of any kind (Column 1, Table 2.10). Alternate indicators for the development 
of the taxation system are the proportion of non-tax revenues in state finances53 and the 
proportion of sales taxes in total tax revenue. Higher non-tax revenues indicate inability 
to raise funds via taxation and reduce the financial constraint on governments who wish to 
enact prohibition and therefore should be correlated positively with it. Higher shares of sales 
taxes indicate an underdeveloped tax system, due to lack of infrastructure or compliance, 
such that indirect taxes are easier to collect. The econometric analysis finds that these 
measures are also insignificant in driving prohibition legislation.
The results therefore indicate that prohibition is not enacted due to underdeveloped 
tax systems where tax policy is ineffective, from an institutional perspective, in curtailing 
alcohol demand. However, a key factor in the policy choice between prohibition and taxation 
in reducing alcohol consumption is the elasticity of alcohol demand. The exiting research for 
India is mixed with some studies finding evidence of price inelasticity (Reddy and Patnaik 
(1993); NCAER (2001)) and others finding that demand is elastic for specific segments of 
the function for particular demographic groups (Mahal (2000)). While cultural preferences, 
amongst other factors, may give rise to varying elasticities, the literature in developed 
countries have found strong evidence that alcohol is price elastic and affected by taxation 
over large parts of the demand curve54. Taken together, the results suggest that the impetus 
for prohibition versus taxation is not driven solely on the basis of which is the most efficient 
tool for reducing alcohol consumption and may be driven by other factors.
State Excise
The composition of state finances, in particular the reliance of public finances on state- 
raised receipts, is likely to be an important determinant of prohibition policy as it may
53Non-tax revenues are, on average, 37% of states revenues and range from 25% in West Bengal and Tamil 
Nadu to over 70% in Jammu and Kashmir. The major components of non-tax revenues are central grants 
and state non-tax receipts which include: interest receipts, dividends and profits, royalty receipts and fees 
due from government provided services.
54 See Cook and Moore (1999) for a review of the existing research.
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affect the financial capacity of the state government. The key component of state finances 
affected by prohibition is state excise which is raised mainly from taxes on the production 
and manufacture of potable alcohol55. State excise revenue can be a significant proportion 
of state finance, ranging up to 23% of total revenues in some cases. The relationship 
between state excise and prohibition is also important from the perspective of policy levers 
as governments may choose to influence demand via taxation rather than prohibition, given 
alcohol price elasticity56. We should therefore expect to see a negative relationship between 
the two variables as per the results in Table 2.10 which show that states with a higher 
proportion of revenues from state excise enact less prohibition57. This effect holds when 
state excise is lagged to the previous election. The result is as expected firstly, because 
higher alcohol taxation may in itself be an alternative to prohibition in curtailing alcohol 
demand; and secondly because higher state excise may indicate a larger alcohol industry and 
hence a larger, more powerful, liquor lobby58. The analysis focuses on state excise collected 
rather than the actual state excise rate, which is more precise in examining the policy 
choice between prohibition and tax rates, as data on the latter is limited and subject to 
comparability problems both within states and across time59. For the question under study, 
actual revenue shares have the advantage that they represent the burden of prohibition for 
the state budget more accurately as higher excise rates are not necessarily indicative of 
higher state excise revenues.
55 State excise is also levied on opium, Indian hemp, and other narcotics but this forms a relatively small 
proportion of receipts.
56 Abraham (1995); Mahal (2000).
5 7 The interaction of the party variables with the share of state excise in total revenue shows no party 
effect on prohibition given the level of state excise.
58 The latter applies only when comparing state excise rates to prohibition periods where the effective excise 
rate is 100%. Once we exclude prohibition years, it could also be argued that high state excise revenues are 
indicative of weaker alcohol lobbies as they may reflect high excise tax rates. It should also be noted that 
state excise and prohibition need not be two ends of the policy spectrum and could be positively correlated 
with high state excise rates being a precursor to stricter regulation of alcohol via prohibition.
59State excise rates can be levied by alcohol type, volume (cases, bottles or liters), or concentration and 
can be lump-sum, percentages or a mixture of both making calculation of an average state excise rate prone 
to large margins of error.
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C en tra l Excise
Another important element of state finance is transfers from the central government. Central 
revenues may be important in determining prohibition as ex ante, prohibition may be used 
by states to extract rents from the centre if state raised revenues are low and likely to be 
unaffected by prohibition, that is state excise and sales tax revenues from alcohol axe small. 
Ex post, states may lobby for increased resource transfers during prohibition periods due 
to the fall in state excise. This has been documented for several states who have run into 
financial problems during prohibition periods60.
Central transfers are of two main types - grants and revenue transfers and shares of 
central union excise61. Grants and share of central receipts are on average 18% of state 
revenues and comprise of statutory transfers to state budgets and plan transfers to support 
state development plans. The level and distribution across states of both are determined 
by distinct central commissions and are theoretically based on complex rules and condi­
tionalities62. While transfers in the form of grants are made to assist state governments to 
overcome exogenous shocks such as earthquakes or floods, they are not fungible across bud­
get items and generally not given to offset the decrease in excise revenues from prohibition 
enactment63. Central union excise is revenue from indirect taxes levied on the production 
and inter-state sale of all commodities manufactured in India64. It is on average 6% but 
ranges up to 20% for some states. Union excise share are determined by the Finance Com­
mission and is distributed across states based on general economic indicators, population,
60 For example, Chief Minister Rao of Andhra Pradesh lobbied the centre to compensate the state for the 
revenue loss during the 1995-97 prohibition of alcohol (Vyasulu (1998)). Naidu and Banu (1992) also recount 
how the government of Tamil Nadu lobbied the centre for grants during the 1970s to offset its decline in 
revenue from prohibition.
61A third category comprises of grants for central schemes, the use of which is tightly controlled by central 
ministries through detailed rules and regulations.
62 Statutory budget transfers are determined by the Finance Commission, an independent entity with 
constitutional authority. Its members consist of technical experts appointed by legal decree. Plan transfers 
are determined by a national council headed by the national political executive with representatives of state 
political leaders. As such, allocation of the former tends to be more rules-based than the latter which allows 
some discretion in allocation (Khemani (2003a; 2003b)).
63 For example, the state of Andhra Pradesh did not receive any grant transfers in lieu of its prohibition 
policy in the 1990s and is still experiencing the problems of high state debt which arose partially from it.
64It excludes: (a) alcoholic liquors for human consumption and (b) opium, Indian hemp, and other narcotic 
drugs, but includes medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol or any substance included in sub- 
paragraph (b). For more information see the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.
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per capital state domestic product, indicators of backwardness, and tax collection and tax 
effort65.
The proportion of grants from the centre is not significantly related with prohibition 
policy66 (Column 5, Table 2.10). On the other hand, the distribution of the share of central 
excise across states is strongly associated with prohibition - states with a higher share 
of central union excise are also those who enact prohibition. This lends credence to the 
hypothesis that centre-state relations are important to ease any financial constraint arising 
from prohibition policies and hence may lead states to enact prohibition in order to extract 
central rents.
The result on central excise shares corroborates findings from the literature on intergov­
ernmental transfers (Chhibber (1995); Khemani (2003a, 2003b, 2004); Rao (2001)). These 
papers find that for India, the inter-state allocation of central grants and state deficits 
(through central financing) axe subject to political economy considerations, particularly 
partisan politics. Khemani’s (2003a) differential result, that this holds for the planned 
grants component of central transfers but not the statutory grants component, was not 
found with respect to prohibition policy. However, this is not surprising because allocation 
of both are not based on any criteria related to the state’s own tax revenue while that of 
central excise share explicitly is. Consequently it is more likely that states can argued for 
increased transfers from union excise when prohibition affects state excise relative to trans­
fers via central grants. In fact, some state governments, such as the Government of Tamil 
Nadu, have contested inter-state allocation of union excise on the grounds that the alloca­
tion mechanism incorporates an inherent moral hazard. This arises as it rewards states 
with lower own-tax revenues due to inefficient tax systems or "foolhardy" policies like pro­
hibition (Naidu and Banu (1992)). Given the importance of partisan politics, the political 
alignment of the state and central governments with respect to prohibition enactment was 
also examined. However, no significant effects were found.
65 Rao (2001).
66 A positive relationship would result if the underlying factors determining central grants, excluded from 
the analysis, were also related to prohibition policy such as state income per capita, population, or poverty 
rates (all of which are significant determinants of central grants). As these controls were not significant in 
determining prohibition, this result confirms the previous analysis that income per capita is not related to 
prohibition policy.
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2.4.7 M im icry
The above result on centre-state transfers suggests that prohibition in other states may 
influence policy makers to enact prohibition. This may occur through three main channels. 
Firstly, state governments may “mimic” other states which enact prohibition. If prohibi­
tion is seen to work well elsewhere such developments may influence citizens’ preferences 
over alcohol policy choices such that politicians are lobbied or voted in to change state 
policy. Secondly, prohibition policy in neighbouring states may make it harder logistically 
to sustain already enacted prohibition. For example, if neighbouring states lift prohibi­
tion, the increased difficulty of patrolling state borders and the ensuing rise in illicit liquor 
into prohibited states, may encourage the lifting of prohibition. Thirdly, as more states 
enact prohibition, the relative gains from prohibition, both from an economic and political 
economy perspective, may change.
Table 2.11 shows that as more states enact prohibition policy, states without prohibition 
enact less prohibition in the following year. The negative result may arise from two separate 
factors. A selection effect—as more states enact prohibition, the states which do not axe 
disproportionately those who may be strongly opposed to prohibition policy. Secondly, as 
more states enact prohibition the marginal benefit of prohibition, with respect to eliciting 
transfers from the centre, decreases thereby inducing non-prohibition. This may be offset by 
states using prohibition to maintain existing central excise shares. The negative effect may 
also result as the proportion of states with prohibition increases the potential gains from 
alcohol production for non-prohibition states also increases. Prohibition in other states may 
result in alcohol factories moving to other states producing much stronger liquor lobbies 
and lower incentives for politicians to enact prohibition. Even in the absence of this effect, 
state governments may strategically avoid prohibition to enable local factories to ripe the 
benefits of smuggling and greater demand for alcohol from state border areas.
To examine these hypotheses further, the state-wide concentration of alcohol factories 
was included in the estimation in Table 2.11 (Column 3). This variable measures the relative 
size of the alcohol industry across Indian states67. The negative effect on the proportion
67 See Column 7 of Table 2.10 which shows the proportion of alcohol factories in a state negatively deter­
mines prohibition even after instrumentation using the labor regulations variable.
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of states enacting prohibition remains. However, its interaction with the share of alcohol 
factories is significant and positive -  i.e. given the relative size of the alcohol industry, the 
greater the proportion of other states enacting prohibition the more prohibition is observed 
in a given state. This result means that after controlling for selection and the alcohol 
industry the effect of other states’ prohibition policy on own-state prohibition is positive. 
The finding is consistent with both a mimicking effect due to preferences changes and due 
to inter-state competition to maintain existing central-excise shares.
2.4.8 N egative effects o f alcohol
The negative effects of alcohol consumption may be important determinants of prohibition 
policy. While the negative effects of alcohol may be a function of alcohol consumption, 
they also depend on varies other factors such as the culture of drinking and type of alcohol 
consumed68. Under the helping hand view of government regulation, higher negative effects 
of alcohol would induce governments to increase regulation to correct for externalities or 
errors in private decision-making which lead to overconsumption. In practise, governments 
may be more responsive to certain types of negative effects like externalities which may be 
of greater concern than private effects of detrimental consumption.
Prohibition during periods when alcohol-related problems are high is also consistent with 
the grabbing hand view of regulation if this influences electorate preferences and hence the 
probability of politicians being re-elected. The literature on women’s movements against 
alcohol cite the large private and social costs associated with alcohol consumption as the 
key reasons for enacting prohibition (Kumari and Salaam (1997); Pathak (1985); Reddy 
and Patnaik (1993)). It is therefore likely that such lobbying informs politicians about 
electorate concerns and preferences over policy choices.
Alcohol re la ted  d eath s and  diseases
A primary negative effect of alcoholism is the private effect on health resulting in alcohol- 
related diseases such as fiver cirrhosis or deaths. These can occur due to prolonged and
68 A good example is France which has higher per capital alcohol consumption than the UK but has lower 
records of drink-related problems.
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excessive alcohol consumption or due to consumption of spurious liquor. Health statistics 
in India on alcohol-related deaths and diseases are fairly precise with respect to coverage of 
illnesses and cause of death but subject to frequent changes in definitions over the sample 
period. The analysis therefore is based on the most accurate and consistent data series 
available. Table 2.2 shows that liver-related illnesses or deaths are not associated with pro­
hibition policy. Given the long-term nature of these diseases, the right-hand side variables 
were lagged by 4 and 8 years as a robustness check - but the insignificant effect remained. 
This result could be due to the small magnitude and variation in the rate of these diseases 
such that empirically an association with prohibition cannot be detected. Alternately they 
might be too small relative to the burden of death and disease from other causes to warrant 
significant policy shifts as per prohibition. They may also not receive the media coverage 
required to precipitate policy. However, deaths due to spurious liquor and accidental poi­
soning, which tend to be widely covered in the media, was also found to be insignificant in 
relation to prohibition. Overall, bearing the caveats regarding the data, the results indi­
cate that prohibition policy is not necessarily enacted as a response to the negative private 
effects of alcohol consumption.
E x terna lities
There is extensive literature on the negative externalities of alcohol which show the link 
between alcohol consumption and crime, domestic violence, and road traffic accidents69. It is 
therefore plausible to assume that as these increase, governments may wish to curtail alcohol 
consumption. I examine the effect of indicators of differentiated crime and road accident 
deaths on prohibition in Table 2.13. The results indicate no effect of crime, including rape, 
murder, thefts, burglary and robbery, on all types of prohibition policy. In addition, road 
traffic deaths are not significant in determining prohibition. It will be shown in Chapter 4 
that these results on alcohol related deaths, crime, and road accidents are not entirely due
69 The Bureau of Justice Statistics (1988) reports that in the United States approximately 60% of all 
persons convicted of assault had been drinking just prior to the crime. See Markowitz and Grossman (1998; 
1999) and Markowitz (1999; 2000a; 2000b) for an extensive survey on the relationship between alcohol, crime 
and domestic violence. Levitt and Porter (2001) find that in the US drunk drivers are involved in 30% of 
all fatal accidents on the road. This proportion increases to 60% in periods when alcohol consumption is 
greatest.
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to lack of variation in the data as prohibition does have an effect of some of these variables. 
Furthermore, while the sample size of the latter are relatively small the data on crime is of 
a long time span and of relatively good quality.
The results from this levels analysis strongly imply that efficiency considerations arising 
from greater negative (both private and social) effects of alcohol consumption are not the 
primary focus of alcohol prohibition. Yet this is not sufficient to negate the helping hand 
view of government. This is because the view is also consistent with prohibition not being 
associated with the negative effects of alcohol consumption if alternate methods are used 
to curtail demand, such as taxation. While this cannot be explicitly tested due to the lack 
of comparable data on alcohol taxes, the results on state excise suggest that this may be 
plausible.
This view of government also purports that prohibition would result if taxation systems 
were under-developed. However, the results in Table 2.10 show that the efficiency of the 
tax system does not determine alcohol prohibition. Nevertheless, to investigate the effect 
of tax systems, interactions were included into the analysis in Table 2.12 and 2.13 of the 
private and social effects of alcohol with the proportion of tax revenue to state income. 
The insignificant result of these variables with respect to prohibition policy remains. The 
insignificant effect is consistent with the helping hand view if alcohol demand was inelastic 
and therefore unaffected by taxation. However, as earlier noted, alcohol demand is price 
elastic and hence open to influence by the tax rate. Therefore, prohibition cannot be easily 
defended on the basis of poor tax systems and/or inelastic alcohol demand functions. Taken 
together, the results strongly suggest that prohibition policy is not necessarily enacted 
improve the efficiency of the market.
2.4.9 E xtensions
The analysis above identifies several factors driving prohibition policy. Prohibition is found 
to be enacted during election years in states with high rural populations and a small alcohol 
industry. It is also associated with states with have relatively low state excise and relatively 
high central excise shares. Prohibition tends to occur in states when the proportion of other 
Indian states implementing prohibition is relatively small. While party identity, political
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competition, and sex of the electorate are not significant determinants of prohibition, legis­
latures with higher proportion of scheduled castes and lower proportion of female politicians 
tend to enact prohibition legislation.
The results provide strong evidence that prohibition is related to political economy con­
siderations. In particular, the finding that non-alcohol producing states and states with a 
higher share of central union excise have more prohibition suggests that prohibition is en­
acted to enable non-alcohol producing states to extract higher central transfers. This is as­
suming that there are no underlying factors which simultaneously determine non-production 
and higher central excise shares70. Table 2.14 shows that given the relative concentration 
of the alcohol industry, lower state excise shares and higher central excise shares illicit more 
prohibition. Therefore, over and above any effect the alcohol lobby may have on policy, 
the composition of state finances plays an important role in determining prohibition. In 
particular, given the size of the alcohol industry, the higher the central excise share the 
higher the preference for prohibition.
The hypothesis is strengthened by the finding that the relative incidence of prohibition 
decreases as more states enact the policy as the ability to extract additional transfers de­
creases at the margin. Examining the interaction between the proportion of states with 
prohibition and central excise share we find that given the proportion of states with pro­
hibition policies, the higher the central excise share, the more likely the state is to enact 
prohibition. This indicates that states which axe relatively stronger in eliciting central trans­
fers are also those most likely to have prohibition. Alternately the result can be interpreted 
as given the central excise share, as more states enact prohibition, the more likely prohi­
bition legislation within a particular state is. This may be due to inter-state competition 
in attaining or maintaining central transfers - a strategy akin to competitive devaluations, 
price under-cutting, and off-setting advertising. This corroborates the finding in Table 2.11 
that given the concentration of alcohol factories, the greater the proportion of states with 
prohibition the more own-state prohibition is enacted. Within this framework, prohibition
70While central excise shares are based on indicators of economic backwardness and tax effort, state 
income per capita and the development of the tax system were both found to be insignificantly related to 
prohibition. There is also limited association with alcohol production i.e. alcohol producing states are not 
necessarily the richest or more developed. Furthermore, it has been shown that alcohol consumption is not 
driving the result behind alcohol production and prohibition.
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can be also used as an effective mechanism by non-producing states to cut off finance for 
producing states. This follows as state excise is levied on production, and hence collected 
by alcohol producing states, and passed through to the consumer via higher prices, paid 
disproportionately more by non-producing, consuming states. The state of Karnataka is a 
case in point where in the 1990s it toyed with the idea of prohibition of consumption but 
not on the manufacture of alcohol to address precisely this issue.
Given that prohibition tends not to occur where the alcohol industry is powerful, the 
relationship between it and the other determinants was examined. Controlling for the alco­
hol industry, prohibition still occurs during the election year (Table 2.15). The interaction 
of alcohol industry with political parties and political competition remained insignificant. 
This is as expected given that prohibition was found not to be associated with political 
ideology. Given the size of the alcohol lobby, a higher proportion of female and scheduled 
caste legislatures implies more prohibition. The result on the sex of politicians suggests 
that women tend to get voted in more urban, alcohol-producing states which are associated 
with lower prohibition. Once these are controlled for, the causal effect of women politicians 
is to increase prohibition legislation. This is consistent with prohibition being associated 
with women’s anti-liquor grass-roots movements. The effect of the alcohol industry and 
the negative indicators of alcohol consumption, such as liver disease and crime, were also 
investigated. As per the levels analysis, no significant results with respect to prohibition 
were found.
2.5 Analysis
The above econometric results offer little support for the helping hand view of government 
regulation in relation to alcohol prohibition in India. Prohibition is not associated with 
private or social negative effects of alcohol consumption such as incidence of liver disease, 
deaths from alcohol-related illnesses, road accident fatalities or crime rates. It could be 
argued that the lack of a significant association is due to the small sample size and insufficient 
variation in the data series. However, this argument is harder to justify in reference to the 
results on crime as this data is of relatively good quality and long time span. Furthermore,
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it will be shown in the analysis in Chapter 4 that lack of variation is not driving the result 
as prohibition is found to have an effect on several of these indicators.
The view that governments regulate in response to efficiency considerations is consistent 
with no prohibition if other methods, such as taxation, are used to curtail alcohol demand. 
While the analysis cannot test this hypothesis directly due to data limitations, the results 
do indicate that prohibition is lower when state excise revenues are higher. This, however, 
is not a sufficient condition for the theory to hold as the result may be due to greater lobby 
power or a larger alcohol tax base. The analysis does find that less developed tax systems 
are not associated with prohibition and that, given the development of the tax system, the 
negative effects of alcohol consumption analysed above remain insignificant indicators of 
prohibition. In addition, research on alcohol demand in India, and developed countries in 
general, find that alcohol demand is price elastic within specific ranges and hence affected by 
taxation. These further mitigate the basis for prohibition on efficiency grounds and suggest 
that prohibition may be enacted to fulfil alternative objectives of government actors.
Prohibition is found to be associated with the electoral cycle which offers strong support 
for the grabbing hand view of government regulation as in this view policies are enacted 
to win political favour. Party identity, electorate characteristics, and political competition 
are unrelated to prohibition which suggests that prohibition is not enacted to reflect the 
preferences for paternalism of the average citizen but to capture the votes of preferred con­
stituencies, to reflect the preferences of political actors, to extract rents from lobby groups, 
or to win favour with popular social movements. This is corroborated by the result that 
legislature characteristics are related to prohibition such that scheduled caste politicians are 
relatively more inclined toward prohibition policies. The result is not surprising given that 
SCs are more inclined to consume alcohol and hence more likely to observe the negative 
effects of consumption. Although female legislatures are found to be negatively associated 
with prohibition, this is likely to be due to effects of the desirability hypothesis and the ef­
fect of female empowerment on the preferences for a large state. Once the size of the alcohol 
industry is controlled for, female legislatures are significantly associated with prohibition, 
in fine with the qualitative evidence on female politicians working with anti-liquor groups.
Distinguishing between the two main theories of opportunistic governments - the theory
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of regulatory capture and the tollbooth view - is difficult. The above results reflect polit­
ical economy considerations are important for alcohol prohibition enactment which lends 
support to the tollbooth view of government regulation. However, the analysis did not ex­
plicitly test the regulatory capture model. Consistent with the capture view, I find that the 
size of the alcohol industry is significantly and negatively related to complete prohibition 
policies across the whole state. The result that the industry is not association with pro­
hibition when examining the proportion of population under prohibition is plausible given 
that the industry would be more affected by prohibition across the entire state due to loss 
of market share and the costs of relocation or closing down. The result indicates that, if 
regulatory capture does occur, it occurs when "extreme" policies are enacted. This strong 
negative association implies that the effect of lobbying by the alcohol industry, which the 
anecdotal evidence suggests is powerful and often successful, is difficult to counterbalance 
by the lobbying activities of other groups such as the anti-liquor movement. The effect of 
the latter could not be explicitly incorporated in the analysis but the qualitative evidence 
reports it is a strong proponent of prohibition policies.
Taken together, the results suggest that prohibition of alcohol results from non-alcohol 
producing states attempting to illicit higher central transfers. Prohibition is positively as­
sociated with the electoral cycle and occurs in states with more rural populations, who tend 
not to be dependent on the alcohol industry and consume relatively more alcohol compared 
to the urban population. This suggests that politicians may use prohibition to coalesce the 
voting majority to win elections in non-alcohol producing states. The limited impact on 
state excise and the promise of higher central transfers are key factors in propelling this ar­
gument. In addition, the second order effect of prohibition on the state excise of producing 
states, may also serve to win popular support.
The estimation also finds evidence of a positive mimicking effect such that as more Indian 
states enact prohibition, holding the concentration of the alcohol industry constant, more 
prohibition is enacted. It is not clear whether this effect works through shaping preferences 
for paternalism and the perceived efficiency of observed prohibition policy or whether this 
is due to increased inter-state competition for central union excise shares. The evidence 
from the interaction of central excise shares with proportion of states enacting prohibition
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suggests that the latter may be the case. That is, states engage in strategic policy enactment 
to attain or maintain central excise shares as is often observed with competitive devaluations 
between countries or offsetting advertising between firms.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter examined the determinants of a particular type of paternalistic policy - pro­
hibition of alcohol in India. In doing so, it has added to the empirical literature on the 
economics of government regulation. The analysis finds limited support for the helping 
hand view of government. The results presented provide strong evidence that prohibition 
policies are not systematically related to the negative effects of alcohol consumption or other 
systemic variables which would suggest prohibition to be the most effective policy handle 
to curtail alcohol demand.
On the other hand, there is good reason to have a less benign perspective of government 
regulation as in the grabbing hand view. Prohibition is found to be related positively with 
the electoral cycle and appears to be driven less by the preferences of the electorate and more 
of specific groups which lends support for the tollbooth view of regulation. Nevertheless, it 
is not easy to distinguish between the latter and the theory of regulatory capture based on 
the analysis presented. What can be deduced is that the alcohol industry has significant 
influence in deterring prohibition whose effect is difficult to counteract by other groups such 
as women’s movements or anti-alcohol movements.
Prohibition of all three types appear to be determined by similar factors. In particular, 
the results provide strong support that prohibition is used strategically by non-alcohol 
producing states to elicit central transfers. The impetus for this is politically motivated as 
politicians win votes by coalescing rural constituencies for prohibition with the promise of 
lower negative effects of alcohol and higher central finance. There are also indications that 
inter-state competition for central rents results in further prohibition as states attempt to 
maintain existing central excise shares.
The finding that prohibition is enacted not with the explicit view to curtail alcohol de­
mand for efficiency reasons but to fulfil the objectives of politicians and bureaucrats, raises
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serious questions regarding the role of the state in the economy. Given that paternalistic 
policies in general, and prohibition policies in particular, limit individual freedom by con­
straining individual choice, the above analysis provides good reasons to support a more 
limited role of government regulation. The observation that prohibition policies are not 
without their costs, such as greatly depleted state finances or larger bureaucracies, lends 
further credence to this view. The results also raise the issue of the effectiveness and effi­
ciency of alcohol prohibition in reducing in alcohol consumption. It is to this which I turn 
to in the next chapter.
2.7 A ppendix 1: Prohibition Legislation in Indian States, 
1957-2001
Source: State Local Acts 
A N D H R A  PR A D E S H
1937 A n d h ra  P rad esh  (A ndhra  area) P ro h ib itio n  A ct, 1937 (10/1937)
Introduced and extended prohibition of manufacture, sale and consumption of intoxicating 
liquors and drugs in the Andhra area of the state of Andhra Pradesh.
1955 A n d h ra  P rad esh  P ro h ib itio n  A ct, 1955 (17 o f 1955) 743 
Extended prohibition of manufacture, sale and consumption of intoxicating liquors and 
drugs in 9 districts of the state of Andhra Pradesh. These are the districts of Chittoor, Cud- 
dapah, Anantapur, Kurnool, Guntur, Nellore, Visakhapatnam, Srikulam, East Godavari, 
West Godavari, and Krishna.
1968 A n d h ra  P rad esh  Excise A ct, 1968 (A ct 17 o f 1968)
Repealed prohibition on 1st November 1969 and introduced rules and regulations for the 
taxation, production and sale of alcohol.
1994 A n d h ra  P rad esh  P ro h ib itio n  O rdinance, 1994
Prohibited the selling, buying, possessing and consumption of arrack but not IMFL or 
Indian liquor.
1995 A n d h ra  P rad esh  P ro h ib itio n  (A m endm ent) A ct, 1995 (35 o f 1995) 744
Prohibited the sale, manufacture and consumption of all alcohol from 15th January 1995.
66
1997 A n d h ra  P rad esh  P ro h ib itio n  (A m endm ent) A ct, 1997
Repealed prohibition on all alcohol except arrack.
A SSAM
1952 T he  A ssam  L iquor P ro h ib itio n  A ct, 1952
Prohibited the possession, consumption and manufacture of liquor and smuggling thereof 
into the Barpeta sub-division and other areas of the state.
1963 T he  A ssam  Liquor P ro h ib itio n  (A m endm ent) A ct, 1963
Amended the 1952 Act to allow permits for foreigners and clarify what a state of drunkenness
described.
1994 T he  A ssam  L iquor P ro h ib itio n  (A m endm ent) A ct, 1994
Lifted any prohibition on all alcohol.
B IH A R
1938 T he  B ihar P ro h ib itio n  of In tox ican ts O rd inance 1980 including “R eg­
u la tion  o f M olasses and  Sugarcane Supply  and  P u rchase  A c t”
Outlined a policy of temperance via control over molasses and sugar-cane production and 
sale and on the alcohol industry via regulations and restricted capacity rules. There was no 
prohibition of consumption and production
G U JA R A T
1949 P ro h ib itio n  A ct, Bombay, 1949
Prohibited manufacture, sale and consumption of all liquors in Gujarat.
1963 T he  Bom bay P ro h ib itio n  (G u ja ra t A m endm ent) A ct, 1963
Amends the 1949 Act to close loopholes to reinforce complete prohibition.
1977 T he  Bom bay P ro h ib itio n  (G u ja ra t A m endm ent) O rd inance, 1977
Amends the 1949 Act to close loopholes to reinforce complete prohibition.
H A RYANA
1914 P u n jab  Excise A ct, 1914 (A ct 1 of 1914) am ended  in  1948
Introduced complete prohibition in the district of Rohtak on 2/10/1948.
1967 P u n jab  Excise A ct, 1914 (A ct 1 of 1914) am ended  in  1967
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Lifted prohibition in Rohtak.
1996 P u n jab  Excise A ct, 1914 (A ct 1 o f 1914) am ended  in  1996 (22 /96)
Introduced complete prohibition on production and consumption of all alcohol types in 
entire state.
1997 P u n jab  Excise A ct, 1914 (A ct 1 of 1914) am ended  in  1998 (20/98)
Lifted complete prohibition on production and consumption of all alcohol types in entire 
state.
JA M M U  & K A SH M IR
No Prohibition Legislation.
K A RN A TA K A
1948 M ysore P ro h ib itio n  A ct, 1948 (A ct 37 o f 1948)
Enforced prohibition in selected districts in Mysore State over 1938-1961. These districts 
include Bangalore, South Kanara, Bellary, Chiradurg, Tumkur, Kolar, Shimoga, Chikma- 
galur, Darwar, North Nakara, Bijapur, Belgaum, Hassan, Coorg, Bidar, Mysore, Mandya. 
1961 M ysore P ro h ib itio n  A ct, 1961 (M ysore A ct 17 o f 1962)
Relaxed prohibition in some districts.
1965 T h e  M ysore Excise A ct, 1965 (A ct 21 of 1966)
Lifted complete prohibition across the state and provided a uniform law relating to produc­
tion, manufacture, possession, import, export, transport, purchase, and sale of liquor and 
intoxicating drugs, and the levy of duties of excise.
K ER A LA
1950 T he  P ro h ib itio n  A ct, 1950 (A ct 13 of 1950)
Enforced total prohibition across districts of Kerala from 25th November 1949. These
districts include Kozhikode, Palghat, Cannanore, Trivandrum, Quilon, Ernakulam, Trichur. 
1967 N otification no. 7 5 1 9 /G 3 /6 7 /R D
Repealed prohibition in all local areas.
1996 T he  P ro h ib itio n  A ct, 1950 (A ct 13 of 1950) A m ended  in  1996
Introduced arrack prohibition on 1st April 1996.
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M A D H Y A  PR A D E S H
1938 T he  C en tra l Provinces P ro h ib itio n  A ct, 1938 (A ct 8 of 1938)
Enforced prohibition in some districts of the state. These include Sagar, Damch, Narsingh- 
pur, Khandwa, Hoshangabad, Vidisha, Raipur, Bilaspur, Durg, Jabalpur, Bhilsa.
1961 T he  M adhya P rad esh  P ro h ib itio n  (A m endm ent) A ct, 1961
Provided compulsory jail imprisonment for liquor offences.
1964 T he  M adhya P rad esh  P ro h ib itio n  (A m endm ent) A ct, 1964
Lifted prohibition in all districts. (Prohibition does exist in selected villages/taluks/districts
for example in Jhanbua district but this is not legislated prohibition but self imposed).
M A H A R A SH T R A
1949 T he  B om bay P ro h ib itio n  A ct, 1949
Imposed prohibition in the whole state of Bombay.
1952 T h e  Bom bay P ro h ib itio n  (A m endm ent) A ct, 1952
Strengthened the 1949 Act and covered loop-holes.
1953 T he  Bom bay P ro h ib itio n  (A m endm ent) A ct, 1953
Strengthened the 1949 Act and covered loop-holes.
1954 T h e  Bom bay P ro h ib itio n  (A m endm ent) A ct, 1954
Disallowed alteration of denatured spirits to produce intoxicating liquor.
1959 T h e  Bom bay P ro h ib itio n  (E xtension  and  A m endm ent) A ct, 1959
Extended the 1949 prohibition Act to the rest of the State of Bombay to repeal any corre­
sponding laws (e.g. Abkari laws) in force in those parts of the state. This is mainly to take 
into account the states reorganisation which occurred in 1956.
1963 N otification, 1963
Lifted complete prohibition and rationalized prohibition where certain types of alcohol were 
allowed.
1968 N otification, A pril 25 th  1968
Allowed vary low alcohol content drinks to be produced/ consumed. (Not arrack or any 
form of toddy).
O RISSA
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1956 T he O rissa P ro h ib itio n  A ct, 1956
Introduced and extended the prohibition of manufacture, sale and consumption of intoxi­
cating liquors and drugs in the State of Orissa on 1st April, 1956 in selected districts. These 
districts are Cuttack, Balasore, Puri, Ganjam, and Koraput.
1968 T he O rissa P ro h ib itio n  Laws (A m endm ent) 1968
Lifted complete prohibition in whole state.
1994 T he O rissa P ro h ib itio n  Laws (A m endm ent) 1994
Imposed complete prohibition in whole state.
1995 T he O rissa P ro h ib itio n  Laws (A m endm ent) 1995
Lifted complete prohibition in whole state.
P U N JA B
1914 P u n ja b  Excise A ct, 1914 (A ct 1 o f 1914) am ended  in  1948
Introduced complete prohibition in the district of Rohtak on 2/10/1948 which was trans­
ferred to Haryana in 1965.
R A JA S T H A N
1950 T he  R a jas th a n  Excise A ct, 1950
Outlined a uniform law relating to the import, export, transport, manufacture, sale and 
possession of intoxicating liquor and of intoxicating drugs. Prohibition was enacted in Abu 
taluk of Sirodhi district.
1969 T h e  R a jas th a n  P ro h ib itio n  A ct, 1969
Prohibited liquor in many districts of the state over 1969-1976. These districts are Dun- 
garpur, Banswara, Sirodhi, Udaipur, Barmer, Jalore, Jaisalmer, Nagaur.
1976 T he  R a ja s th a n  P ro h ib itio n  (A m endm ent) A ct, 1976
Lifted prohibition in the prohibited districts and introduced government regulation of liquor 
via the Rajasthan Excise (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act 30 of 1976).
1977 N otifications, 12th  S ep tem ber 1977
Enforced prohibition from 1st October 1977 in Tonk and Bundi districts, Kishanganj and 
Shahabad tehsils of Kota district, Pratapgarh tehsil of Chittorgarh district and Salumbar 
tehsil of Udaipur district.
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1977 N otifications, O ctober 20, 1977
Enforced prohibition from 1st December 1977 in Jahajpur and Mandalgarh tehsils of Bhilwara 
district, and Bali tehsil of Pali district.
1978 T he  R a jas th a n  P ro h ib itio n  (A m ending an d  E x tend ing) A ct, 1978
Extended prohibition to the Abu area due to the 1956 states reorganization.
1979 N otifications, 31st M arch , 1979
Enforced prohibition from 1st April 1979 in Jhunjhunu, Sikar, Bhilwara, Jhalawar, Sawai- 
Madhopur, Altar and Bharatpur districts.
1979 N otifications, 31st M arch , 1979
Enforced prohibition from 2nd September 1979 in Chittorgarh, Ajmer, and Kota districts. 
1979 N otifications, 31st M arch , 1979
Enforced prohibition from 1st April 1980 in Ganganagar, Japer, Udaipur districts.
1981 T he  R a jas th a n  P ro h ib itio n  A ct R epealing  A ct, 1981
Repealed the 1969 Prohibition Act from 11th August 1981 and revived the Rajasthan Excise
Act, 1950.
TA M IL N A D U
1937 M adras P ro h ib itio n  A ct, 1937
Introduced prohibition in Madras.
1970 T he Tam il N adu  P ro h ib itio n  (A m endm ent) A ct, 1970
Suspended prohibition of production and introduced regulation of production via licenses.
1971 T he Tam il N adu  P ro h ib itio n  (Suspension of O peration ) A ct, 1971
Repealed prohibition and suspended Prohibition Act 1937.
1973 T he  Tam il N adu  P ro h ib itio n  (Suspension of O pera tion ) A m endm ent
A ct, 1973
Introduced the Prohibition Act 1937 for toddy.
1974 T he  Tam il N adu  P ro h ib itio n  (Suspension o f O pera tion ) A m endm ent
A ct, 1974
Repealed the 1973 Act.
1978 T he Tam il N adu  P ro h ib itio n  (A m endm ent) A ct, 1978
Enforced prohibition on 1st October 1978.
1979 T he  Tam il N adu  P ro h ib itio n  (A m endm ent) A ct, 1979
Enforced stricter rules for prohibition on 3rd October 1978.
1981 T he Tam il N adu  P ro h ib itio n  (A m endm ent) A ct, 1981
Repealed prohibition on 22nd April 1981 and issued guidelines for production of liquor in
the Tamil Nadu Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1982 (Act 42 of 1982).
1983 T he Tam il N adu  P ro h ib itio n  (Second A m endm ent) A c t, 1983 
Transferring bulk of production of arrack and IMFL from the private sector to a state 
controlled cooperation. This led to a public auction-cum-tender system for the sale of 
alcohol.
1985 T he Tam il N adu  P ro h ib itio n  (A m endm ent) A ct, 1985
Transferring retail rights to the State Cooperation due to collusion of retailers under the 
previous regulations.
1986 T he Tam il N adu  P ro h ib itio n  (Second and  T h ird  A m endm en t) A ct, 
1986
Introduced prohibition with respect to arrack and toddy throughout the state from 1st 
January 1987.
1990 T he  Tam il N adu  P ro h ib itio n  (A m endm ent) A ct, 1990
Abolished Prohibition of arrack or “country liquor” on the 7th March 1990 and gives the 
State Cooperation sole license to produce it.
1993 T he  Tam il N adu  P ro h ib itio n  (A m endm ent) A ct, 1993
Prohibition of arrack from 16th July 1991. This act omits the reference to arrack in the 
Prohibition Act of 1937.
U T T A R  P R A D E S H
1947 U tta r  P rad esh  In tox ican t P ro h ib itio n  R ules 1947
Guidelines for prohibition in selected districts: Etah, Mainpuri, Budaun, Farrukabad, Sul- 
tanpur, Pratapgarh, Jaunpur, Unnao, Kanpur, Rae Bareli, Fatehpur, Saharanpur, Dehra 
Dun, Mathura.
1969 N otification 28 th  M arch  1969
Prohibition from 1st April 1969 in Chamoli, Pithoragaxh and Uttarkashi districts.
1972 N otification 22nd Ju ly  1972
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From 22nd July 1972, prohibition of import, export, transport, and possession of liquor 
in Chamoli, Pithoragarh and Uttarkashi districts and the municipal areas of Hardwar, 
Brindavan and Rishikesh.
1977 N otification 1st O ctober 1977
From 1st October 1977, prohibition of import, export, transport or possession of liquor in 
clubs.
1978 N otification 30 th  M arch  1978
From 1st April 1978, prohibition in Kanpur, Unnao, Lucknow, Bara Banki, Dehra Dun, 
Nainital, Almora districts.
1978 N otification 31st M arch  1978
From 1st April 1978, prohibition of foreign liquor in hostels, restaurants, cafes, hotels bars, 
shops of arrated water and foodstores.
1978 N otification 16th  O ctober 1978
From 1st April 1978, prohibition of import, transport, possession in and export of fermented 
toddy.
1980 N otification 20th  D ecem ber 1980
Amended the Excise Act to imposed prohibition on certain days e.g. Holi, Dewali, Inde­
pendence day (August 15th), Mahatma Gandhi’s birthday (October 25th).
1991 N otification 20 th  M arch  1991
From 1st April 1991, lifted prohibition of IMFL in Chamoli and Uttarkashi districts. 
W E S T  B EN G A L
No prohibition legislation. Alcohol legislation falls under the Bengal Excise Act, 1909 (Act 
5 of 1909).
2.8 A ppendix 2: D ata Appendix
The data used in this chapter come from a wide variety of sources. They cover the sixteen 
main Indian states: Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Jammu and Kash­
mir, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil 
Nadu, U ttar Pradesh, West Bengal. Haryana split from the state of Punjab in 1965 and is
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treated as a separate observation from this date on. The time span for each variable varies 
due to availability as illustrated in Table 2.2. In general the period covers 1957-2001. The 
data collection has been greatly aided by Besley and Burgess (2000, 2002, and 2004) who 
have compiled data on political, economic, and social variables on Indian states for this 
period. The prohibition variable has been described in detail in the text and will not be 
covered here.
General Variables
D rough t an d  flood are dummy variables for periods when annual average rainfall is two 
standard deviations above or below the state specific rainfall mean 1958-1992. Rainfall data 
are from the Statistical Abstract of India, Government of India.
Fem ale L iteracy  R a te  is the proportion of literate females (aged 7 and above) from the 
Census of India for 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, and 2001. It is interpolated between census 
years and sourced from the Census of India, Registrar General and Census Commissioner, 
Office of the Registrar General, Government of India.
F lood  D am age is statewise data on the value of crops affected by floods measured in 
rupees from the Central Water Commission, Government of India.
Food G ra in  P ro d u c tio n  is total food grain production measured in tonnes from the 
Bulletin on Food Statistics, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Directorate of Economics 
and Statistics, Government of India. It is expressed in real per capita terms using the price 
deflator and population figures.
P rice  deflators used are the Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Labourer (CPIAL) 
and Consumer Price Index fro Industrial Workers (CPIIW). These are sourced from the 
Indian Labour Handbook, Indian Labour Journal, Indian Labour Gazette, and the Reserve 
Bank of India Report on Currency and Finance.
P op u la tio n  data come from the 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, and 2001 (provisional) 
censuses [Census of India, Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Government of 
India] and have been interpolated between census years by urban and rural sectors. 
P op u la tio n  density  is interpolated total population divided by total land area of each 
state from the Census Atlas of India, Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Officer 
of the Registrar General, Government of India.
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P ro p o rtio n  S C /S T  P opu la tion  is the proportion of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled 
Tribe persons of total population from the Census of India for 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 
and 2001. It is interpolated between census years and sourced from the Census of India, 
Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Office of the Registrar General, Government 
of India.
P ro p o rtio n  S ta tes  w ith  P ro h ib itio n  measures the ratio of Indian states with any type 
of prohibition in the previous year excluding the state in question.
P ro p o rtio n  u rb an  popu la tion  is a measure of how urbanized a size is and is constructed 
from the total and urban population data from the census. It is therefore interpolated 
between 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, and 2001 census years. The data source is Census 
of India, Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Office of the Registrar General, 
Government of India.
S ta te  incom e is from estimates of the State Domestic Product published by the Depart­
ment of Statistics, Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Government of India. 
This is deflated using the price deflator.
Political Variables
E lection  dum m y is a variable that is equal to one in years with a state legislative election 
and zero otherwise. The data is from the Election Commission of India, Government of 
India.
E lection  in s tru m en t is a dummy variable constructed from electoral rules such that 
starting from the first year when state elections were held every fifth year is defined as an 
election year. The variable is similar to that used by Khemani (2004).
N u m ber o f P a rtie s  C ontesting  is the total (registered and unregistered) number of 
parties contesting in the state elections by state. The data is from the Election Commission 
of India, Government of India.
N u m ber of C o n testan ts  P e r Seat is the total number of contestants competing in the 
state elections by state divided by the number of contested seats. The data is from the 
Election Commission of India, Government of India.
Political C om petition  is defined as minus the absolute difference between the proportion 
of seats occupied by the party in power and the proportion occupied by its main competi­
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tor(s). A larger value indicates greater political competition. Data on party seats is from 
the Election Commission of India, Government of India.
P ro p o rtio n  seats by p a rty  is the proportion of seats in the state legislature by party 
groupings as follows: (i) Congress Party (Indian National Congress 4- Indian Congress So­
cialist 4- Indian National Congress URS -I- Indian National Congress Organization), (ii) 
Janata Party (Janata Party +  Janata Dal -I- Lok Dal Party), (iii) Hard Left parties (Com­
munist Party of India 4- Communist Party of India Marxist), (iv) Soft Left parties (Socialist 
Party 4- Praja Socialist Party), (v) Hindu parties (Bhartiya Janata Party 4- Bhartiya Jana 
Sangh), (vi) Regional parties (State/regional-specific parties), (vii) Other parties (residual 
national and state registered and non-registered parties), and (ix) Muslim parties (parties 
with Islamic/Muslim party names). The data is from the Election Commission of India, 
Government of India.
P ro p o rtio n  Fem ale Seats is the proportion of female seats in the state legislature. 
P ro p o rtio n  S C /S T  Seats is the proportion of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe seats 
in the state legislature.
P ro p o rtio n  S C /S T  Fem ale Seats is the proportion of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled 
Tribe female seats of total Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe seats in the state legislature. 
T u rnou t is turnout in state elections and is held constant between elections. The data is 
from the Election Commission of India, Government of India.
Industry Data
L abour regu la tion  is a variable to measure pro-worker versus pro-employer labour regula­
tion complied by Besley and Burgess (2004). They code state amendments to the Industrial 
Disputes Act as l=pro-worker, 0=neutral, -1=pro-employer and accumulate this over the 
period to generate the labour regulation measure.
N u m ber o f A lcohol Factories is the total number of registered breweries, distilleries, and 
wine producers in the state. The data is sourced from the Annual Survey of Industries and 
Census of Industries (Central Statistical Office, Industrial Statistics Wing), Department of 
Statistics, Ministry of Planning and Programme Implementation, Government of India. 
N u m ber o f M anufactu ring  Factories is the total number of registered manufacturing 
factories as defined by the Factories Act of 1948 which refers to registered manufacturing
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as firms with ten or more employees with power or twenty or more employees without 
power. The data is sourced from the Annual Survey of Industries and Census of Industries 
(Central Statistical Office, Industrial Statistics Wing), Department of Statistics, Ministry 
of Planning and Programme Implementation, Government of India.
P ro p o rtio n  Alcohol Factories is the proportion of alcohol factories within each state 
of the total number of alcohol factories in India. As such, it is a measure of the relative 
concentration of the alcohol industry across states.
Public Finance Variables
C en tra l Excise Share is the ratio of central union excise to total state revenue. The data 
is sourced from the Public Finance Statistics (Ministry of Finance, Government of India) 
and the Report on Currency and Finance, Reserve Bank of India.
P ro p o rtio n  C en tra l G ran ts  is the ratio of central grants to total state revenue. The data 
is sourced from the Public Finance Statistics (Ministry of Finance, Government of India) 
and the Report on Currency and Finance, Reserve Bank of India.
P ro p o rtio n  N on Tax R evenue is the ratio of state non-tax revenue to total state revenue. 
The data is sourced from the Public Finance Statistics (Ministry of Finance, Government 
of India) and the Report on Currency and Finance, Reserve Bank of India.
P ro p o rtio n  S ta te  Excise is the ratio of state excise revenue to total state revenue. State 
excise includes receipts from taxes on potable alcohol; commercial and denatured spirits 
and medicated wines; medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol; opium, hemp, 
and other drugs; and fines and confiscations. The data is sourced from the Public Finance 
Statistics (Ministry of Finance, Government of India) and the Report on Currency and 
Finance, Reserve Bank of India.
P ro p o rtio n  S ta te  Sales Tax is the ratio of state sales tax revenue to total state revenue. 
The data is sourced from the Public Finance Statistics (Ministry of Finance, Government 
of India) and the Report on Currency and Finance, Reserve Bank of India.
R atio  Tax R evenue to  G D P  is the ratio of state total tax revenue to state income. The 
data is sourced from the Public Finance Statistics (Ministry of Finance, Government of 
India) and the Report on Currency and Finance, Reserve Bank of India.
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Health Variables
Log A ccidental Poisoning D eaths is the log of accidental deaths from poisoning sourced 
from the Accidental Deaths and Suicides in India, National Crime Records Bureau, Gov­
ernment of India.
Log Liver C irrhosis D eaths is the log of number of deaths from liver cirrhosis sourced 
from the Statistical Abstract of India and Vital Statistics of India, Central Statistical Office, 
Government of India.
Log Liver Disease D eaths is the log of number of liver disease deaths sourced from 
the Statistical Abstract of India and Vital Statistics of India, Central Statistical Office, 
Government of India.
Log N um ber T rea ted  Liver D isease is the log of treated cases of liver disease sourced 
from the Statistical Abstract of India, Central Statistical Office, Government of India.
Log R oad  A ccident D eaths is the log of road accident deaths sourced from the Accidental 
Deaths and Suicides in India, National Crime Records Bureau, Government of India.
Log Spurious Liquor D eaths is the log of deaths from spurious liquor poisoning sourced 
from the Accidental Deaths and Suicides in India, National Crime Records Bureau, Gov­
ernment of India.
Crime Data
P ro p o rtio n  B urglaries is the ratio of reported burglaries to total crimes sourced from 
Crime in India, National Crime Records Bureau, Government of India.
P ro p o rtio n  D acoity  is the ratio of reported cases of dacoity to total crimes sourced from 
Crime in India, National Crime Records Bureau, Government of India.
P ro p o rtio n  M urders  is the ratio of reported murders to total crimes sourced from Crime 
in India, National Crime Records Bureau, Government of India.
P ro p o rtio n  R apes is the ratio of reported rapes to total crimes sourced from Crime in 
India, National Crime Records Bureau, Government of India.
P ro p o rtio n  R obberies is the ratio of reported robberies to total crimes sourced from 
Crime in India, National Crime Records Bureau, Government of India.
P ro p o rtio n  T hefts  is the ratio of reported thefts to total crimes sourced from Crime in 
India, National Crime Records Bureau, Government of India.
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Figure 2-2: Proportion Population Under Arrack Population
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Table 2.1: Summary of Prohibition Variables
P ro p o rtio n  of P o p u la tion  U nder: 
S ta te  C om plete A rrack  P a rtia l
P ro h ib itio n  P ro h ib itio n  P ro h ib itio n
M ean S.d. M ean S.d. M ean S.d.
Andhra Pradesh 0.30 0.38 0.43 0.43 0.13 0.34
Assam 0.15 0.25 0.15 0.25 0.00 0.00
Bihar 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.00
Gujarat 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Haryana 0.15 0.34 0.15 0.34 0.00 0.00
Jammu & Kashmir 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.00
Karnataka 0.21 0.37 0.97 0.07 0.76 0.43
Kerala 0.24 0.38 0.37 0.44 0.13 0.34
Madhya Pradesh 0.10 0.23 0.10 0.23 0.00 0.00
Maharashtra 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00
Orissa 0.24 0.34 0.24 0.34 0.00 0.00
Punjab 0.08 0.21 0.08 0.21 0.00 0.00
Rajasthan 0.14 0.29 0.14 0.29 0.00 0.00
Tamil Nadu 0.44 0.50 0.82 0.39 0.38 0.49
U ttar Pradesh 0.11 0.21 0.11 0.21 0.00 0.00
West Bengal 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.00
Total 0.23 0.39 0.32 0.44 0.09 0.28
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Table 2.2: Summary of Main Variables
V ariables
Log State Income Per Capita 
Proportion Urban Population 
Congress Party 
Janata Party 
Hard Left Parties 
Soft Left Parties 
Hindu Parties 
Regional Parties 
Other Parties 
National Parties 
Muslim Parties 
Year of Election Dummy 
Year of Election Instrument 
Political Competition 
Number of Parties Contesting 
Number of Contestants Per Seat 
Proportion Female Seats 
Female Literacy Rate 
Proportion SC/ST Seats 
Proportion SC Seats 
Proportion ST Seats 
Proportion SC/ST Female Seats 
Proportion SC Female Seats 
Proportion ST Female Seats 
Proportion SC Population 
Proportion ST Population
M ean S.d. Obs Y ears
-2.21 0.40 637 1960-2000
0.22 0.08 692 1958-2001
0.47 0.25 702 1957-2001
0.09 0.18 702 1957-2001
0.07 0.14 702 1957-2001
0.02 0.04 702 1957-2001
0.07 0.12 702 1957-2001
0.14 0.25 702 1957-2001
0.07 0.10 702 1957-2001
0.72 0.23 702 1957-2001
0.01 0.03 702 1957-2001
0.23 0.42 702 1957-2001
0.20 0.40 702 1957-2001
0.38 0.14 702 1957-2001
16.52 12.01 702 1957-2001
6.96 4.49 702 1957-2001
0.04 0.02 702 1957-2001
29.04 17.33 646 1961-2001
0.21 0.08 702 1957-2001
0.14 0.05 702 1957-2001
0.07 0.08 702 1957-2001
0.04 0.04 626 1961-2001
0.04 0.05 626 1961-2001
0.03 0.08 626 1961-2001
0.15 0.06 548 1958-1992
0.07 0.08 548 1958-1992
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Table 2.2 Cont: Summary of Main Variables
Variables
Number of Alcohol Factories 
Number of Manufacturing Factories 
Proportion Alcohol Factories 
Proportion States with Prohibition 
Ratio Tax Revenue to GDP 
Proportion State Excise of Revenue 
Proportion State Sales Tax of Revenue 
Proportion Central Grants of Revenue 
Proportion Non-Tax Revenue of Revenue 
Central Excise Share 
Log Road Accident Deaths 
Log Accidental Poisoning Deaths 
Log Spurious Liquor Deaths 
Log Number Treated Liver Disease 
Log Liver Disease Deaths 
Log Liver Cirrhosis Deaths 
Proportion Rapes of Total Crime 
Proportion Murders of Total Crime 
Proportion Thefts of Total Crime 
Proportion Burglaries of Total Crime 
Proportion Robberies of Total Crime 
Proportion Dacoity of Total Crime
Mean S.d. Obs Years
9.52 11.57 648 1957-1997
4545.54 4790.26 545 1957-1995
0.05 0.05 648 1957-1997
0.31 0.26 712 1957-2001
0.09 0.03 640 1960-2000
0.06 0.04 706 1957-2001
0.18 0.08 706 1957-2001
0.18 0.12 706 1957-2001
0.37 0.13 706 1957-2001
0.06 0.04 674 1957-1999
7.08 1.17 480 1970-1999
5.67 1.54 480 1970-1999
3.39 1.28 237 1984-1999
9.49 1.27 337 1957-1985
4.81 1.27 335 1957-1985
5.41 1.48 192 1973-1993
0.01 0.01 304 1983-2001
0.02 0.02 709 1957-2001
0.25 0.10 709 1957-2001
0.13 0.10 709 1957-2001
0.01 0.01 709 1957-2001
0.01 0.01 709 1957-2001
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Table 2.3: Prohibition and State Controls
P roportion  P opulation U nder
C om plete Prohibi­ A ny prohibition Partia l P roh ib ition
tion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS
AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1)
Log State Income 
Per Capita
-0.040
(0.784)
-0.030
(0.595)
0.003
(0.046)
0.005
(0.082)
0.010
(0.408)
0.009
(0.366)
Proportion 
Urban Population
-2.174
(2.380)
-1.986
(2.071)
-0.788
(0.787)
-0.386
(0.378)
0.141
(0.248)
0.275
(0.637)
Constant 0.103
(0.667)
0.768
(2.786)
0.648
(2.103)
0.385
(2.663)
0.619
(2.173)
0.492
(1.542)
0.190
(1.474)
0.183
(0.694)
0.112
(0.654)
Chi2 of Controls 
Prob > chi2
5.04
(0.080)
0.14
(0.931)
0.62
(0.735)
Observations 637 676 637 637 676 637 637 676 637
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. All models include state and year effects. All right hand-side variables 
lagged by one year. The sample size is smaller for models including state income per capita as figures are available from 
1960-2000 and there are 6 reports to date for 2000.
Table 2.4: The Electoral Cycle
Proportion Population Under Complete Prohibition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS
AR(1) AR(1) (IV) (IV) AR(1) AR(1)
Election Year Dummy 0.069
(4.224)
0.076
(4.532)
0.319
(6.916)
0.354
(6.357)
Pre-Election Year 
Dummy
0.020
(1.177)
0.020
(1.143)
Proportion Urban 
Population
-2.531
(2.348)
-3.219
(2.909)
-4.103
(2.275)
-4.019
(2.679)
-2.566
(2.399)
-3.058
(2.778)
Constant 0.947
(4.412)
0.657
(2.107)
1.257
(3.607)
0.570
(1.318)
0.952
(4.475)
0.711
(2.281)
Party Controls 
Observations 672
Yes
672 672
Yes
672 672
Yes
672
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. All models include state and 
year effects. Party controls include share of seats by party groups as in Column 2 
Table 2.5. GLS (IV) uses an instrument constructed from electoral rules such that 
starting from the first year when state elections were held every fifth year is defined 
as an election year.
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Table 2.5: Political Parties
Proportion Population Under Complete Prohibition
Party Grouping (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
_____________________GLS AR(1) GLS AR(1) OLS GLS AR(1) GLS AR(1)
National Parties -0.145
(0.948)
Regional Parties -0.174
(1.166)
-0.172
(1.123)
0.484
(1.490)
-0.186
(1.224)
0.004
(0.027)
Congress Party -0.148
(0.938)
0.611
(1.801)
-0.146
(0.938)
-0.004
(0.025)
Janata Party -0.131
(0.796)
0.710
(1.784)
-0.124
(0.768)
0.002
(0.011)
Hard Left Parties -0.127
(0.713)
1.030
(2.391)
-0.176
(0.999)
-0.063
(0.378)
Soft Left Parties -0.174
(0.629)
0.842
(0.959)
-0.094
(0.346)
0.019
(0.112)
Hindu Parties -0.163
(0.946)
0.659
(1.612)
-0.142
(0.832)
0.008
(0.049)
Muslim Parties -2.040
(3.379)
Other Parties -0.240
(1.311)
-0.252
(1.301)
-0.054
(0.127)
-0.196
(1.027)
Proportion Urban 
Population
-2.371
(2.758)
-2.304
(2.627)
-3.739
(2.565)
-2.306
(2.677)
-2.420
(2.620)
Constant 0.967
(3.307)
0.951
(3.211)
0.623
(1.522)
0.953
(3.265)
0.836
(2.608)
Prob>Chi2 of Parties 
Observations
0.453
672
0.884
672
0.005
672
0.117
672
0.676
667
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. All models include state and 
year effects. All right hand-side variables lagged by one election. OLS estimator 
uses robust standard errors clustered at the state level. Column 4 refers to party of 
the Chief Minister.
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Table 2.6: Political Competition
Proportion Population Under Complete Prohibition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS
AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1)
Political competition 0.012 0.014
(0.341) (0.404)
Number of Parties 
Contesting
0.001
(0.435)
0.001
(0.520)
Number of 
Contestants Per Seat
-0.001
(0.068)
-0.001
(0.150)
Proportion Urban 
Population
-1.798
(2.029)
-1.765
(2.102)
-1.749
(1.953)
-1.695
(1.988)
-2.389
(2.562)
-2.445
(2.689)
Constant 0.645
(2.462)
0.736
(2.592)
0.617
(2.297)
0.696
(2.382)
0.823
(2.903)
0.968
(3.119)
Party Controls 
Observations 632
Yes
632 632
Yes
632 632
Yes
632
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. All models include state and 
year effects. All right hand-side variables lagged by one election. Party controls 
include share of seats by party groups as in Column 2 Table 2.5.
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Table 2.7: Female Politicians
P ro p o rtio n  P opu la tion P ro p o rtio n
U nder C om plete P ro h ib i­ Fem ale Seats
tion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GLS GLS GLS GLS IV 1st IV 1st
AR(1) AR(1) (IV) (IV) Stage Stage
Proportion 
Female Seats
-0.048
(0.163)
-0.038
(0.115)
-16.786
(2.836)
-20.795
(2.318)
Female Literacy Rate 0.001
(3.32)
0.001
(2.58)
Proportion Urban 
Population
-2.252
(2.473)
-2.321
(2.656)
-3.690
(2.555)
-3.792
(2.284)
-0.108
(1.44)
-0.113
(1.55)
Constant 0.790
(2.880)
0.952
(3.231)
2.029
(3.610)
0.696
(1.114)
0.041
(1.87)
0.002
(0.08)
Party Controls 
Observations 672
Yes
672 628
Yes
628 628
Yes
628
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. All models include state and 
year effects. All right hand-side variables lagged by one election. Party controls 
include share of seats by party groups as in Column 2 Table 2.5. GLS IV was 
carried out using the female literacy rate as the instrument.
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Table 2.8: Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Politicians
Proportion Population Under Complete Prohibition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Proportion GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS
AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1)
SC/ST Seats 0.957
(1.995)
SC Seats 3.249
(3.739)
3.465
(3.943)
2.871
(3.366)
ST Seats 0.960
(1.700)
0.608
(0.894)
SC/ST 
Female Seats
-0.160
(0.840)
SC
Female Seats
-0.071
(0.486)
-0.092
(0.629)
ST
Female Seats
-0.169
(1.267)
SC Population 0.001
(0.124)
ST Population 0.001
(1.028)
Urban
Population
-2.596
(3.034)
-2.278
(2.817)
-4.275
(3.139)
-1.939
(2.452)
-0.675
(0.914)
-0.782
(1.065)
-0.684
(0.927)
Constant 0.783
(2.632)
0.359
(1.161)
0.631
(1.892)
0.408
(1.312)
0.447
(1.769)
0.460
(1.831)
0.440
(1.742)
Party Controls 
Observations
Yes
670
Yes
670
Yes
542
Yes
670
Yes
610
Yes
610
Yes
610
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. All models include state and 
year effects. All right hand-side variables lagged by one election. Party controls 
include share of seats by party groups as in Column 2 Table 2.5. Sample size is 
smaller in Column 3 as total SC/ST population is available up to 1992.
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Table 2.9: Alcohol Industry
P ro p o rtio n  Com- A lcohol C om plete  P roh ib i-
p le te  P ro h ib itio n  Facto- tio n  A cross W hole
ries S ta te
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS
AR(1) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV)
1st
Stage
Alcohol
Factories
-0.002
(1.771)
-0.014
(1.361)
-0.030
(2.545)
Manufacturing
Factories
-0.001
(0.821)
-0.001
(1.271)
Prop Alcohol 
Factories
-10.900
(1.994)
Labour
Regulation
1.855
(3.49)
Prop Urban 
Population
-2.175
(1.992)
-1.303
(0.376)
0.381
(0.059)
334.019
(10.92)
5.374
(1.349)
10.825
(0.949)
6.105
(1.123)
Constant 0.967
(2.857)
0.518
(0.630)
0.334
(0.722)
-73.950
(6.970)
-0.747
(0.790)
0.168
(0.205)
-0.287
(0.285)
Party Controls 
Observations
Yes
624
Yes
596
Yes
533
Yes
596
Yes
596
Yes
533
Yes
596
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. All models include state and 
year effects. All right hand-side variables lagged by one election. Party controls 
include share of seats by party groups as in Column 2 Table 2.5.
Labour regulation used in the GLS (IV) measures pro-worker versus pro-employer 
labor regulation as complied by Besley and Burgess (2004). They code state amend­
ments to the Industrial Disputes Act as l=pro-worker, 0=neutral, -l=pro-employer 
and accumulate this over the period to generate the labor regulation measure. 
Number of alcohol and manufacturing factories refers to registered factories only. 
The proportion of alcohol factories is a measure of the relative location of the alcohol 
industry across Indian states.
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Table 2.10: Taxation
Proportion Population Under Complete Prohibition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proportion GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS
______________________ AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1)
Tax Revenue -0.277
of GDP (0.660)
Non-Tax Revenue 0.079
(1.040)
State Sales Tax -2.400
(1.431)
State Excise -1.931
(5.672)
Central Grants 0.108
(1.225)
Central Excise Share 
Urban Population -2.149 -2.404 -2.492 -1.653 -2.350
0.887
(2.095)
-2.225
(2.347) (2.882) (2.873) (2.072) (2.760) (2.416)
Constant 0.886 0.925 1.309 0.893 0.934 0.859
(2.762) (3.250) (3.385) (3.421) (3.241) (3.345)
Party Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 636 671 654 671 671 655
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. All models include state and 
year effects. All right hand-side variables lagged one year. Party controls include 
share of seats by party groups as in Column 2 Table 2.5. All proportions except 
proportion tax revenue to GDP are to total state revenues.
91
Table 2.11: Mimicry
Proportion
P ro p o rtio n  P opu la tion
(1) (2)
GLS AR(1) GLS AR(1)
U nder C om plete  P ro h ib itio n
(3) (4)
GLS (IV) GLS (IV)
States with -2.986 -3.070 -2.975 -3.223
Prohibition (9.251) (9.482) (8.843) (9.339)
Alcohol Factories -1.097 -1.619
(4.618) (4.856)
Alcohol Factories* 1.136
States with Prohibi­ (2.267)
tion
Urban Population -1.740 -2.095 -1.699 -1.464
(3.020) (3.336) (2.506) (2.154)
Constant 0.794 0.828 0.869 0.855
(4.871) (3.695) (4.793) (4.751)
Party Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 676 672 628 628
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. All models include state and 
year effects. All right hand-side variables lagged one year. Party controls include 
share of seats by party groups as in Column 2 Table 2.5.
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Table 2.12: Death Rates
P ro p o rtio n  P opu la tion  U nder C om plete  P ro h ib itio n  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS
AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1)
Log Treated 
Liver Diseases
0.004
(0.634)
Log Liver Disease 
Deaths
-0.001
(0.148)
Log Liver 
Cirrhosis Deaths
-0.001
(0.013)
Log Spurious Liquor 
Deaths
-0.001
(0.274)
Log Poisoning Deaths -0.001
(0.138)
Log Road 
Accident Deaths
0.004
(0.478)
Proportion 
Urban Population
-8.666
(2.480)
-8.546
(2.441)
-0.004
(0.011)
0.084
(0.144)
0.170
(0.349)
0.150
(0.314)
Constant 2.188
(2.597)
2.201
(2.611)
0.002
(0.016)
0.152
(0.579)
0.071
(0.479)
0.008
(0.044)
Observations 326 326 192 237 480 480
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. All models include state and 
year effects. All right hand-side variables lagged one year. Party controls include 
share of seats by party groups as in Column 2 Table 2.5.
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Table 2.13: Crime Rates
Proportion Population Under Complete Prohibition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proportion GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS
AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1)
Rapes 0.113
(0.091)
Murders 0.111
(0.265)
Thefts 0.069
(0.363)
Burglaries -0.148
(1.328)
Robberies -0.109
(0.262)
Dacoity 1.731
(1.141)
Proportion 
Urban Population
0.071
(0.145)
-2.136
(2.306)
-2.152
(2.365)
-2.076
(2.296)
-2.203
(2.443)
-2.170
(2.389)
Constant 0.103
(0.387)
0.755
(2.691)
0.753
(2.713)
0.747
(2.747)
0.776
(2.859)
0.765
(2.790)
Observations 288 675 675 675 675 675
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. All models include state and 
year effects. All right hand-side variables lagged one year. Party controls include 
share of seats by party groups as in Column 2 Table 2.5.
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Table 2.14: State Finance Interactions
Proportion Population  U nder C om plete P roh ib ition
Proportion GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS
AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Alcohol Factories -1.045
(4.035)
-0.112
(0.201)
-0.862
(3.272)
-1.674
(3.324)
State Excise -1.916
(5.348)
-1.355
(2.951)
-2.069
(6.120)
-1.535
(4.250)
Alcohol Factories* -13.975
State Excise (1.919)
Central Excise Share 1.077
(2.361)
0.374
(0.650)
0.747
(1.581)
0.427
(0.857)
Alcohol Factories* 6.906
Central Excise Share (1.893)
States with Prohibition -3.069
(9.455)
-2.932
(9.013)
-2.999
(8.889)
-3.404
(9.438)
State Excise* -2.550
States with Prohibition (3.456)
Central Excise* 0.868
States with Prohibition (1.786)
Urban Population -1.346 -1.423 -1.978 -1.922 -0.982 -1.161 -2.018 -2.161
(1.445) (1.542) (1.952) (1.908) (1.650) (2.006) (3.003) (3.238)
Constant 1.038 1.032 0.889 0.944 0.673 0.664 3.298 3.643
(4.448) (4.472) (3.326) (3.544) (3.307) (3.337) (8.546) (9.144)
Observations 623 623 623 623 671 671 655 655
Party Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. All models include state and year effects. All right 
hand-side variables lagged one year. Party controls include share of seats by party groups as in Column 2
Table 2.5.
Table 2.15: Alcohol Industry Interactions
Proportion Population Under Complete 
Prohibition
GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS
(IV) (AR1) (IV) (AR1) (AR1) (AR1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No. Alcohol Factories -0.005
(1.740)
-0.041
(2.737)
-0.008
(4.029)
-0.008
(4.267)
-0.002
(1.907)
-0.010
(2.893)
Proportion Female 
Seats
-22.210
(2.224)
-23.587
(2.563)
No. Alcohol Factory* 
Prop Female Seats
0.869
(2.304)
Election Year Dummy 0.334
(6.234)
0.248
(6.770)
No/ Alcohol Factory 
*Election Year
0.003
(2.985)
Proportion SC Seats 2.726
(3.070)
2.195
(2.417)
Prop Alcohol Factory* 
Prop SC Seats
0.051
(2.423)
Proportion Urban 
Population
-1.345
(0.592)
-1.447
(0.737)
-2.293
(1.156)
-2.263
(1.158)
-1.734
(1.701)
-1.189
(1.159)
Constant 0.022
(0.031)
0.584
(0.887)
0.427
(1.048)
0.426
(1.069)
0.515
(1.772)
0.520
(1.808)
Observations 
R-squared 
Party Controls
580
Yes
580
Yes
624
0.545
Yes
624
0.581
Yes
622
Yes
622
Yes
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. All models include state and 
year effects. Instrument used for column 1 is female literacy rate. Instrument used 
for column (3) as described in text and footnote to Table 2.4. Columns 2 and 4 were 
not instrumented as additional instruments were not available. All variables lagged 
one year except female and SC politicians which are lagged one election. Party 
controls include share of seats by party groups as in Column 2 Table 2.5.
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Chapter 3
Alcohol Prohibition and Addictive 
Consumption
“Prohibition is better than no liquor at all. ”
Will Rogers, (1879-1935) American Humorist and Actor.
3.1 Introduction
Finding tools to affect alcohol consumption is key to reducing the international increase 
in alcohol-related diseases. Alcohol-related illnesses are now represented in the top ten 
causes of deaths worldwide, with the fastest growth observed in the developing countries of 
the Asian sub-continent. This trend has been underlined by a 50% increase in per capita 
pure alcohol consumption since 1980 (WHO (2002)). For developing nations as a whole, 
such consumption directs resources away from basic necessities such as food and shelter 
and may have acute consequences for the welfare of other individuals living within these 
households. It also creates a double burden on limited health resources focused on fighting 
undernutrition and communicable diseases. Mortality represents one aspect of the numerous 
negative private and social effects of excessive alcohol consumption -  the medical literature 
has also emphasized the increased risk of liver cirrhosis, kidney failure and mental illness1.
1 Although some medical research suggests that moderate alcohol consumption is beneficial as it reduces 
the probability of coronary heart disease, strokes and diabetes mellitus, the consensus is that these positive
97
There is also strong empirical evidence to suggest that alcohol consumption is associated 
with negative externalities such as domestic violence, crime, and a higher incidence of motor 
vehicle accidents2.
The element of individual decision-making in triggering alcohol- (and other choice-) re­
lated diseases implies a possible role for government policy3. Traditional policy tools to 
reduce alcohol consumption include measures to affect price directly such as taxation; or 
legal enactments to prevent consumption such as prohibition, which have a more indirect 
effect on the implicit price. The most common methods have been taxation, minimum age 
requirements, and restrictions on drinking hours. However, taxation may have a limited im­
pact on price when demand is inelastic and may not be implemented effectively in economies 
with under-developed taxation systems and poor institutional environments. It is therefore, 
important to analyse the impact of alternative policy handles which may be more feasible 
to implement and more effective in reducing alcohol consumption in developing country 
settings.
This paper examines the determinants of alcohol consumption in India and assesses 
the impact of state-level alcohol prohibition on alcohol demand. Prohibition is an under- 
researched policy area and relatively little is known about its effects on alcohol consumption 
in both developed and developing countries. In fact, it is not clear a priori, whether pro­
hibition affects consumption and, if so, in which direction and through which mechanisms. 
Studying the effectiveness of prohibition is also important given the finding from Chapter 
2 that governments enact prohibition to fulfil alternative self-motivated objectives as op­
posed to improving the efficiency of the market. Consequently, whether prohibition has any 
impact, and if so of what kind, is imperative in assessing the inherent associated trade-offs. 
Finally, examining prohibition policy is important in its own right as it encompasses a sig­
health benefits are overshadowed by the negative effects of excessive alcohol consumption (WHO, 2001).
2 The WHO (2001) estimates that alcohol causes approximately 20-30 %  of motor vehicle accidents, 
homicide, and other intentional injuries. For econometric research linking alcohol to the related externalities 
see for example, Ruhm (1996); Markowitz & Grossman (1998; 1999); Markowitz (1999; 2000a; 2000b); Miron 
(1999a).
3 As noted in Chapter 2, paternalism is economically valid if there are consumption externalities or 
if there is bounded rationality or self-control problems. Nevertheless, arguments for paternalism are not 
sufficient conditions for prohibition. Rather they imply that there may be a role for government in reducing 
consumption but does not specify the actual mechanism.
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nificant policy tool for alcohol control in India - most states at some point have introduced 
alcohol prohibition legislation. This allows for substantial variation in policy across states 
and over time, ideal for assessing the effects of prohibition policy.
Alcohol prohibition is modelled as increasing both the fixed costs of consumption and 
the consumer price in a static model of household demand. The empirical effect on alcohol 
participation and the magnitude of demand is estimated using a Heckman selection model of 
alcohol quantity and budget shares controlling for a large set of household characteristics. 
The effects on the supply side and, in particular, producer prices are inferred through a 
careful analysis of the effect of prohibition on alcohol unit values. Robustness of the results 
from these two analysis are checked by decomposing the effect of total alcohol by type 
and examining the cross-demand effects between alcohol groups. The analysis finds that 
the effect of prohibition on alcohol demand differs by the type of policy enacted and the 
alcohol group. Overall, the estimates suggest that complete prohibition decreased alcohol 
participation by 26%. This resulted mainly from the deterrent effect of prohibition on 
demand although supply shifts also occurred. During periods when only one type of alcohol 
is prohibited, supply shifts are the dominant mechanism in reducing alcohol participation. 
While total alcohol participation decreased, prohibition increased consumption for certain 
types of liquor. Specifically, complete prohibition increased demand for toddy which is 
traditionally home brewed, while partial prohibition increased demand for non-prohibited 
close substitutes.
The significant variation afforded by Indian state prohibition policy provides a useful 
instrument to examine the relationship between alcohol and other “bads” such as leaf to­
bacco, cigarettes, bidis, and pan. The nature of this relationship is important to assess the 
magnitude and nature of spill-over effects of alcohol policy, and provide some insight on how 
consumption of these addictive goods4 can also be curtailed. The results show that alcohol 
and tobacco, and alcohol and pan are complements, although the relationship varies be­
4 Addictive goods axe defined as goods for ehich past consumption has a positive impact on present 
consumption. In Becker and Murphy’s (1988) rational addiction model, future consumption also affects 
current consumption levels. Addictive goods are modelled to have two characteristics: reinforcement, in 
that past consumption increases the marginal utility of current consumption; and tolerance, in that higher 
current consumption is required to attain the same level of utility as in the past (Gruber and Koszegi (2001); 
Becker and Murphy (1990)).
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tween disaggregated tobacco and alcohol items. The spillover effects of alcohol prohibition 
therefore worked to decrease overall consumption of these goods.
This paper adds to the significant economic literature on alcohol demand and the impact 
of policy in curtailing demand. The study of alcohol prohibition improves our understanding 
of alternative policy handles, while the developing country focus expands the empirical 
literature beyond economies with well-functioning markets and institutions. The main 
contribution of this paper is a systematic analysis of three types of prohibition policy using 
household reported data on alcohol consumption which mitigates data problems faced by 
other studies. The paper also adds to the body of work assessing the relationship between 
groups of bads. Specifically, it identifies the relationship between alcohol, tobacco, and pan. 
In doing so it offers insight into the spillover effects of alcohol policies on these markets.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section motivates the 
research and discusses background issues. Section 3 describes the data and summary sta­
tistics of the main variables. The basic model and empirical specification are laid out in 
Sections 4 and 5. The main results are reported in Section 6. Section 7 carries out unit 
value analysis to estimate the price-effect of prohibition. Section 8 discusses the mechanism 
through which prohibition policy effects alcohol consumption. The relationship between 
alcohol and tobacco and pan items is examined in Section 9 and Section 10 concludes.
3.2 Background
There is extensive literature on the effect of alcohol policy on alcohol demand in developed 
countries. Key to this analysis is the price elasticity of demand as this indicates whether 
consumption can be affected by "price-effecting” policies like taxation, and if so to what 
extent. These studies find that the own-price effect for alcohol5 is negative and varies 
substantially across type of drink, and socioeconomic and demographic groups6. Research
5 Clements et al (1997) report that for Australia, Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and 
the U.K. as a whole, the own-price effect for alcohol ranges from -0.98 for spirits to -0.35 for beer and -0.68 
for wine. Leung and Phelps (1993) report elasticities for the US of -0.2 to -1.0 for beer, -0.3 to -1.8 for wine, 
and -0.5 to -3.0 for spirits. See Cook and Moore (1999) for a survey of the literature.
6 Research based on US data suggests that alcohol consumption patterns also vary by gender, age and 
race with women and youths having more elastic, and ethnic minorities having less elastic, alcohol demands 
relative to white adult males. See Grossman et al, (1987; 1993; 1994); Coate and Grossman (1988); Cook
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on similar empirical issues in the developing world is more limited. While it can be argued 
that the underlying models of addictive consumption can be equally applied to all countries, 
it is harder to assume, for reasons of culture, climate and religion, that own-and cross-price 
elasticities for these goods will be similar in magnitude and sign with those found for 
the developed world. Consequently, little is known about the effectiveness and impact of 
traditional alcohol controls policies in developing countries.
This chapter focuses on a relatively under-researched policy tool (in both developed 
and developing countries), used for curtailing the pattern and magnitude of alcohol con­
sumption - prohibition. Given the limited econometric analysis of prohibition, analysing 
its impact on the consumption of alcohol and its substitutes is important, particularly as 
the direction and magnitude of its effect is unclear a priori. For example, on the demand 
side, while the illegal nature of consumption may reduce demand, prohibition may lead to 
“glamorization” of alcohol7 and hence increase consumption amongst certain groups. The 
effects on the supply side and prices is also unclear, as prohibition may not necessarily 
result in an increase in costs. This is likely to occur when there are high initial state ex­
cise rates on production that are abolished during prohibition periods8. The mechanism 
through which prohibition works is not clearly understood. If supply factors are driving the 
change, alternatives should focus on policies to increase the production cost of alcohol. On 
the other hand, if demand factors dominate then policies should emphasize increasing the 
cost of consumption, for example, through permits. There is also limited understanding of 
other unintended effects of prohibition policy such as the demand effect on addictive goods 
which are substitutes for alcohol such as tobacco or drugs, or the impact on illegal activities 
and criminal violence. Therefore, studying alcohol prohibition may shed light on the policy 
effectiveness of prohibition of other addictive goods such as opium, bhang and cocaine and 
the potential policy problems which may ensue.
and Moore (1993); Kenkel (1993); Saffer and Chaloupka (1998).
7 It is hypothesized that this was a factor in increasing alcohol demand in the 1930s prohibition of alcohol 
in the US. It is also believed that drug prohibition increases drug consumption in some countries for the 
same reason Thornton (1991).
8 Miron (2001) formulates a model of supply under prohibition and denotes that although the price of 
the good under prohibition may fall below the non-prohibition price if the tax rate is high, this is not 
an equilibrium for firms to comply with the tax under non-prohibition. The price under prohibition must 
therefore always exceed (weakly) the price under taxation, although the differential may be arbitrarily small.
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While the efficacy of prohibition versus other policy handles such as taxation is an 
important area of research, it is beyond the scope of this paper. This is mainly due to the 
problems of finding a precise price or tax for alcohol comparable across states9. In contrast, 
prohibition legislation is more or less consistent in its mandate across states10 and over time, 
and a relatively easier variable to collect. However we can infer that if prohibition is found 
to increase alcohol supply or have little effect on alcohol consumption, aside from driving it 
underground, other policy levers, such as higher taxation or production quotas, should be 
emphasized to curtail consumption. The effect on consumption is particularly important 
from a public health perspective since available liquor during prohibition is usually illicitly 
produced (and also illegally transported from other states) and hence may have serious 
health consequences for consumers. If the health side-effects are sufficiently large, taxation 
may be a superior tool to curtail alcohol consumption as it allows regulation of quality as 
well as providing the government with an important (in terms of size) source of revenue.
On the other hand, if alcohol demand is price inelastic (at the mean or for segments of 
the demand function) it may not be affected by taxation, thus requiring alternate control 
methods such as prohibition. The existing literature for India finds mixed results for the 
elasticity of alcohol demand. Musgrave and Stern (1988) find demand to be price inelastic 
with elasticities in the range of -0.47 and -0.62. This is corroborated by Reddy and Patnaik 
(1993) and NCAER (2001) who find that higher prices do not decrease demand but lead to 
increased consumption of cheaper varieties of liquor. On the other hand, Mahal (2000) finds
9 This is difficult because the price of a “drink” depends on the type of beverage, brand, volume, retailer 
and location of consumption (restaurants, bars or residence), and can vary across localities. In the absence of 
a local-area price index researchers focusing on developed countries have typically used the average price of 
a 6-pack of beer or the state excise rate on beer (Cook and Moore (1999)). A similar analysis is problematic 
for Indian states as state-specific alcohol prices are not publicly released, are collected mainly from urban 
centers, and as such are not representative of rural prices. Furthermore, even if such prices were available it 
would be difficult to construct an average price for a representative beverage, as there is substantial product 
heterogeneity even within the narrowly defined and commonly consumed local liquor, arrack. The alternative 
of using state excise rates is also problematic due to the complex and disparate excise systems in place which 
make it difficult to calculate effective tax rates across states and even across time within the same state. 
To highlight this further, note that duties range from flat-rate fees to percentages of the manufactured cost, 
actual retail price, or estimated market price set by the state government. These in turn can be levied per 
bulk liter, proof, bottle or case. Aside from these there are different state-imposed production and retail 
structures, some of which are designed to curtail consumption and hence have different effects on the market 
price of alcohol.
10In fact, prohibition legislation across most states is very similar in terms of its extent and the penalties 
it imposes on the production and consumption of prohibited liquor items.
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demand to be elastic for specific segments of the function and for particular demographic 
groups. In particular, Mahal finds the elasticity of alcohol participation to range from - 
0.50 for individuals aged 25 years and over to -1.0 for those between 15 and 25 years11. 
While these elasticity estimates lie in the mid-range of figures reported in the literature for 
the developed countries, prohibition may be more effective relative to taxation in affecting 
demand for alcohol in India. Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 2, prohibition may also be 
more efficient in settings with under-developed tax systems or where tax evasion is high.
Existing econometric analysis of prohibition for the US and other developed countries 
suffer from serious data limitations as consumption is usually inferred from sales/production 
data or estimated using proxies for consumption. The former is subject to large measure­
ment errors as, during prohibition periods, limited records are kept for potable alcohol 
production and no correction is made for illegal supply12. Using proxies such as the liver 
cirrhosis rate or incidence of alcoholism to infer the effect of prohibition on consumption 
is also problematic due to the long gestation period of the effect of alcohol consumption 
on health13. Empirical research on prohibition in India is limited to Mahal (2000) who 
examined alcohol policy in a group of Indian states and included a prohibition dummy for 
Gujarat in his analysis. He found that prohibition has large negative effects on alcohol con­
sumption and simulated declines in consumption rates of 30% to 67% for those over 25 years 
of age and of 90% for those aged between 15 to 25 years. The main problem with Mahal’s 
analysis of prohibition is that the prohibition variable is, in effect, a dummy for Gujarat. 
As such, its effects on alcohol consumption are indistinguishable from fixed-effects particu­
lar to Gujarat for example, a lower disposition for consuming alcohol due to differences in 
preferences, culture or history
There is therefore a significant gap in the literature on alcohol policy, and addictive 
goods as a whole, on the effects of alcohol prohibition. The main contribution of this par
11 Musgrave and Stern (1988) estimate arrack price elasticities using household expenditure surveys for 
Karnataka in 1973/74 and 1977/78. Mahal (2000), calculates the price elasticity of participation using a 
specialized drug survey for Andhra Pradesh. While Deaton (1997) uses NSS alcohol budget-shares in the 
adult-goods approach to detect gender discrimination, the analysis does not cover the price determinants 
of alcohol demand. Aside from these studies, there has been practically no microeconometric work on 
estimating the effect of policy on alcohol demand, and its cross-price effects, in India.
12 See, for example, Bentzen et al (1999).
13See Miron and Zwiebel (1991); Miron (1999b); Dills and Miron (2001).
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per to the existing research is that it provides a systematic analysis of the effect of three 
types of prohibition policy on the consumption of alcohol by alcohol type. It also mitigates 
some of the data problems in previous studies by using a series of representative consumer 
expenditure surveys which cover both home-produced and purchased alcohol. Use of micro- 
data allows examination of detailed household characteristics on demand and provides the 
necessary degrees of freedom to estimate a large number of parameters consistently. The 
analysis in this paper also adds to the understanding of the nature of demand functions 
for alcohol, tobacco, and pan in developing country settings. In doing so it identifies the 
relationship between alcohol and other “bads” by using prohibition as an instrument for 
price. This improves our understanding of the potential spillover effects of alcohol policy 
on the consumption of these items.
3.3 D ata and M ain Variables
3.3.1 D ataset
The main data used in the paper is comprised of measures of prohibition and estimates of 
alcohol consumption. As per Chapter 2, prohibition policy is compiled from State Local 
Acts (See Chapter 2, Appendix 1) and therefore the variable captures enacted legislation 
and not actual enforcement. While the scope of legislation is similar across states and 
time, there are small variations in the extent of penalties imposed14. Therefore, effective 
prohibition can vary over time, across and within states, particularly between rural and 
urban areas. Over the sample period studied, prohibition within a state was enacted over 
the whole state area15 as opposed to in the 1960s and 1970s when it was common to have 
prohibition in selected districts. This implies a natural measure of prohibition as a dummy 
variable such that it takes the value of one for states enacting prohibition for the years 
of the policy and zero otherwise. In all instances prohibition covers both consumption
14 Legislation tends to focus mainly on producers although there are penalties for consumers for consuming 
alcohol during prohibition. The terms of sentences in penalties are fairly similar although there is some 
variation in the level of penalties levied. For example, in Kerala the penalty on alcohol producers is Rs5000 
whereas in Andhra Pradesh it is RslOOO. On the other hand, the penalties for consumers tend to be similar 
across states.
15The only exception over 1983-2000 is Uttar Pradesh which had prohibition in selected areas over 1983- 
1991. This covered 12% of the state’s population.
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and production of the alcohol. Three types of prohibition policy are examined: periods of 
complete prohibition of all alcohol items; periods of partial prohibition when only arrack16 
and no other alcohol is prohibited; and periods of arrack prohibition which measures all 
years of arrack prohibition including when there is complete prohibition. The summary 
statistics in Table 3.1 show that complete prohibition occurred in 8% of the sample, arrack 
prohibition 19%, and partial prohibition 11% reflecting the relative popularity of arrack and 
partial prohibition over the period.
The consumption dataset is compiled from 13 rounds17 of the National Sample Survey of 
India (NSS) covering the years 1983-2000. The NSS is an All-India representative, household 
consumption-expenditure survey covering over 500 food and non-food items and contains 
a large set of household characteristics. The sample studied is a series of cross-sections of 
approximately 600,000 households in both rural and urban sectors of the 16 major states18 
with strictly positive total household expenditure19. The large sample size, time period and 
wide set of socioeconomic variables allow for substantial variation across time and states, 
making it ideal for the study of the impact of alcohol policy on household behaviour.
Total household expenditure and quantity purchased is assumed to be synonymous with 
consumption and includes cash purchase and home grown consumption in the last 30-days. 
Consumption items examined are alcohol disaggregated by type of liquor, tobacco items, 
and pan. Alcohol comprises country liquor or arrack - an unrefined distilled spirit, generally 
made from locally available (and cheap) raw materials such as sugarcane, rice, and coconuts; 
Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL) - alcohol items such as whisky, gin and rum, formally 
produced in large distilleries; beer which includes any alcoholic drink fermented from grain; 
and toddy - fermented palm liquor generally home-brewed.
Several measures of consumption are examined: the budget share of alcohol in total
16 There are some incidences when only toddy was prohibited but these tend to coincide with arrack 
prohibition. As these periods are relatively few they were not analyzed separately.
17These are the 38th, 43rd, 45th, 46th, 47th, 48th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 52nd, 53rd, 54th and 55th rounds 
respectively.
18These are Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Jammu & Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, 
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. 
Together they account for over 95% of total population. In my preliminary analysis of the data I included 
all states and found no change in my main results when the smaller states are dropped.
19 Households reporting per capita expenditures (on all items) lying in the bottom and top 0.05 percentile 
of the distribution were excluded to ensure that results were not excessively influenced by outliers.
105
household monthly expenditure, total quantity consumed, and participation in alcohol as 
estimated by the Heckman model. These measures were selected as they capture differen­
tial effects of prohibition on the pattern of alcohol consumption20. Reported participation 
treats all households who consume liquor equally regardless of the level of consumption, 
whereas budget share analysis and quantity consumed assess the magnitude of consump­
tion once the participation constraint has been fulfilled21. Between the latter measures, 
quantity may be a better indicator of the level of consumption if the associated error in re­
calling quantity consumed does not change across prohibition and non-prohibition periods. 
However, quantity variables may be more subject to measurement error, particular in the 
case of liquor, where prices are usually by the glass or bottle. While, price changes during 
prohibition (say if illegal liquor is more expensive or harder to acquire) cannot be controlled 
for using budget shares, the nature of data collection in the National Sample Survey, and 
the truncation arising from using budget shares suggests that the expenditure data may be 
more reliable and less susceptible to outliers. I therefore report budget share estimates and 
refer to the quantity consumed estimates as a further robustness check. In all of the above 
discussion it should be noted that I assume that the underlying liquor in terms of strength 
and proof, remains the same during prohibition.
3.3.2 M easuring Alcohol C onsum ption
Most papers examining alcohol consumption patterns proxy per capita consumption by 
adjusting production or sales data for the population above 15 years. There are several 
problems with using such a variable in assessing the impact of prohibition on consumption. 
The primary problem is that during periods of prohibition, production data or retail sales of 
potable alcohol are not officially collected22. Hence it is impossible to accurately assess the
20 Although the NSS disaggregates consumption into home-grown and cash purchase, an analysis of the 
extent of home-produced alcohol was not possible due to the limited sample size and small budget share.
21 However, both budget shares and quantity consumed are limited measures of actual alcohol consumption 
as they do not account for the strength, or proof, of drink consumed.
22 In general, in India, figures on retail sales of alcohol are not available as the state government does not 
collect these statistics. The main source of estimates of retail sales is from national breweries such as UB 
Breweries who are extremely reluctant to provide these figures and tend not to maintain historical series. 
Production data is available only through surveys such as the Annual Survey of Industries conducted by the 
Central Statistical Organization which do not distinguish between domestic and foreign consumption.
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amount of alcohol available in practise even using the simple calculation described above. 
The second issue is that of illicit production which generally exists but expands rapidly 
during prohibition23. Using production data would not capture this segment of the market 
and hence would result in an underestimation of alcohol consumption. It would also fail 
to shed light on an important side effect of prohibition - the extent of the consumption 
of illicit alcohol and the increased probability of consuming spurious liquor detrimental to 
consumer health. A separate issue, which is related to the measurement error in calculating 
per capita consumption using production or sales data, is that production figures do not 
take into account inventories or stockpiling at the manufacturing or retailing level which 
would lead to an overestimate of actual consumption levels.
In the Indian context, state alcohol production data are not reliable measures of state 
consumption as production is concentrated in a small number of states and not highly 
correlated with consumption. In addition, there are significant cross-border movement of 
goods. Given that records of cross-border movement of alcohol are limited, no adjustment 
can be made to state production figures implying that production figures alone are not an 
accurate estimate of in-state consumption. Finally, production data does not allow inference 
on the socioeconomic characteristics of alcohol consumers and the frequency with which 
they consume. Both these issues are extremely relevant when assessing and estimating the 
response to any policy change.
The main disadvantage of using the consumer expenditure surveys to estimate con­
sumption is that the data is at the household level and so who consumes cannot be directly 
assessed. However, specialized surveys of drug dependency are generally small scale, cross- 
sectional and localized in their geographical area of coverage. As such, they are not suited 
to study the effects of alcohol policy across states and over time24. A second disadvantage is 
the lack of data on the frequency of consumption, defined as the number of units consumed 
within a specific period of time (usually a week). This is an important indicator in assessing 
the negative effects of alcohol and may itself be affected by prohibition policies. For exam-
23 The 1964 Committee on Alcohol Prohibition is one of the few studies on the extent of illegal liquor in 
India and provides interesting accounts of how this sector rapidly expands during prohibition.
24 Examples include NCAER’s 1994 rural household survey studying alcohol consumption, the Ministry of 
Social Welfare’s 1979 survey of drug dependency in rural Rajasthan, and the WHO’s 1997 survey of alcohol 
consumption in three Indian districts.
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pie, if prohibition increases the fixed cost of obtaining alcohol, by increasing search costs or 
distance to liquor outlet, frequency of consumption may decrease due to the higher effect 
price of consumption. On the other hand, frequency may increase as individuals consume 
more in a single visit to the local arrack shop than they normally would do. This is an 
important spillover specific to prohibition policy which cannot be studied with the avail­
able data, but which qualitative evidence from Andhra Pradesh suggests may be significant 
(Kumari and Salaam (1997)).
Another pertinent issue is that reported alcohol consumption from consumer expenditure 
surveys tends to be sizably lower than figures obtained from retail sales and production25 
(WHO (2000). Such figures do not exist for India but the experience from other country 
studies suggests the shortfall may be significant and hence a relevant issue when assessing 
alcohol demand from expenditure surveys. The discrepancy may be due to underreporting 
as discussed below, or because the design of household surveys tends to exclude some heavy 
drinkers such as slum dwellers and migrant workers or households with transitory life-styles 
for example, some nomadic tribes. The first two groups are excluded as slums do not fall in 
the NSS sample frame and because the expenditures of transitory workers are not generally 
included in the expenses of their permanent household. Amongst the household population, 
non-response may be higher in households headed by young adults or heavy drinkers further 
leading to lower estimates of consumption in the aggregate sample. This is supported by 
studies for the UK which suggest a high degree of skewness in alcohol consumption (Kemsley 
et al (1980)). In particular, Redpath (1987) notes that “30% of the total consumed was 
accounted for by only 3% of the population”.
Alcohol expenditure may also be lumpy and extend beyond the 30-day recall period. 
This is plausible given the context in which alcohol is consumed in India with consumption 
often being confined to social occasions, public holidays and festivals. The 30-day recall 
would overestimate consumption for households who purchase alcohol over greater than 30- 
day intervals but happened to purchase alcohol during the survey period, if such households 
were not randomly distributed across the sample frame. It would underestimate the true
25 Cook & Moore (1999) report that comparisons of self-reported drinking with sales data suggests that 
such surveys typically capture only 40-60% of actual consumption.
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consumption for households who did not report consumption during the survey period but 
consumed over a longer period of time or during specific occasions. If there is a greater 
proportion of the population in the latter category this would result in an underestimation 
of consumption at the aggregate level. In addition to this, there are also reports of alcohol 
being distributed free during election campaigns in rural areas. As the NSS does not collect 
data on consumption out of gifts for all years this may explain any actual shortfall in 
estimates of per capita alcohol consumption based on consumption and production data.
Given this, and the issues later discussed regarding underreporting, it is important to 
emphasize that the analysis below refers to reported alcohol consumption in households 
whose period of purchase is less than 30-days and who happened to purchase alcohol items 
during that time, and is not representative of all alcohol consumers in general. Further­
more, purchase or expenditure on alcohol is taken to be synonymous with consumption i.e. 
stockpiling at the household level and distribution to guests is ignored.
3.3.3 Sum m ary Statistics
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics on key variables used in the analysis. Approximately 
12 % of the total sample report consuming some form of alcohol. Arrack is the most widely 
consumed form of liquor although in the Southern States (Andhra Pradesh in particular) 
the quantity of toddy consumed is also high. 71% of the total sample reporting alcohol 
consumption in the last 30 days consumed arrack; the corresponding figure for toddy is 
20% and 10% for IMFL. However the consumption of IMFL has been steadily increasing, 
and in some states is higher than the consumption of toddy. Beer and wine have the least 
coverage - only 3% of the alcohol consuming sample report beer consumption. The data 
suggests that the majority of households consume a particular type of liquor - only 4% of 
households reporting alcohol consumption consume more than one type of liquor. If this is 
correlated with household characteristics then the effects of partial prohibition will impact 
only specific groups amongst the alcohol consuming population.
Average quantity consumed per household is 10 litres per month, being 8.6 litres for 
arrack, 13.4 litres for toddy, 2 litres for IMFL, and 5.1 litres for beer. Figure 3.1 shows the 
distribution of the total alcohol budget share which has a mean of 5.1% and a median of
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3.6%26. In line with other studies on alcohol expenditure, the distribution is skewed to the 
right: 5.5% have a budget share larger than 15% and 0.5% have a share greater than 30%. 
There does not appear to be any systematic observable difference between households with 
large budget-shares (i.e. greater than 15%) devoted to alcohol and the rest of the alcohol 
consuming sample.
Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2 show the significant variation in alcohol consumption across 
the 16 major states27. Reported consumption, the percent of households reporting alcohol 
consumption, ranges from 4.7% in Gujarat28 to 20% in Andhra Pradesh; while quantity 
consumed ranges from 9 to 18 litres per month for the same states. However, the disparity 
in average alcohol budget shares is lower, with households in Gujarat reporting an average 
budget share of 5.2% relative to 6.0% in Andhra Pradesh. There is also a distinct sectoral 
split in the level and type of liquor consumed with reported and quantity of consumption 
being much higher in the rural sector - 14% compared to 8.3% for participation and 10.4 
litres per month relative to 8.6 for quantity consumed. However, average budget shares are 
significantly higher in the urban sector, 5.6% relative to 4.9% in the rural sector, reflecting 
higher urban prices on average. While arrack is preferred throughout both areas, there is a 
preference for toddy in rural households and IMFL in urban centres. There is no significant 
difference in taste for beer across sectors.
3.4 Basic M odel
I assume a static model of alcohol demand with a weakly separable utility function with 
respect to alcohol and other goods and services29. In doing so I am ignoring the addictive
26 These figures are computed for the alcohol consuming population.
27 Andhra Pradesh enacted partial prohibition of arrack from 1993 and complete prohibition between 
1995-1997. The effect of this policy change is reflected in the figure which shows a dramatic decline in 
reported arrack consumption from 1993 onwards. West Bengal is one of the few states never to have had 
prohibition and shows a steady, slightly downwards, pattern of alcohol consumption aside from a slight 
increase in 1992/93 during trade liberalization when several constraints on the industry were lifted. The 
most important of these was lifting the constraints on grain-based alcohol production that enabled distilleries 
to expand their capacity for IMFL.
28Despite having complete prohibition since Independence, the data for Gujarat shows positive alcohol 
consumption. The source of this liquor is either illicit production or smuggled goods from neighboring states. 
There are also reports of individuals living near state borders temporarily crossing over for a few drinks.
29This ensures that the model is suitably identified and we can analyze the effects of changes in alcohol 
“price” without having to consider the effects on other goods.
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and habit-formation element of alcohol consumption, mainly due to the limitations on the 
empirical analysis imposed by the available data30. Ignoring myopic or rational addiction 
may result in an underestimation of the price-sensitivity of alcohol consumption and hence 
the effectiveness of prohibition policy, both over the short-and long-term. For example, 
Grossman, Chaloupka and Sirtalan (1995) find that in the US the long-run elasticity of 
consumption with respect to price of beer is approximately 60% larger than the short run 
price elasticity in models of addictive behaviour, and twice as large as the elasticity that 
ignores addiction. Therefore the possibility that our estimates of the impact of prohibition 
are the lower bound should be kept in mind when interpreting the results.
The household maximizes a quasi-linear utility function subject to a budget constraint:
M axXfV QU(x ) +  y s.t. px + y =  M  — c (3.1)
C/(0) =  0, U '\x )<  0, c h  0 (3.2)
where 6 is a taste parameter, x  is alcohol, y is a composite commodity representing all other 
goods, p is the price of alcohol, M  is household income, and c is a fixed cost of consuming 
alcohol. First-order conditions are:
QU' -  Xp = 0 (3.3)
1 -  A =  0 (3.4)
px + y — M  + c = 0 (3.5)
30 One potential solution is to study the effects of prohibition announcements as an indicator of future 
price. The problem with this approach is that information about such announcements is difficult to collect 
and household-level stockpiling makes it difficult to detect the direct effect on present consumption due to 
the anticipated decrease in future consumption.
I l l
These imply:
0U(x) = \p  = p/Q (3.6)
x = u' '(p/e) = x(p/e) (3.7)
y = M  — c — px(p/0) (3.8)
The indirect utility function is:
V  (6, p, c) =  QU (x(p/0)) +  M  — c — px(p/0) (3.9)
so the household will consume if:
V{0jP) — 0U(x(p/0)) +  M  — px(p/0) >z c (3.10)
V(0*,p) = c (3.11)
Demand for alcohol is then:
x  =
x{p/Q) if 0 >: 0*(c,p) 
0 otherwise
(3.12)
Within this model, a pure shift in c has a direct effect on 0* such that higher fixed costs 
induce households to cease consumption but do not effect demand given participation. A 
rise in price has two effects - a fall in x(p/0) and a rise in 0*(c,p).
The effect of prohibition on consumption can be analysed using this framework if we 
assume that prohibition increases the effective fixed cost of alcohol consumption and affects 
the price faced by the household. Prohibition may increase the fixed cost of alcohol for 
the household due to difficulties associated in acquiring liquor such as a greater distance 
to the local liquor source or costs of acquiring information about the supply of alcohol. In 
addition, in most states, purchase and consumption of liquor during prohibition is subject
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to penalties further increasing the implicit fixed cost of consuming. Coupled with these are 
imputed costs that arise from a higher probability of drinking spurious liquor which has 
severe health and mental side effects (Manor (1993)). Together these factors suggest that 
prohibition should increase the fixed cost of participating in alcohol consumption and hence 
induce households at the margin to drop out of the market.
The effect of prohibition on price is ambiguous. The retail price of alcohol may rise due 
to the higher costs of evading detection, smuggling liquor from neighbouring states and the 
increased difficulty in acquiring raw materials and equipment for alcohol production. There 
are also severe penalties for being caught producing or retailing illicit liquor within the 
state (which are generally much higher than for consumption) which would factor into the 
production costs for illicit retailers. This rise in costs is expected to shift supply upwards, 
resulting in an increase in the retail price. This should reduce alcohol participation via the 
effects on the taste parameter and decrease the level of demand given participation.
On the other hand, prices may fall as illicit producers no longer pay state excise and 
other duties on production whose marginal rates are often very high. In addition, producers 
no longer face costs of regulation of production and may substitute towards cheaper raw 
materials all of which would reduce costs and increase supply. The decrease in the retail 
price should therefore increase participation and the level of alcohol demanded.
3.5 Empirical Specification
3.5.1 Observed A lcohol Dem and
The observed demand for alcohol therefore depends on the probability of participation as 
follows:
P r(9 h  0*) = Pr(z 0|Z, P) (3.13)
where Z  is a vector of household characteristics and P  is prohibition policy. The observed 
demand will be equal to the true household taste for alcohol only when the first-order 
conditions hold with equality. In all other cases the observed demand will be zero. However, 
for commodities such as alcohol which are characterized as "sin goods", there are problems 
of underreporting in micro-surveys and hence not all zeros in a sample represent corner
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solutions. In household surveys zero reports may also arise due to interviewer error and 
infrequency of purchase over the period of the survey.
Underreporting may arise if households wish to conceal the true expenditure on sin goods 
from the interviewer or other household members who are present. This is particularly 
relevant in the Indian sub-continent where there is a culture of abstinence across religious 
and social lines. For example, in the Hindu religion, alcohol consumption is seen as an 
impurity with the higher castes, Brahmins, being encouraged to abstain. Muslims also 
tend to abstain from alcohol. Underreporting may also arise due to the sex-specificity of 
alcohol consumption31 - the majority of consumers are males who are often reported to 
spend significant percentages of their daily wages on liquor (Pathak (1985); Reddy and 
Patnaik (1993)). The respondent, if male, may thus want to underestimate the magnitude 
of their habit or that of other male household members; or if female, the respondent may 
not actually know the true expenditure on alcohol items.
There are two forms this understatement may take: reporting total or part of the ex­
penditure on alcohol items under other heads such as rice or fruit; or completely omitting 
the item from expenditure leading to a shortfall in total expenditure. Studies in the UK 
on these issues have found that detection of the former is extremely difficult (Kemsley et 
al (1980)). Research on the latter examine shortfalls in total expenditure in the UK using 
special surveys in which informants had to balance all outgoings against incomings over a 
14-day period. These conclude that underreporting did not generally take this form. To the 
author’s knowledge there are no equivalent studies for the NSS or other household expendi­
ture surveys in India. The effect of underreporting, if systematically related to prohibition, 
is discussed further below.
3.5.2 Estim ation o f Censored D ependent Variables
The implications of this and the other sources of measurement error is that alcohol demand is 
a zero-censored variable. Furthermore, due to underreporting and also because of the nature 
of the good, alcohol budget shares are typically a small proportion of the total household 
budget. Consequently, there may not be sufficient variation to detect any significant changes
31 Consumption of other drugs such as tobacco and bhang is less sex-specific (AIIMS (1978)).
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in consumption due to prohibition policy32. The standard approach to estimate censored 
dependent variables is the Tobit model which uses a censored maximum-likelihood function 
and overcomes the inconsistency of OLS. However, within the Tobit framework all zero 
observations represent corner solutions and hence the parametrization restricts the same 
set of variables and parameters to determine both the discrete probability of a nonzero 
outcome and the level of positive expenditures (Yen and Jensen (1996)).
The approach taken in this paper is to estimate Heckman’s generalized Tobit or sample 
selection model which takes the following form:
Vit = <
Witj3 +  un , if zua  +  eu > 0 and w it/3 +  uu > 0
(3.14)
0 , otherwise
where wu  and zu are vectors of explanatory variables, a  and /3 are vectors of parameters, 
and uu and eu are error terms with uu~N(0, a) , eu~N(0,1) and corr(uu, eu) =  p. The 
model decomposes the observed unconditional demand for alcohol into two components, 
one which predicts the probability of consuming positive amounts and one which estimates 
the magnitude of consumption conditional on consuming alcohol. In effect the household 
has to overcome two hurdles for positive demand to be observed - to participate and then 
to consume positive amounts.
The Heckman model assumes that the participation decision dominates the consump­
tion decision and hence zero consumption should not be thought of in terms of marginal 
adjustments, implied by a standard corner solution, but as a separate discrete choice. This 
is essentially an empirical assumption, which is based on the intuition of the underlying 
behavioural model and on observation of the pattern of actual consumption levels recorded 
in the survey. In effect, dominance implies that no individual is observed at a standard cor­
ner solution, and that once the first hurdle has been passed standard Tobit censoring is no 
longer relevant. This has the important implication that, unlike the standard double-hurdle 
model (Cragg (1971)), individuals observed with zero consumption provide no restrictions 
on the parameters of the Engel curve, as none of the zeros are generated by the consumption
32 This problem is referred to in Deaton (1997) who asserts that the problem of small budget shares may 
be one reason the adult-goods approach to detecting gender discrimination has not been successful.
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decision33.
3.5.3 Estim ation Problem s
There are two main problems in estimating the Heckman model for alcohol demand. Firstly, 
the dependent variable (measured by the budget share and quantity) is skewed to the right as 
illustrated in Figure 3.1. While this may also arise from the distribution of the explanatory 
variables it strongly suggests that the error distribution may be non-normal. There is also 
the problem of heteroskedasticity which is usually present in cross-sectional data and which 
preliminary analysis of the data suggests is present. Since maximum likelihood estimators 
are scale (variance) and location (mean) dependent heteroskedasticity implies that one 
cannot recover the parameters of the underlying data generating process34. The estimates 
therefore lose their efficiency and consistency and may be no better than OLS estimates 
that ignore the censoring (Deaton (1997); Melenberg and Van Soect (1996); DiNardo and 
Johnston (1997)). The degree of inconsistency is generally a function of the number of 
censored observations - the more the censoring, the more severe the inconsistency. This 
is therefore likely to be a problem when estimating alcohol demand where the level of 
censoring is high, particularly for the lesser consumed alcohol types like beer. The problem 
of inconsistency is further compounded when the assumption of normal errors is violated 
(Arabmazar and Schmidt (1982)).
Non-normal errors can be handled by specifying an alternative distribution for the error 
term as in Atkinson et al (1989)35; using estimation strategies that require only weak 
assumptions about the distribution of the error term such as Powell’s (1984) Censored Least 
Absolute Deviation (CLAD) estimator36; or transforming the dependent variable using the 
log, Box-Cox, or Inverse Hyperbolic Sine transformations (Yen and Jensen (1996)) which
33 Note that if independence and dominance are assumed to hold together the Heckman model reduces to 
a probit for participation and ordinary least squares for the consumption equation, also referred to as the 
two-part model (Manning et al, 1987).
34This result was first noted by Hurd (1979), Nelson (1981) and Arabmazar and Schmidt (1981).
35 They estimate alcohol budget shares using a variation on the Tobit by assuming that the error terms 
follow the gamma distribution. This allows a variety of shapes for the density function as the skewness varies 
for a fixed standard deviation of the error term. Hence the Tobit is nested within the gamma-Tobit when 
the skewness of error terms equals 0.
36 Another alternative is Powell’s Symmetrically Trimmed Least Squares (STLS) estimator (Powell (1986); 
Chay and Powell (2001)).
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truncate the normal distribution and allows for skewness in the untransformed dependent 
variable. This paper uses the log-normal transformation to address the problem of non- 
normalilty. The log-normal transformation has been found to reduce skewness in income 
distributions and thereby ameliorate concerns regarding non-normality of errors (van de 
Ven (1981); Azzalini et al (2003)). The first approach of specifying the error distribution 
was not used since the distribution of the error terms is almost always unknown, hence it 
is not always clear how one might re-specify the likelihood function in order to do better. 
Furthermore, while the CLAD estimator is appealing on theoretical grounds, it does not 
allow separate parametrization of the participation and consumption decision. It is also 
computationally very demanding and given the size of the dataset difficult to estimate 
within a reasonable period of time. In order to account for heteroskedasticity, all test 
statistics were calculated using robust standard errors based on Huber-White’s method of 
quasi-maximum likelihood estimation, and clustered at the state level.
3.5.4 Econom etric Specification
The econometric specification I use is Working-Lesser’s (1943) Engel curve for items pur­
chased by household i in state s and year t:
la o>ist =  ot-\- f3 In X ist +  7  In IVist +  ^%ist +  P>Pat +  Pa +  $t +  £ist (3.15)
where a is the measure of alcohol consumption, X  is per capita real monthly household 
expenditure, N  is household size, Z  is a vector of household characteristics, P  is prohibi­
tion policy and p and 8 are state and year dummies. Household characteristics included 
are household caste (scheduled caste/tribe or general caste) and the sex, literacy, land own­
ership, age, marital status and occupation of the household head37. The state dummies 
were introduced to control for state-specific variables which may effect alcohol consump­
tion, such as a high preference for liquor, and which if not controlled for may result in serial 
correlation in the error terms. The year dummies control for year-effects at the All-India
37 Unfortunately, the NSS does not collect data on household religion for every round so it was excluded 
from the econometric analysis. A sample analysis found religion to be significantly related with alcohol 
participation with Muslim and Buddhist households drinking less relative to Sikhs, Hindus, and Christians.
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level such as trade liberalization which may have increased alcohol consumption. State-year 
dummies were not included as this would have effectively removed much of the variation in 
the data and as it is difficult to think of state-specific time-varying variables which would 
systematically effect alcohol consumption38. The main source of variation in the existing 
model is therefore within state over time.
3.6 Prohibition and Alcohol Consum ption
3.6.1 Pattern  o f A lcohol Consum ption in India
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 report maximum likelihood estimates of the Heckman model for alcohol 
budget shares and quantity. Income, proxied by log per capita household expenditure, is 
positively and significantly associated with alcohol participation across all alcohol types with 
the probability of participation being higher for IMFL and beer, the luxury liquor types. The 
expenditure elasticity of quantity indicates that alcohol is a normal good with the elasticity 
varying by alcohol type. However, the expenditure elasticity of alcohol budget shares is 
negative which suggests that among households who consume, proportionate increases in 
income result in less than proportionate increases in alcohol budget shares. Taken together, 
this means that as income increases, quantity of alcohol consumed increases in proportion 
but the price paid falls. This may be due to lower costs of acquiring alcohol as income rises, 
for example due to bulk buying.
Overall, rural households have a significant preference for arrack and toddy relative to 
urban households and a lower preference for IMFL. The pattern of expenditure elasticities 
across alcohol types (not reported) across the sectors are similar, although alcohol as a 
whole, is more expenditure elastic in urban households.
The positive and significant coefficient on the log of household size is a measure of the 
economies of scale in consumption and indicates that larger households are also those that 
are more likely to consume alcohol. This suggests that when per capita expenditure is 
used, a large proportion of children may conceal the actual disposable income available to
38 One possible state-time varying variable may be state and local elections in which alcohol is often 
distributed free to villagers.
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consumers in the household who may wish to consume alcohol (Musgrave and Stern (1988)). 
This result is also consistent with a story that adult alcohol consumption is driven by the 
proportion of children in the household or some other factor which drives both consumption 
and fertility decisions.
Land ownership significantly increases participation and quantity consumed of total al­
cohol, particularly of arrack and toddy. It is not significant for IMFL and beer consumption 
which suggests that economic stratification by land owned is not an important determinant 
of demand for these alcohol types. Analysis by sector, shows that land ownership in general 
significantly increases rural alcohol consumption but significantly decreases urban alcohol 
consumption, reflecting the importance of land as a measure of asset ownership and wealth 
in the former relative to the latter.
Alcohol participation is, in general, significantly lower in female-headed households39 
and in households with a higher proportion of females40. It is also lower for households 
headed by older individuals, but significantly higher in households with married heads. 
Literate household heads imply significantly lower consumption of arrack and toddy but a 
strong preference for IMFL. Scheduled caste and scheduled tribe households are more likely 
to participate(or report) in consumption of all alcohol types relative to general castes41. This 
may be because as members of the lower castes in the caste system they are less bound 
by the Hindu principles of temperance which are most strictly enforced on the priestly 
(Brahmins) and higher castes. With respect to quantity demanded, scheduled castes and 
tribes consume significantly more arrack.
The pattern of alcohol consumption also varies across occupation of the household head 
(not reported). All occupations, except for service workers, consume significantly less alco­
hol and arrack than labourers. Consumption of toddy is also significantly less for profes­
sionals, administrative personal, executives and clerical and sales staff relative to labourers. 
After including all controls, we find that IMFL consumption is not significantly different for
39 The sex-specificity of consumption is reflected somewhat in the observation that female-headed house­
holds report lower alcohol participation: 3.7% compared to 12.6% in male-headed households.
40See Chapter 4 for a detailed anlysis of household demographic composition on alcohol consumption and 
the differential effect of prohibition.
41 Given that Chapter 2 found scheduled castes to be a significant determinant of prohibition while sched­
uled tribes were not, the estimates were run using separate SC and ST dummies. However, the results were 
similar for both groups and hence they were aggregated to increase the degrees of freedom in the estimation.
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professionals relative to labourers, although the coefficients for other white-collar workers 
e.g. administrative and clerical staff, are positive.
3.6.2 Effect o f Prohibition Policy on A lcohol C onsum ption
The regressions in Tables 3.5 to 3.8 report the effect of complete, partial, and arrack prohi­
bition policy on alcohol participation and consumption. Since the estimated coefficients on 
the independent variables reported in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 do not change significantly, only 
coefficients for the prohibition variables are presented. The complete prohibition variable 
captures the effect of prohibition policy on alcohol budget shares and participation when all 
potable alcohol types are prohibited within that state, while the partial prohibition dummy 
captures the effect on each alcohol type when arrack alone is prohibited. The arrack pro­
hibition variable estimates the effect on consumption for all periods for which arrack is 
prohibited (i.e. periods of complete and partial prohibition).
Overall, complete prohibition had a significant negative effect on total alcohol participa­
tion reducing it by approximately 26% (Column 2, Tables 3.5 and 3.7). There was a limited 
effect on total quantity consumed but a significant decrease in budget shares implying a 
decrease in alcohol price. Complete prohibition also decreased arrack participation by 50% 
and quantity consumed by 22%. There is also evidence of a significant increase of 18% 
in arrack budget shares. The direction of change of arrack consumption is similar when 
looking at periods of arrack prohibition. Prohibition increased toddy participation which is 
in line with toddy being home-produced and easy to substitute for other types of alcohol. 
Participation in IMFL and beer strongly decreased but the effect on quantity consumed 
was weak (Columns 4 and 6, Table 3.8). There was a positive and significant effect on the 
respective budget shares implying an increase in prices (Columns 4 and 6, Table 3.6).
The partial prohibition term captures the effect on alcohol demand when only arrack 
was prohibited. The estimates show that partial prohibition significantly decreased both 
participation and consumption (budget shares and quantity) of total alcohol (Column 2, 
Tables 3.5 and 3.7). The decrease in participation appears to be driven mainly by the 
large decrease in arrack which also experienced a significant decrease in quantity consumed. 
Partial prohibition of arrack also significantly decreased toddy participation in both sectors.
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This may be due to some periods of arrack prohibition coinciding with toddy prohibition. 
On the other hand, participation in IMFL rose significantly by approximately 13%. This 
suggests that alcohol consumers substituted towards IMFL from arrack during period of 
partial prohibition but reduced consumption of both during complete prohibition.
The finding that prohibition decreased alcohol consumption is similar to findings for the 
US National Prohibition. Warburton (1932) estimated declines in consumption of approx­
imately 30% in the first few years of prohibition, although consumption subsequently rose 
while remaining below pre-1920 levels. Thornton (1991) reviews the qualitative and avail­
able empirical literature for this period, and notes that consumption levels had increased 
to pre-1920 levels a few years after prohibition was lifted in 1933.
The results for India suggest that alcohol consumption during prohibition did not fall to 
zero which indicates a higher probability of consuming spurious liquor for the alcohol con­
suming population. Black market alcohol tends to be supplied through illegal manufacture 
of alcohol within the prohibited state or smuggled from non-prohibition states. While all 
illegal alcohol is not necessarily spurious, there is a higher probability of alcohol poisoning 
due to the lack of regulation of production, and the addition of chemicals and drugs to low- 
proof alcohol to give them an additional kick. Prohibition of alcohol may therefore result 
in specific alcohol-related health problems arising from drinking spurious liquor. This is a 
particularly relevant issue given that such negative effects are not typically associated with 
alternative alcohol policies such as taxation.
3.6.3 Incidence o f Prohibition
Prohibition had differing effects on alcohol consumption depending on household charac­
teristics including sectoral location, demographic composition, scheduled caste/tribe status, 
sex of the household head and literacy of household head (Table 3.9). Sector-specific analy­
sis suggest that both complete and partial prohibition policy had a differential impact on 
participation in the rural and urban sector, with policy being significantly less effective in 
the rural sector, particularly for toddy and IMFL. This differential may be due to differences 
in the price elasticity of demand or in the effect of prohibition on the fixed costs of acquiring 
alcohol. The former may arise if preferences differ across sectors due to inherent tastes or
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differences in quality e.g. in the strength of alcohol. Ceteris paribus, given a higher urban 
price elasticity a shift in supply due to prohibition would reduce consumption more relative 
to the rural sector.
The effect of prohibition on fixed costs may differ across sectors if, for example, it is 
harder to enforce prohibition policy in rural areas where home brewing is easier and where 
illicit liquor is more prevalent, due to geographical dispersion or fewer police staff per pop­
ulation or area. Fixed costs may also rise in the urban sector if there is a higher probability 
of consuming spurious liquor. As prohibition policies in the period studied were enforced 
throughout the state concurrently, the differential impact across the sectors does not cap­
ture a difference in the timing of the policy. They may, however, capture unobservable 
differences in underreporting across rural and urban areas e.g. if urban households were 
more conscious of breaking the law, contributing to a more negative urban prohibition co­
efficient. Nevertheless, reported consumption of alcohol is nonzero in urban households 
during prohibition periods and the effect on toddy is actually positive, suggesting that the 
observed sectoral differences are unlikely to result from systematic underreporting.
Prohibition had a differential effect on households with literate heads, whose total con­
sumption of alcohol fell significantly. This is driven mainly by falls in toddy and IMFL 
consumption with literate household consuming less of these during prohibition periods. 
While complete prohibition impacted SC/ST households less relative to general households, 
partial prohibition led to a significant decrease in arrack consumption for SC/STs. There 
is also evidence of a significant increase in toddy and IMFL consumption for SC/ST house­
holds during this period. In spite of this the overall effect on alcohol consumption during 
partial prohibition is negative suggesting that arrack prohibition, to some extent, had its 
desired effect.
Prohibition significantly decreased alcohol consumption in households with relatively 
more males, which is expected given that men are the main consumers of alcohol in Indian 
society. There is also a differential affect by the sex of the household head. Consistent with 
the finding that female headed households are less likely to consume any form of alcohol, 
complete prohibition had less effect on alcohol consumption in these households42. This
42 The only exception was for toddy whose consumption decreased relative to male-headed households
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follows, as alcohol use in these cases may be very low making inference of change difficult, 
or inelastic due to households preferences or problems with alcohol addiction.
3.6.4 R obustness Checks 
Under-reporting
As noted earlier, the dependent variable may suffer from underreporting. If underreporting 
is generated from a random process and independent of other right-hand-side variables in 
the analysis, its main effect is to result in inefficiently large standard errors. Thus, although 
the coefficient estimates will be non-biased it will increase the probability of Type 2 errors 
(i.e. failure to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient is zero). In practice, due to 
the sin nature of alcohol consumption, underreporting is likely to be highly correlated with 
individual and household characteristics such as religion, caste, sex, wealth and literacy 
and as such is empirically indistinguishable from individual preferences. More importantly, 
underreporting may have a time series element which may effect the analyses of alcohol 
prohibition - individuals may deliberately report lower or no consumption of alcohol during 
prohibition due to the criminalization of consumption. This would result in any estimates 
of the effect of prohibition on consumption to be biased downwards.
In practise, this type of underreporting is likely to be limited as respondents to the NSS 
household survey have little incentives to underreport during prohibition. First, although 
prohibition legislation bans both consumption as well as production, it should be noted that 
enforcement is mainly concentrated on producers and that the penalties for consumption 
are much lower than for manufacturing or retailing liquor. For example, in Andhra Pradesh, 
the penalty for manufacturing liquor is imprisonment of at least 2 years and/or fines of at 
least Rs5000. The corresponding figures for consumption are imprisonment of at least 3 
months and/or fines of at least Rs500. Secondly, in practise, the law is mainly applied to 
individuals arrested during raids on illegal arrack shops or found under the influence of 
alcohol and not enforced within residences or ex post. Furthermore, the limited extent of 
underreporting of illegal consumption is born out by widely documented reports of other
during prohibition.
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illegal activities in the NSS surveys such as opium consumption and the payment of dowries, 
both of which are subject to large fines and imprisonment.
From an econometric perspective the problem of systematic underreporting is addressed 
by using instrumental variables which are selected to be highly correlated with prohibi­
tion but uncorrelated with the underreporting error and alcohol demand. However, it is 
difficult to find suitable proxies for state-level prohibition policies which fulfil this criteria 
such that it is both uncorrelated with underreporting and unrelated to alcohol consump­
tion. The following section discusses potential instruments and the basic results from the 
instrumentation analysis.
Endogeneity
It could be argued that the results in Tables 3.5 to 3.8 may be subject to simultaneity 
bias as prohibition policy may not be exogenous to alcohol consumption. The analysis in 
Chapter 2 provides strong evidence that prohibition is not related to the negative effects 
associated with alcohol or the production of alcohol. By extension, this implies that the 
extent of alcohol demand within a state is not the main factor driving prohibition policy. 
However, in order to check the robustness of the results with respect to endogeneity concerns 
and address the issue of systematic underreporting, potential instruments for prohibition 
were examined based on the determinants of prohibition legislation found in Chapter 2. 
These include the timing of the electoral cycle, the sex and caste of legislatures, the size 
and location of the alcohol industry, the proportion of state excise, and the share of central 
excise. A priori, some of these variables are not suitable instruments for prohibition policy 
as they may also affect alcohol consumption directly. For example, as noted earlier, the 
electoral cycle may be associated with alcohol consumption as liquor is often distributed 
free as part of the campaigning strategy. In addition, state excise will tend to be higher 
where alcohol consumption is higher, while the share of central excise may be affected by 
preferences for addictive goods. Furthermore, the size of the alcohol industry and location 
of alcohol producers could be argued to be associated with alcohol consumption. Finally, 
the proportion of states with prohibition may indicate that non-prohibiting state are those 
with higher alcohol consumption or other non-observables related to alcohol preferences.
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Of the set, the best candidate is the proportion of schedule caste legislatures which 
was found to be positively correlated with prohibition43. The results of the instrumented 
estimates do not find any significant effect of prohibition on alcohol consumption by type. 
This may be due to the lack of variation in the instrument over the sample period, given that 
the variable is constant between elections held approximately every five years. In addition, 
the proportion of scheduled caste politicians may not be exogenous to alcohol consumption 
in equilibrium, as higher consumption may result in more scheduled caste politicians being 
elected given their preferences for prohibition. The analysis therefore has not been fully 
tested for robustness, and the results should be interpreted bearing this caveat in mind. The 
arguments presented above do suggest that underreporting and endogeneity may not be as 
significant as thought. Nevertheless, future work will focus on finding suitable instruments 
to further check the robustness of these results.
Out-migration
It could be argued that the negative prohibition coefficient reflects out-migration of alco­
hol consumers to non-prohibition states rather than an actual decrease in consumption44. 
However, this is unlikely as out-of-state migration is mainly determined by ethnic and eco­
nomic reasons rather than a sole preference for alcohol. Given that Indian states tend to 
be linguistically and culturally heterogeneous relative to one another this would imply low 
rates of migration for ethnic reasons alone45. If prohibition policy was accompanied by 
other socially restrictive policies, e.g. lack of religious freedom, freedom of information etc., 
the case for migration would be higher but this pattern in government policy can not be 
observed for the period of study.
43 The proportion of female legislatures was not used as Chapter 2 has shown it is endogenous with respect 
to prohibition unless instrumented.
44 An analysis of how prohibition affects migration figures was not possible as the main state migration 
figures are produced decennially in the Census of India.
45 The 1956 States Reorganization Act arranged Indian states along cultural and linguistic lines and al­
though there are disputed taluks, and hence ” similar” villages, along state borders their relative populations 
are small. Thus it is unlikely that mass migration would be possible to these culturally similar areas in 
neighboring states without prohibition.
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3.7 U nit Value Analysis
In order to test whether prohibition increases the price of alcohol, an analysis of the unit- 
value of each alcohol type was carried out for each sector. Unit values are computed by 
dividing total expenditures by total quantity consumed and, as such, differ from price as 
they are affected by the choice of quality. Thus, high-quality items, or mixtures that have a 
relatively large share of high-quality items, will have higher unit values. Following Prais and 
Houthakker (1955), Deaton (1997), and Deaton and Tarozzi (2000) I estimate the following 
specification of unit values:
hi Vist — ot +  /? In Xiat +  7 In Niat +  A Zi8t +  iiPst +  Pa +  +  £ist (3.16)
where lnu,a* denotes the log unit value of the item in household * in state s and year 
t and other variables are as defined in Equation 3.15. OLS estimates of this regression 
were calculated for all alcohol types. Each estimate was corrected for cluster effects at 
the state and village level which implicitly assumes that market prices do not vary within 
each village over the relevant reporting period. This is important as unit values vary 
with actual market prices hence omitting them would result in biased and inconsistent 
estimates (Deaton (1997)). The effect of alcohol prohibition on alcohol price was inferred 
by including a prohibition dummy in the unit value analysis46. As noted above, unit values 
are approximates to price due to the heterogeneity in quality even within narrowly defined 
groups. In the analysis which follows we are thus assuming that alcohol quality remains 
constant between prohibition and non-prohibition periods47.
The estimates in Tables 3.10 and 3.11 suggest that the expenditure elasticity of quality 
is positive and differs across alcohol types - i.e. households with higher per capita monthly 
expenditure consume higher quality alcohol items as reflected by the higher unit value they 
pay. The effect of prohibition on the unit value differs by the type of alcohol and nature
46 OLS estimates of the determinants of alcohol unit log values excluding prohibition variables were not 
reported as the main results are similar to when prohibition is included.
47 This may be a strong assumption per se as supply during prohibition is partly through illicitly brewed 
liquor which may be of lower quality. Nevertheless, once costs of detection are factored into price it is 
assumed that total price will increase.
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of prohibition in force. For total alcohol, complete prohibition significantly decreased unit 
values while partial prohibition significantly increased them. On the other hand, complete 
prohibition did not affect arrack unit values. The overall effect of arrack prohibition on 
arrack unit values is positive and significant and is driven mainly by increases during partial 
prohibition. The unit value of toddy decreased significantly during periods of complete and 
partial prohibition. The lower price may indicate a greater shift toward home-production 
of toddy when arrack or toddy itself is prohibited. Prohibition, both complete and partial, 
increased the unit value of IMFL. There is also a positive significant effect of complete 
prohibition on unit values of beer.
3.8 Policy M echanism
Reconciling the above results to those from the effect of complete prohibition on consump­
tion we can deduce that prohibition had a significant deterrent effect on total alcohol par­
ticipation and a more limited effect on actual consumption. This follows despite the large 
decrease in alcohol unit values suggesting that the downwards demand shift due to higher 
fixed costs of consumption dominated any supply effect arising from prohibition. Complete 
prohibition also deterred arrack participation as well as quantity consumed. The lack of 
impact on unit values means that the demand decrease was offset completely by a decrease 
in supply. This resulted in the overall budget share of arrack increasing during complete 
prohibition. The increase in toddy consumption and decrease in price indicate an increase 
in toddy supply during complete prohibition, perhaps due to the ease of home-production 
and low detection rates. On the other hand, it is clear that there was an upwards supply 
shift dominating any demand decrease for IMFL and beer as reflected by the increase in 
unit values and decrease in participation. This is corroborated by the increase in the budget 
shares of households consuming IMFL and beer during prohibition.
The limited effects on quantity consumed for all alcohol aside from arrack mean that 
there were no significant changes in the magnitude of alcohol demand among those con­
suming during complete prohibition periods. This may be because those continuing to 
participate in consumption during prohibition are those households with more inelastic al­
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cohol demand functions. The significant changes in budget shares are therefore the result 
of the changes in unit values, ceteris paribus.
During partial prohibition, supply shifts dominated in affecting alcohol demand, par­
ticularly for arrack. This resulted in an increase in arrack unit values and a corresponding 
decrease in participation and quantity demanded. Interestingly, participation of IMFL in­
creased by 13% during the prohibition of arrack. This together with the increase in IMFL 
unit values indicates an upward shift in demand as consumers substitute IMFL for arrack. 
Partial prohibition, decreased participation in both toddy and beer which suggests that 
they are complements to arrack. The decrease in toddy may also be due to some periods 
of arrack prohibition coinciding with toddy prohibition which could not be separately iden­
tified. However, when all alcohol is prohibited, the increase in toddy consumption reflects 
the relative utility of any alcohol consumption.
Overall, arrack prohibition significantly decreased both participation and quantity of 
arrack consumed, and increased unit values. The latter suggests that the effectiveness of the 
policy arose mainly from a decrease in supply during prohibition, although there may have 
also been demand effects. This drove the overall decrease in total alcohol consumption which 
was somewhat mitigated by the increase in demand for IMFL as consumers substituted away 
from arrack during partial prohibition. Nevertheless, the results are promising for arrack 
prohibition, given arrack’s large share in alcohol and its high proof relative to the other 
alcohol types.
These results suggest that prohibition affects consumption in two ways - by inducing an 
upwards shift in supply which increases the producer price faced by the consumer and by 
increasing the fixed cost of alcohol demand (c in the model) which results in a downwards 
shift in demand. The relative importance of each depends on the type of prohibition enacted 
and the liquor type. For complete prohibition, the demand effect on arrack participation 
dominates and is reinforced by decreases in supply. On the other hand, for IMFL and beer 
supply effects dominate any demand shifts. For partial prohibition of arrack, the supply 
effect dominates any decrease in demand. The importance of the demand shift during 
complete prohibition indicates that prohibition has a significant deterrent effect, in that 
households are less likely to consume liquor even if available, during prohibition periods.
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This result is particularly significant given that prohibition is traditionally modelled as 
working mainly through constraining supply (Thornton (1991)). The policy implications 
are that the estimated decrease in consumption are larger than anticipated from the supply 
effect alone. This means that similar decreases in alcohol consumption can not easily be 
replicated using taxation unless very large producer taxes are enforced.
3.9 Alcohol and Addictive G oods Consum ption
There is extensive literature on the cross-price effects of alcohol demand with respect to 
cigarette and drug consumption. These studies find conflicting results with respect to 
the nature of the relationship between alcohol and these addictive goods. Some authors, 
find that alcohol and cigarettes are economic complements while others find evidence of 
substitution48. In a similar vein, some studies of drug consumption find a positive relation­
ship between US beer taxes and marijuana consumption49. More recently however, Pacula 
(1998a; 1998b) finds that youth consumption of alcohol and marijuana are complementary.
The nature of the relationship between alcohol and the consumption of other addic­
tive goods is important to assess the spillover effects, if any, of alcohol policy50. If alcohol 
and these goods are economic substitutes, then an effective prohibition policy will unin­
tentionally increase the consumption of other addictive goods which, given their associated 
negative effects, would have to be controlled using alternative policies. On the other hand, if 
addictive substances are a complement to alcohol, decreased alcohol consumption will have 
a greater positive impact on health than if it was consumed alone and there is a stronger 
case for curtailing consumption.
The additive goods examined are total tobacco items, bidis, leaf tobacco, cigarettes and 
pan. Smoking is associated with increased risk of lung, throat, and stomach cancer and
48 See Dee (1999); Decker and Schwartz (2000); Shew-Jiun and Yen (2000); and Cameron and Williams 
(2001).
49See, for example, DiNardo and Lemieux, (1992); Chaloupka and Laixuthai (1994); Thies and Register 
(1993); Farrelly et al (1999).
50 Some studies for the US find that policies restricting the availability of alcohol in the 1990s have increased 
the consumption of marijuana by adolescents suggesting that they may be economics substitutes. See 
DiNardo and Lemieux (1992); Chaloupka and Laixuthai (1992). Others imply that early use of alcohol 
encourage adolescents to experiment with marijuana, implying that they are economic complements (Kandel 
and Maloff (1983); Ellickson and Hays (1991)).
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is considered to be highly addictive. As such, tobacco items axe obvious candidates for 
study. In addition, the breakdown by type of item is interesting as bidis and leaf tobacco 
contain more nicotine relative to cigarettes. Approximately 59% of households in the sample 
report tobacco consumption with the majority of tobacco consumers consuming bidis (58%) 
followed by leaf tobacco (32%) and cigarettes (13%). Together these items comprise 90% of 
all tobacco items consumed. Household preferences appear to be limited to particular forms 
of tobacco with only 10% of smoking households smoking more than one type of tobacco.
Pan is also considered to be an additive substance with negative health effects, although 
the magnitude and nature of these are not widely documented51. Given that pan is often 
chewed as a mouth refresher after drinking or smoking, there is reasonable grounds to 
assume a relationship between its consumption and drinking. 32% of the sample reports 
pan consumption. As with alcohol there is a distinct sectoral split to pan and tobacco 
demand, being significantly higher in the rural sector. Cigarettes are the only exception, 
being more popular in urban areas. There is also substantial variation in consumption rates 
across states with Punjab having a tobacco participation rate of 27% and Assam of 74%; 
and pan participation rates of 3.3% and 83% respectively.
The consumption patterns across the set of addictive goods suggests that on the whole 
tobacco and pan are complements to alcohol. Households consuming alcohol are significantly 
more likely to also consume tobacco relative to those who don’t (84% of alcohol consuming 
households smoke compared to 56% of tee-total households) and vice versa (17% of smoking 
households consume alcohol compared to 4.7% of non-smoking households). A similar 
pattern is found for pan - 39% of drinking households also consume pan compared to 30% 
of tee-total households while 14%% of pan consuming households also drink relative to 10% 
of non-pan consuming households. In all cases the difference in proportions is significant.
The determinants of addictive goods consumption estimated using a specification sim­
ilar to Equation 3.15 are reported in Table 3.12. Expenditure elasticities for participation 
are positive for total tobacco and pan, although there is substantial variation across to­
bacco types. Amongst those who participate, the expenditure elasticity of budget shares
51 Pan is thought to have detrimental effects on dental and mental health and lead to mouth cancer. 
However, the negative externalities associated with pan consumption are much lower than for tobacco and 
alcohol.
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is negative implying that richer households spend proportionately less on addictive goods 
than poorer ones. Across sectors, rural households are more likely to participate in tobacco 
and pan consumption but significantly less likely to consume cigarettes - the luxury tobacco 
type. Female headed households tend to consume less of all tobacco items and pan, while 
landed household and households with older heads tend to consume less bidis and cigarettes 
but significantly more leaf tobacco and pan. Educated households consume more cigarettes 
while scheduled caste/tribe households consume more bidis and leaf tobacco. There are 
also differential consumption patterns by occupation with most groups, aside from farmers, 
consuming significantly more cigarettes and less bidis and leaf tobacco relative to labourers.
The relationship between alcohol consumption and addictive consumption is analysed 
by estimating the following model:
l is t  =  o: +  Kdist +  /? hi Xist +  7 In Nist +  \ z ist 4- pa-\- 8f\- Sist (3*17)
where Oi8t is household alcohol participation, list is reported participation in consump­
tion of the addictive good, and the other variables are as previously described. Reported 
participation is the measure of consumption used as the previous analysis has shown that 
prohibition has the greatest impact on this aspect of demand. In addition, measurement 
error problems are assumed to be lower relative to quantity consumed or household bud­
get shares52. A potential source of bias remains if households systematically underreport 
participation in the consumption of one item relative to the other. This is plausible in the 
Indian context where alcohol consumption is considered more taboo than consumption of 
the other addictive goods studied. The effect of this would be to underestimate the strength 
of the relationship between the goods and hence the estimates should be considered as the 
lower bound to the true cross-effect.
It is clear that this specification is not suitably identified as its excludes important 
unobservables which may influence both alcohol and addictive good participation such as an 
idiosyncratic rate of time preference. In order to overcome this, Equation 3.17 was estimated
52 The problem of measurement error may be significant particularly for budget share analysis as errors in 
total expenditures would result if the residual and independent variables were correlated. This would give 
rise to biased, inconsistent estimates.
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using a probit model with alcohol prohibition (complete and partial) as an instrument for 
alcohol consumption. The advantage of using prohibition over alcohol price arises due to 
the orthogonality of the policy with respect to latent variables which drive both alcohol 
and addictive goods participation. This overcomes the problem of omitted variable bias 
that is present when directly estimating the cross-price effect, for example, if a decrease in 
aggregate income is driving both, and enables consistent estimates of the effect of alcohol 
consumption on addictive consumption. As shown earlier, prohibition is highly associated 
with alcohol participation and results in a relatively large variation in alcohol consumption 
making it statistically easier to estimate the nature of the relationship. If we assume 
that the unobservable determinants of alcohol and addictive participation have a positive 
covariance then the coefficient estimated in Equation 3.17 will overstate the true relationship 
between the two goods. They would therefore constitute an upper bound to the instrumental 
variables estimates in the absence of misspecification.
Instrumental variables probit estimates of Equation 3.17 are reported in Table 3.13 with 
complete, partial and arrack prohibition being the instruments for alcohol participation by 
type53. Note that this table concentrates only on the coefficients of alcohol participation 
for space considerations and as the estimates for the other explanatory variables did not 
change significantly from those in Table 3.12. In estimating the model, there are issues 
of non-linearities arising from the instrumentation of a dichtomous variable like alcohol 
participation. Following Angrist (2000) the analysis therefore reports on the nature, rather 
than the magnitude, of the relationship between the variables.
The broad relationship between alcohol and tobacco and alcohol and pan is complemen­
tary and highly significant. The positive relationship also holds for bidis and leaf tobacco 
but not for cigarettes which is strongly negatively associated with all types of alcohol partic­
ipation. Amongst households consuming alcohol, those who consume IMFL are significantly 
less likely to consume the addictive goods considered in this analysis. This is in line with 
more educated households heads consuming IMFL and education being related to lower
53 OLS instrumental variables estimates were also carried out but not reported as probit estimates take 
into account the dichtomous nature of the variables. Where more than one instrument was available, 
overidentification tests were carried out. These found the identifying restrictions to hold for most cases, the 
exception being for beer and cigarettes.
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demand for both alcohol and tobacco. Beer participation is also negatively associated with 
participation in bidi and cigarette consumption.
Given the relationship between alcohol and tobacco and pan we would expect prohibi­
tion policy to have a significant impact on demand for these addictive goods. Reduced-form 
estimates of the effect of prohibition on these addictive goods are reported in Tables 3.14 
and 3.15. Complete prohibition significantly decreased participation in total tobacco con­
sumption as we would expect given our above finding that tobacco is a complement to 
alcohol. However, the magnitude of the effect is small at 4%. Across tobacco types, prohi­
bition increased bidi participation, suggesting that the strong relationship between bidi and 
toddy consumption dominated any decrease due to the drop in arrack consumption during 
prohibition. On the other hand, as expected, complete prohibition significantly decreased 
leaf tobacco consumption by approximately 26%. It also increased cigarette consumption 
by 8%. The latter result most likely being driven by the decrease in arrack , and to a smaller 
extent, beer consumption during prohibition resulting in households smoking more.
The impact of partial prohibition was larger, with total tobacco participation dropping 
by 18%, mainly due to the fall in leaf tobacco consumption of 34%. This is as expected 
given the strong relationship between arrack and leaf tobacco found in Table 3.13. In spite 
of this, the overall impact of partial prohibition on tobacco budget shares was positive and 
significant.
The effect of prohibition on pan was to significantly reduce participation which is ex­
pected given the complementary nature of the relationship between pan and alcohol. Com­
plete prohibition decreased pan consumption by 12% and partial prohibition by 28%. Com­
plete prohibition had limited effects on budget shares but partial prohibition increased these 
significantly.
3.10 Conclusion
Assessing policy tools for curtailing alcohol consumption is important given the sharp rise 
in alcohol related illnesses and deaths over the last two decades. This paper added to 
the existing literature by examining the effect of an under-researched policy tool used to
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affect consumption - alcohol prohibition. Using a series of household expenditure surveys 
for India, the analysis found that alcohol prohibition had differential effects on alcohol by 
type of prohibition enacted and liquor group. Complete prohibition reduced participation 
and consumption of arrack, IMFL and beer, although it increased consumption of toddy - 
the local home brew. While supply shifts resulted from prohibition, the main mechanism 
through which demand decreased was through demand shifts resulting from the higher 
fixed costs of consumption. On the other hand, during partial prohibition supply shifts 
dominated any decrease in demand due to fixed costs. In particular, partial prohibition 
decreased arrack, toddy and beer participation and lead to an increase in IMFL demand as 
consumers substituted away from arrack towards its nearest substitute. This suggests that 
partial prohibition has important spillover effects on the consumption of other liquor types 
which may have to be controlled using alternative measures such as higher taxes.
The finding that demand decreases, not only due to the increase in price resulting from 
the reduction in supply, but due to a deterrent effect of prohibition has several implications. 
First, it indicates that very high taxes would need to be implemented on production in or­
der to achieve similar decreases in consumption via taxation. Secondly, it suggests that the 
design of alternative policies to prohibition should also focus on increasing the fixed costs 
of consumption, in addition to factors which affect price. These could include requiring 
consumers to purchase a liquor license, regulating the location of bars to be a suitable dis­
tance from the village/community centre, or limiting the number of retailers within a given 
area. Finally, the result indicates that prohibition causes a greater effect on consumption 
than estimated from the supply effect alone. The implication for the consumption of other 
prohibited goods such as drugs, is that lifting prohibition may result in a greater change in 
demand than expected from the price effect in isolation.
An analysis of the relationship between alcohol type and specific addictive goods in­
dicates the existence of strong associations between most of these items. Estimates using 
prohibition as an instrument for alcohol consumption suggest that overall alcohol and to­
bacco and alcohol and pan are complements although the direction of the relationship differs 
by alcohol type and tobacco item. In particular, bidis and leaf tobacco are a complement to 
arrack and toddy and a substitute to IMFL in both sectors. On the other hand, cigarettes
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axe a strong substitute for all alcohol items in both sectors. Pan appears to be comple­
mentary to arrack, toddy and beer but a substitute for IMFL. Consequently, as shown by 
the reduced-form estimates, prohibition had significant spill-over effects on the consump­
tion of these items and is associated with a decrease in overall demand for tobacco and pan. 
Amongst tobacco items, prohibition decreased leaf tobacco consumption and increased ciga­
rette and bidi consumption - the latter being a substitute for IMFL and complementary 
to toddy. Given that bidi and cigarette consumption is already high in India and that the 
associated negative health effects of increased tobacco consumption are substantial, this 
is a worrying side-effect. It also highlights the dangers of undertaking isolated policies to 
curtail alcohol demand, which exhibits strong associations with other harmful addictive 
goods, without incorporating measures to counter the unintended negative spillover effects 
of policy.
3.11 Appendix 1: D ata Appendix
The consumption and household characteristics dataset is compiled from 13 Consumer- 
Expenditure Schedules of the National Sample Survey of India (NSS) conducted by the 
National Sample Survey Organization of India. These correspond to the following years: 
38th Round Schedule 1.0 (1983), 43th Round Schedule 1.0 (1987-88), 45th Round Schedule 
1.0 (1989-90), 46th Round Schedule 1.0 (1990-91), 47th Round Schedule 1.0 (1991-92), 
48th Round Schedule 1.0 (1992), 49th Round Schedule 1.0 (1993), 50th Round Schedule 1.0 
(1993-94), 51th Round Schedule 1.0 (1994-95), 52th Round Schedule 1.0 (1995-96), 53th 
Round Schedule 1.0 (1997), 54th Round Schedule 1.0 (1998), 55th Round Schedule 1.0 
(1999-00).
The sample for analysis comprises of 600618 households in the 16 major states. These 
axe Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, 
Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar 
Pradesh, and West Bengal. The sample excludes households reporting per capita expendi­
tures lying the top and botton 0.05 percentile of the distribution to ensure results are not 
excessively influenced by outliers. In addition, the consumption variables were cleaned for
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outliers if budget shares of individual items were greater than total expenditures. 
C onsum ption  figures are based on 30-day recall and cover cash purchase and home grown 
consumption.
P a rtic ip a tio n  is based on positive reports of alcohol consumption in the last 30-days. 
Q u an tity  consumed is based on litres per 30-day recall. For total alcohol this is aggregated 
across all alcohol types.
U n it V alues are calculated by dividing expenditure by quantity.
P e r cap ita  m onth ly  household ex p en d itu re  is calculated from total monthly expen­
ditures divided by total number of household members.
H ousehold  size comprises total number of individuals residing in the household.
Sex o f head  is a dummy of the gender of the reported household head.
Age o f head  is the age in years of the reported household head.
L iteracy  o f head  is a categorical variable measuring the education of the household head 
as follows: 0=Not literate, l=Literate without formal schooling, 2=Literate below primary, 
3=Primary, 4=Middle, 5=Secondary, 6=Graduate and above.
M arita l S ta tu s  of head is a categorical variable reflecting the marital status of the house­
hold head as follows: 1= Single/never married, 2= Married, 3=Divorced/separated, 4=Wid­
owed.
L and ow nership is a dummy equal to one for households with more than 1 acre of land. 
Scheduled C as te /T rib e  is a dummy for households classified as Scheduled Caste or Sched­
uled Tribe.
R u ra l dum m y is a dummy for the rural sector as defined by the NSS sample frame. 
O ccupation  dum m ies are dummies for the following categories: Professional, Administra­
tive/Executive/Managerial, Clerical, Sales, Service Workers, Farmers, Production Workers, 
Labourers.
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Figure 3-1: Distribution of Total Alcohol Budget Shares
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Figure 3-2: Reported Alcohol Participation In Indian States
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Table 3.1: Summary of Main Variables
M ain V ariables M ean S.d.
Complete Prohibition 0.079 0.270
Arrack Prohibition 0.193 0.395
Partial Prohibition 0.114 0.318
Budget Share Total Alcohol 0.051 0.047
Budget Share Arrack 0.049 0.046
Budget Share Toddy 0.045 0.044
Budget Share IMFL 0.053 0.047
Budget Share Beer 0.039 0.036
Quantity Alcohol 10.102 31.413
Quantity Arrack 8.603 31.555
Quantity Toddy 13.376 20.427
Quantity IMFL 1.999 9.964
Quantity Beer 5.139 10.230
Reported Participation Alcohol 0.121 0.326
Reported Participation Arrack 0.086 0.281
Reported Participation Toddy 0.026 0.158
Reported Participation IMFL 0.012 0.107
Reported Participation Beer 0.004 0.062
Budget Share Total Tobacco 0.025 0.024
Budget Share Bidis 0.027 0.022
Budget Share Leaf Tobacco 0.011 0.011
Budget Share Cigarettes 0.030 0.030
Budget Share Pan 0.017 0.017
Reported Participation Total Tobacco 0.612 0.487
Reported Participation Bidis 0.354 0.478
Reported Participation Leaf Tobacco 0.197 0.398
Reported Participation Cigarettes 0.075 0.264
Reported Participation Pan 0.324 0.468
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Table 3.1 Cont: Summary of Main Variables
M ain V ariables M ean S.d.
Log Unit Value Alcohol 2.644 1.478
Log Unit Value Arrack 2.754 1.371
Log Unit Value Toddy 1.323 0.837
Log Unit Value IMFL 4.628 0.880
Log Unit Value Beer 3.104 1.081
Log P.C. Household Expenditure 5.633 0.779
Log Household Size 1.501 0.558
Sex of Head 0.080 0.272
Age of Head 44.155 13.313
Literacy of Head 2.200 2.111
Marital Status of Head 2.073 0.378
Land Ownership 0.602 0.489
Scheduled Caste/Tribe 0.243 0.429
Rural Sector Dummy 0.628 0.483
Total Observations 600618
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Table 3.2: Alcohol, Tobacco and Pan Consumption In Indian States, 1983-2000
A lcohol Tobacco P a n
S ta te s  % B udget Q u a n t i t y  B udget % B udget
Share l t r  S hare  Share
Andhra Pradesh 21.09 5.91 18.37 57.21 4.11 18.10 1.90
Assam 21.59 4.74 9.09 75.19 1.81 83.50 2.10
Bihar 14.84 3.94 8.57 68.22 1.70 29.65 1.23
Gujarat 5.05 5.21 8.65 55.73 3.15 18.60 2.20
Haryana 11.14 5.29 12.91 64.16 2.80 3.44 1.68
Jammu & Kashmir 5.52 5.42 10.33 69.11 2.76 1.02 1.05
Karnataka 12.82 6.45 11.55 52.17 2.98 44.29 1.82
Kerala 11.76 4.30 5.11 52.88 2.87 21.84 1.74
Madhya Pradesh 19.04 4.30 5.11 70.14 2.28 50.35 1.33
Maharashtra 10.89 4.75 5.36 55.65 1.93 49.21 1.35
Orissa 13.47 4.57 6.58 74.11 1.36 44.11 2.06
Punjab 16.65 5.72 16.95 27.44 3.22 3.39 2.05
Rajasthan 9.81 5.86 11.34 64.68 3.48 11.00 1.52
Tamil Nadu 9.54 5.84 9.20 42.88 2.75 29.77 2.17
Uttar Pradesh 5.93 4.86 8.28 68.25 2.47 31.19 1.69
West Bengal 6.35 4.73 7.32 72.41 2.48 34.33 1.32
T otal 12.11 5.07 10.10 61.23 2.53 32.40 1.66
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Table 3.3: Heckman Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Log Alcohol Budget
Share
P a r t  A: P a rtic ip a tio n  
(1) (2) (3) 
T otal A rrack  Toddy 
Alcohol
(4)
IM FL
(5)
B eer
Log P.C. Expenditure 0.401
(59.490)
0.294
(38.890)
0.120
(9.440)
0.761
(63.030)
0.617
(29.780)
Log Household Size 0.233
(42.270)
0.205
(33.420)
0.150
(14.610)
0.342
(28.170)
0.254
(12.530)
Sex of Head -0.691
(49.810)
-0.683
(44.030)
-0.561
(24.730)
-0.356
(10.040)
-0.144
(2.590)
Age of Head -0.006
(27.780)
-0.006
(24.800)
-0.004
(10.510)
-0.002
(3.760)
-0.006
(7.780)
Education of Head -0.102
(61.430)
-0.105
(56.480)
-0.129
(38.510)
0.011
(3.050)
0.001
(0.090)
Marital Status 
of Head
0.089
(11.360)
0.100
(11.970)
0.032
(2.260)
0.062
(3.160)
-0.042
(1.340)
Land Ownership 0.017
(2.390)
0.019
(2.360)
0.057
(4.280)
-0.008
(0.560)
-0.036
(1.570)
Scheduled
Caste/Tribe
0.660
(95.200)
0.642
(84.670)
0.435
(35.340)
0.153
(9.500)
0.386
(14.110)
Rural Dummy 0.121
(13.820)
0.121
(12.320)
0.301
(15.590)
-0.054
(3.150)
-0.027
(0.910)
Notes: Z-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state-
level in parenthesis. All estimates include occupation, year and state dummies.
Total sample size is 600618.
Table continues on next page.
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Table 3.3 Cont: Heckman Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Log Alcohol
Budget Share
P art B: C onsum ption  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Arrack T oddy IM FL B eer
A lcohol
Log P.C. Expenditure -0.113
(9.210)
-0.184
(13.810)
-0.253
(10.390)
-0.819
(12.300)
-0.447
(6.710)
Log Household Size -0.403
(44.190)
-0.428
(41.880)
-0.500
(25.430)
-0.752
(21.370)
-0.480
(9.820)
Sex of Head -0.172
(6.930)
-0.128
(4.410)
-0.151
(3.160)
0.269
(4.050)
0.090
(0.980)
Age of Head 0.001
(0.240)
0.001
(1.020)
0.001
(1.770)
0.005
(5.170)
0.001
(0.070)
Education of Head -0.031
(10.380)
-0.030
(9.210)
-0.045
(6.080)
0.007
(1.020)
-0.016
(1.270)
Marital Status 
of Head
0.051
(4.250)
0.060
(4.390)
0.027
(0.920)
-0.063
(1.710)
-0.125
(2.220)
Land Ownership -0.049
(5.250)
-0.080
(7.120)
-0.017
(0.840)
0.012
(0.440)
-0.035
(0.650)
Scheduled
Caste/Tribe
0.117
(7.950)
0.072
(4.670)
0.038
(1.540)
-0.129
(3.790)
-0.106
(1.660)
Rural Dummy -0.078
(6.420)
-0.095
(6.660)
-0.020
(0.630)
0.016
(0.550)
-0.037
(0.590)
Log Likelihood 
Inverse Mills
-284050.4
0.183
-216758.2
0.099
-71816.35
0.076
-38760.07
-0.816
-13851.95
-0.197
Wald Test 76.10
(0.000)
25.31
(0.000)
3.35
(0.067)
94.12
(0.000)
4.48
(0.034)
Uncensored Obs 72473 51649 15124 6724 2023
Notes: Z-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state-
level in parenthesis. All estimates include occupation, year and state dummies.
Total sample size is 600618.
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Table 3.4: Heckman Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Log Alcohol Quantity
Part A: Participation  
(1) (2) (3) 
Total Arrack Toddy  
A lcohol
(4)
IM FL
(5)
B eer
Log P.C. Expenditure 0.405
(60.410)
0.298
(39.780)
0.118
(9.290)
0.757
(62.310)
0.614
(29.570)
Log Household Size 0.229
(41.770)
0.200
(32.960)
0.145
(14.140)
0.335
(26.970)
0.253
(12.420)
Sex of Head -0.693
(50.130)
-0.682
(44.310)
-0.565
(24.830)
-0.352
(9.940)
-0.147
(2.630)
Age of Head -0.006
(27.760)
-0.006
(24.670)
-0.004
(10.510)
-0.002
(3.740)
-0.006
(7.830)
Education of Head -0.102
(61.570)
-0.104
(56.460)
-0.129
(38.460)
0.011
(3.170)
0.001
(0.080)
Marital Status 
of Head
0.089
(11.350)
0.100
(12.020)
0.032
(2.230)
0.063
(3.210)
-0.041
(1.310)
Land Ownership 0.018
(2.490)
0.020
(2.480)
0.058
(4.390)
-0.009
(0.590)
-0.033
(1.430)
Scheduled
Caste/Tribe
0.653
(94.420)
0.634
(84.050)
0.435
(35.340)
0.151
(9.320)
0.384
(13.930)
Rural Dummy 0.124
(14.170)
0.123
(12.560)
0.305
(15.780)
-0.053
(3.080)
-0.029
(0.980)
Notes: Z-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state-
level in parenthesis. All estimates include occupation, year and state dummies.
Total sample size is 600618.
Table continues on next page.
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Table 3.4 Cont: Heckman Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Log Alcohol
Quantity
Part B: C onsum ption  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Arrack T oddy IM FL B eer
A lcohol
Log P.C. Expenditure 0.926
(45.650)
1.023
(47.530)
0.602
(21.250)
0.494
(10.540)
0.539
(7.820)
Log Household Size 0.674
(44.230)
0.724
(42.400)
0.452
(19.960)
0.332
(10.240)
0.476
(8.720)
Sex of Head -0.893
(21.990)
-1.027
(22.000)
-0.100
(1.810)
-0.053
(0.730)
-0.064
(0.570)
Age of Head -0.006
(10.850)
-0.007
(11.980)
0.002
(1.970)
0.006
(5.520)
0.001
(0.080)
Education of Head -0.181
(35.010)
-0.170
(30.390)
-0.054
(6.150)
0.011
(1.490)
-0.055
(3.500)
Marital Status 
of Head
0.147
(7.510)
0.200
(8.770)
0.033
(0.950)
0.005
(0.110)
-0.077
(1.120)
Land Ownership 0.064
(3.800)
0.050
(2.480)
0.071
(3.010)
0.005
(0.190)
-0.063
(0.980)
Scheduled
Caste/Tribe
0.868
(32.850)
1.048
(41.010)
-0.011
(0.370)
0.043
(1.150)
0.084
(1.170)
Rural Dummy 0.278
(12.530)
0.152
(6.000)
0.102
(2.750)
0.017
(0.500)
0.162
(2.080)
Log Likelihood 
Inverse Mills
-310926.4
1.485
-232619
1.731
-73557.22
-0.048
-39788.98
-0.034
-14182.69
-0.096
Wald Test 
Uncensored Obs
1630.06
(0.000)
72140
2762.90
(0.000)
51394
0.830
(0.363)
15081
0.340
(0.562)
6661
1.960
(0.161)
2011
Notes: Z-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state- 
level in parenthesis. All estimates include occupation, year and state dummies. 
Total sample size is 600618. Uncensored sample differs from budget share sample 
as quantity consumed is not available for all households.
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Table 3.5: Heckman Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Effect of Prohibition
on Log Alcohol and Arrack Budget Shares
(1)
T otal Alcohol
(2) (3) (4)
A rrack
(5) (6)
P a rtic ip a tio n
Complete
Prohibition
-0.170
(7.380)
-0.259
(10.690)
-0.414
(12.660)
-0.502
(14.830)
Partial
Prohibition
-0.263
(13.940)
-0.406
(18.650)
Arrack
Prohibition
-0.261
(15.710)
-0.438
(21.950)
Log P. C. 
Expenditure
0.400
(59.370)
0.402
(59.690)
0.402
(59.670)
0.292
(38.710)
0.295
(39.010)
0.295
(39.040)
C onsum ption
Complete
Prohibition
-0.084
(2.510)
-0.111
(3.150)
0.183
(3.370)
0.175
(3.200)
Partial
Prohibition
-0.072
(3.170)
0.011
(0.330)
Arrack
Prohibition
-0.084
(3.910)
0.066
(2.110)
Log P. C. 
Expenditure
-0.113
(9.270)
-0.107
(8.790)
-0.107
(8.760)
-0.184
(13.800)
-0.181
(13.470)
-0.182
(13.470)
Log Likelihood 
Inverse Mills
-283974
0.184
-283711
0.200
-283712
0.200
-216497
0.097
-216113
-0.176
-216132
0.110
Wald Test 76.44
(0.000)
92.20
(0.000)
92.36
(0.000)
24.22
(0.000)
0.109
(0.000)
27.41
(0.000)
Uncensored
Obs
72473 72473 72473 51649 51649 51649
Notes: Z-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state-level in
parenthesis. All estimates include occupation, year and state dummies. Total sample
size is 600618.
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Table 3.6: Heckman Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Effect of Prohibition
on Log Toddy, IMFL, and Beer Budget Shares
Toddy IM FL B eer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P a rtic ip a tio n
Complete 0.175 0.071 -0.333 -0.274 -0.381 -0.448
Prohibition (5.230) (1.970) (6.530) (5.290) (3.920) (4.300)
Partial -0.217 0.132 -0.144
Prohibition (7.540) (4.380) (2.750)
Log P. C. 0.122 0.125 0.761 0.760 0.617 0.617
Expenditure (9.580) (9.800) (62.940) (62.890) (29.690) (29.720)
C onsum ption
Complete -0.063 -0.049 0.449 0.422 0.394 0.514
Prohibition (1.140) (0.820) (4.430) (4.060) (2.120) (2.740)
Partial 0.022 -0.066 0.305
Prohibition (0.510) (1.150) (2.790)
Log P. C. -0.254 -0.254 -0.818 -0.822 -0.452 -0.450
Expenditure (10.440) (10.410) (12.230) (12.420) (6.700) (6.880)
Log Likelihood -71779 -71692 -38718 -38704 -13833 -13823
Inverse Mills 0.066 0.078 -0.816 -0.821 -0.206 -0.209
Wald Test 2.19 3.15 92.59 96.42 4.64 5.22
(0.139) (0.076) (0.000) (0.000) (0.031) (0.022)
Uncensored 15124 15124 6724 6724 2023 2023
Obs
Notes: Z-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state-level in
parenthesis. All estimates include occupation, year and state dummies. Total sample
size is 600618.
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Table 3.7: Heckman Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Effect of Prohibition
on Log Alcohol and Arrack Quantity
(1)
T otal Alcohol
(2) (3) (4)
A rrack
(5) (6)
P a rtic ip a tio n
Complete
Prohibition
-0.180
(7.880)
-0.266
(11.060)
-0.419
(12.910)
-0.506
(15.060)
Partial
Prohibition
-0.253
(13.420)
-0.400
(18.430)
Arrack
Prohibition
-0.259
(15.560)
-0.435
(21.890)
Log P. C. 
Expenditure
0.404
(60.350)
0.407
(60.680)
0.407
(60.600)
0.297
(39.610)
0.299
(39.920)
0.300
(39.960)
C onsum ption
Complete
Prohibition
0.294
(5.120)
0.115
(1.900)
-0.065
(0.680)
-0.221
(2.280)
Partial
Prohibition
-0.525
(10.420)
-0.904
(14.040)
Arrack
Prohibition
-0.317
(7.120)
-0.678
(11.040)
Log P. C. 
Expenditure
0.935
(46.460)
0.942
(46.590)
0.926
(45.520)
1.021
(47.580)
1.026
(47.880)
1.024
(47.530)
Log Likelihood 
Inverse Mills
-310696
1.508
-310401
1.513
-310599
1.482
-232299
1.725
-231870
1.726
-232005
1.730
Wald Test 1768.88
(0.000)
1763.19
(0.000)
1588.86
(0.000)
2786.47
(0.000)
2866.74
(0.000)
2726.55
(0.000)
Uncensored
Obs
72140 72140 72140 51394 51394 51394
Notes: Z-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state-
level in parenthesis. All estimates include occupation, year and state dummies.
Total sample size is 600618.
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Table 3.8: Heckman Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Effect of Prohibition
on Log Toddy, IMFL, and Beer Quantity
Toddy
(1) (2)
IM FL
(3) (4) (5)
B eer
(6)
P a rtic ip a tio n
Complete
Prohibition
0.174
(5.230)
0.071
(1.970)
-0.328
(6.410)
-0.269
(5.180)
-0.380
(3.910)
-0.448
(4.290)
Partial
Prohibition
-0.216
(7.510)
0.131
(4.330)
-0.147
(2.790)
Log P. C. 
Expenditure
0.120
(9.430)
0.123
(9.660)
0.757
(62.220)
0.757
(62.170)
0.613
(29.470)
0.613
(29.510)
C onsum ption
Complete
Prohibition
-0.009
(0.120)
0.062
(0.790)
0.243
(2.320)
0.159
(1.450)
-0.119
(0.560)
0.016
(0.070)
Partial
Prohibition
0.138
(2.580)
-0.170
(2.680)
0.346
(2.700)
Log P. C. 
Expenditure
0.600
(21.150)
0.597
(21.010)
0.491
(10.860)
0.491
(10.600)
0.543
(7.880)
0.542
(7.980)
Log Likelihood 
Inverse Mills
-73522
-0.062
-73429
-0.056
-39748
-0.038
-39731
-0.038
-14165
-0.090
-14156
-0.099
Wald Test 1.15
(0.283)
0.97
(0.325)
0.48
(0.490)
0.42
(0.515)
1.75
(0.186)
2.21
(0.137)
Uncensored
Obs
15081 15081 6661 6661 2011 2011
Notes: Z-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state-level in
parenthesis. All estimates include occupation, year and state dummies. Total sample
size is 600618.
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Table 3.9: Heckman Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Incidence of Prohibition
by Household Characteristics
P art A: P articipation  in  T otal A lcohol 
(1) (2) O ) (4)
Complete Prohibition -0.539 -0.182 -0.353 -0.271
(16.880) (6.940) (13.600) (11.100)
Partial Prohibition -0.324 -0.226 -0.217 -0.261
(14.920) (10.730) (11.310) (13.710)
Complete Prohibition 0.389
*Rural Dummy (11.790)
Partial Prohibition 0.089
*Rural Dummy (4.240)
Complete Prohibition -0.250
*Literacy Dummy (9.920)
Partial Prohibition -0.084
* Literacy Dummy (4.900)
Complete Prohibition 0.230
*SC/ST Dummy (8.000)
Partial Prohibition -0.195
*SC/ST Dummy (9.740)
Complete Prohibition 0.238
*Female Head (5.260)
Partial Prohibition -0.019
*Female Head (0.590)
Notes: Z-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state-
level in parenthesis. All estimates include occupation, year and state dummies.
Total sample size is 600618.
Table continues on next page
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Table 3.9: Heckman Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Incidence of Pro­
hibition by Household Characteristics
Part B: C onsum ption  o f  T otal A lcohol 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Complete Prohibition -0.204
(3.910)
-0.096
(2.640)
-0.242
(6.350)
-0.107
(3.030)
Partial Prohibition -0.122
(4.170)
-0.079
(3.180)
-0.057
(2.380)
-0.070
(3.030)
Complete Prohibition 
* Rural Dummy
0.123
(2.290)
Partial Prohibition 
* Rural Dummy
0.069
(2.430)
Complete Prohibition 
^Literacy Dummy
-0.046
(1.030)
Partial Prohibition 
^Literacy Dummy
0.039
(1.590)
Complete Prohibition 
*SC/ST Dummy
0.271
(6.550)
Partial Prohibition 
*SC/ST Dummy
-0.073
(2.740)
Complete Prohibition 
*Female Head
-0.089
(1.130)
Partial Prohibition 
*Female Head
-0.056
(0.990)
Uncensored Obs 72473 72473 72473 72473
Notes: Z-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state- 
level in parenthesis. All estimates include occupation, year and state dummies. 
Total sample size is 600618.
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Table 3.10: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Prohibition on Log Unit Values of
Alcohol and Arrack
(1)
A lcohol
(2) (3) (4)
A rrack
(5) (6)
Complete
Prohibition
-0.354
(12.153)
-0.298
(9.317)
-0.132
(3.831)
-0.056
(1.454)
Partial
Prohibition
0.137
(4.499)
0.226
(6.236)
Arrack
Prohibition
-0.013
(0.483)
0.127
(3.969)
Log P.C. 
Expenditure
0.344
(28.681)
0.342
(28.496)
0.348
(28.886)
0.135
(9.663)
0.133
(9.508)
0.135
(9.675)
Log Household 
Size
-0.216
(19.341)
-0.214
(19.222)
-0.218
(19.514)
-0.060
(4.665)
-0.058
(4.538)
-0.060
(4.686)
Sex of Head -0.012
(0.494)
-0.012
(0.491)
-0.013
(0.535)
-0.038
(1.307)
-0.035
(1.203)
-0.035
(1.222)
Age of Head 0.001
(0.729)
0.001
(0.756)
0.001
(0.702)
-0.001
(0.834)
-0.001
(0.801)
-0.001
(0.860)
Education 
of Head
0.044
(15.378)
0.045
(15.518)
0.044
(15.330)
-0.003
(1.001)
-0.003
(0.854)
-0.003
(0.954)
Marital Status 
of Head
-0.002
(0.170)
-0.003
(0.214)
-0.002
(0.173)
-0.001
(0.015)
-0.002
(0.104)
-0.001
(0.088)
Land
Ownership
-0.096
(8.417)
-0.095
(8.345)
-0.095
(8.321)
-0.097
(7.569)
-0.096
(7.477)
-0.097
(7.520)
Scheduled
Caste/Tribe
-0.069
(6.248)
-0.070
(6.283)
-0.068
(6.100)
-0.098
(7.770)
-0.099
(7.898)
-0.098
(7.856)
Rural Dummy -0.226
(14.414)
-0.226
(14.409)
-0.228
(14.461)
-0.062
(3.582)
-0.063
(3.624)
-0.063
(3.622)
Uncensored
Obs
71792 71792 71792 51153 51153 51153
Notes: Z-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state-
village level in parenthesis. All estimates include occupation, year and state dum­
mies. Total sample size is 600618.
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Table 3.11: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Prohibition on Log Unit Values of
Toddy, IMFL, and Beer
Toddy 
(1) (2)
IM FL 
(3) (4) (5)
B eer
(6)
Complete
Prohibition
-0.056
(1.476)
-0.097
(2.336)
0.100
(1.876)
0.187
(3.016)
0.347
(3.347)
0.319
(2.941)
Partial
Prohibition
-0.090
(2.513)
0.135
(2.953)
-0.054
(0.773)
Log P.C. 
Expenditure
0.105
(6.393)
0.107
(6.526)
0.194
(7.938)
0.194
(7.958)
0.062
(1.455)
0.061
(1.443)
Log Household 
Size
-0.103
(6.652)
-0.104
(6.724)
-0.089
(3.375)
-0.088
(3.360)
0.008
(0.188)
0.007
(0.178)
Sex of Head -0.006
(0.189)
-0.006
(0.185)
0.132
(2.055)
0.128
(1.986)
0.170
(1.944)
0.170
(1.947)
Age of Head -0.001
(0.088)
-0.001
(0.118)
-0.003
(3.108)
-0.003
(3.103)
-0.001
(0.558)
-0.001
(0.516)
Education 
of Head
0.024
(5.873)
0.024
(5.801)
0.001
(0.227)
0.003
(0.446)
0.040
(3.673)
0.040
(3.670)
Marital Status 
of Head
-0.005
(0.237)
-0.003
(0.174)
-0.005
(0.091)
-0.006
(0.123)
-0.044
(0.711)
-0.043
(0.708)
Land
Ownership
-0.081
(5.804)
-0.082
(5.837)
0.003
(0.121)
0.005
(0.200)
0.069
(1.437)
0.068
(1.415)
Scheduled
Caste/Tribe
0.018
(1.295)
0.018
(1.339)
-0.099
(2.982)
-0.100
(2.998)
-0.171
(3.013)
-0.171
(3.021)
Rural Dummy -0.137
(6.727)
-0.137
(6.733)
-0.031
(1.039)
-0.030
(0.999)
-0.202
(3.760)
-0.203
(3.766)
Uncensored
Obs
15018 15018 6548 6548 2000 2000
Notes: Z-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state-
village level in parenthesis. All estimates include occupation, year and state dum­
mies. Total sample size is 600618.
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Table 3.12: Heckman Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Log Addictive Good
Budget Shares
T otal
Tobacco
(1)
P a r t  A: P a rtic ip a tio n  
B idis Leaf
Tobacco 
(2) (3)
C ig are ttes  P an  
(4) (5)
Log P.C. 0.058 0.012 -0.110 0.603 0.227
Expenditure (12.090) (2.390) (17.290) (90.810) (41.820)
Log Household 0.208 0.227 0.061 0.432 0.303
Size (50.620) (52.840) (12.160) (69.220) (67.600)
Sex of Head -1.035 -1.020 -0.408 -0.327 -0.089
(119.490) (102.580) (37.720) (22.990) (10.340)
Age of Head 0.002 -0.003 0.008 -0.002 0.005
(12.290) (18.620) (41.830) (10.200) (32.710)
Education -0.134 -0.134 -0.056 0.053 -0.013
of Head (111.170) (106.940) (37.220) (29.220) (9.980)
Marital Status 0.083 0.069 0.035 0.040 0.011
of Head (13.600) (11.240) (4.930) (4.250) (1.820)
Land 0.025 -0.062 0.127 -0.031 0.067
Ownership (4.970) (11.720) (19.200) (4.170) (11.940)
Scheduled 0.257 0.125 0.215 -0.026 0.019
Caste/Tribe (47.920) (23.070) (32.750) (3.080) (3.130)
Rural Dummy 0.230 0.217 0.238 -0.101 0.087
(38.000) (32.920) (26.440) (11.810) (11.920)
Notes: Z-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state-
level in parenthesis. All estimates include occupation, year and state dummies.
Total sample size is 600618.
Table continues on next page.
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Table 3.12 C ont: H eckm an M axim um  Likelihood E stim ates  o f Log A d­
dictive G ood B udget Shares
Total
Tobacco
(1)
P a r t  B: C onsum ption  
B idis L eaf
Tobacco 
(2) (3)
C ig are ttes  P a n  
(4) (5)
Log P.C. -0.407 -0.653 -0.670 -0.256 -0.284
Expenditure (87.040) (124.730) (94.570) (14.700) (32.530)
Log Household -0.510 -0.668 -0.716 -0.537 -0.396
Size (141.720) (158.440) (138.730) (36.900) (56.540)
Sex of Head -0.392 -0.108 -0.141 0.110 0.205
(40.970) (8.990) (11.560) (3.640) (14.780)
Age of Head -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.003
(12.450) (2.490) (4.310) (9.720) (11.580)
Education -0.023 -0.024 -0.025 0.068 0.021
of Head (20.380) (19.110) (15.260) (19.490) (10.430)
Marital Status 0.018 0.011 0.011 -0.011 -0.056
of Head (3.300) (1.740) (1.580) (0.600) (5.520)
Land -0.079 -0.051 0.002 -0.040 -0.123
Ownership (17.240) (10.100) (0.270) (3.080) (13.460)
Scheduled 0.029 -0.019 0.032 -0.111 -0.228
Caste/Tribe (6.700) (4.040) (4.920) (6.930) (24.200)
Rural Dummy -0.059 0.008 -0.007 -0.215 -0.116
(9.800) (1.190) (0.680) (14.490) (10.320)
Log Likelihood -821906 -573634 -376444 -199078 -640626
Inverse Mills 0.042 0.033 0.007 0.012 0.029
Wald Test 191.17 45.20 0.97 0.23 85.79
(0.000) (0.000) (0.324) (0.635) (0.000)
Uncensored
Obs
366299 212854 118520 45114 193912
Notes: Z-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state-
level in parenthesis. All estimates include occupation, year and state dummies.
Total sample size is 600618.
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Table 3.13: In s tru m en t V ariables P ro b it E stim ates o f A ddictive  G oods P a rtic ­
ip a tio n
Total
Tobacco
Bidis
P a rtic ip a tio n
Leaf C ig are ttes  P an  
Tobacco
Household Consumes 
Alcohol
0.504
(16.206)
0.172
(2.760)
0.959
(19.721)
-0.038
(2.551)
0.857
(18.068)
Household Consumes 
Arrack
0.464
(16.071)
0.150
(2.372)
0.939
(20.346)
-0.037
(2.503)
0.824
(18.762)
Household Consumes 
Toddy
0.463
(15.910)
0.681
(5.811)
0.933
(17.519)
-0.031
(0.796)
0.820
(17.065)
Household Consumes 
IMFL
-0.714
(10.369)
-0.363
(6.731)
-0.254
(11.418)
-0.048
(1.921)
-0.403
(11.297)
Household Consumes 
Beer
0.390
(2.251)
-0.347
(2.544)
0.903
(4.041)
-0.056
(2.956)
0.755
(3.571)
Notes: Marginal effects reported. Z -statistics in parenthesis. Instruments for toddy, 
IMFL, and beer are complete prohibition and partial prohibition dummies. Instru­
ment for arrack is arrack prohibition dummy. All regressions include the full set of 
explanatory variables and occupation, state and year dummies.
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Table 3.14: Heckman Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Effect of Prohibi­
tion on Log Addictive Goods Budget Share
Participation 
Total Tobacco Pan
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Complete Prohibition 0.020 -0.038 -0.041 -0.116
(1.380) (2.430) (2.090) (5.680)
Partial Prohibition -0.177 -0.283
(14.610) (17.620)
Log P. C. Expenditure 0.059 0.060 0.227 0.229
(12.110) (12.320) (41.780) (42.140)
C onsum ption
Complete Prohibition 0.011 0.032 0.008 0.033
(0.670) (2.040) (0.220) (0.860)
Partial Prohibition 0.092 0.160
(7.860) (6.850)
Log P. C. Expenditure -0.407 -0.408 -0.284 -0.286
(87.050) (87.210) (32.530) (32.710)
Log Likelihood -821904 -821668 -640620 -640185
Inverse Mills 0.042 0.040 0.030 0.028
Wald Test 191.50 176.12 87.28 84.21
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Uncensored Obs 366299 366299 193912 193912
Notes: Z-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state-
level in parenthesis. All estimates include occupation, year and state dummies.
Total sample size is 600618.
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Table 3.15: Heckman Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Effect of Prohibi­
tion on Log Tobacco Goods Budget Share
Bidis 
(1) (2)
P a rtic ip a tio n  
Leaf 
Tobacco 
(3) (4)
C ig are ttes  
(5) (6)
Complete
Prohibition
0.086
(5.150)
0.069
(3.980)
-0.178
(6.860)
-0.261
(9.710)
0.069
(3.590)
0.076
(3.840)
Partial
Prohibition
0.061
(4.400)
-0.340
(17.560)
0.018
(1.230)
Log P. C. 
Expenditure
0.013
(2.470)
0.013
(2.540)
-0.110
(17.400)
-0.109
(17.160)
0.603
(90.860)
0.603
(90.830)
C onsum ption
Complete
Prohibition
-0.004
(0.200)
0.001
(0.010)
0.100
(3.330)
0.131
(4.290)
-0.018
(0.520)
0.040
(1.090)
Partial
Prohibition
0.017
(1.270)
0.205
(9.270)
0.138
(5.640)
Log P. C. 
Expenditure
-0.653
(124.770)
-0.653
(124.790)
-0.670
(94.560)
-0.670
(94.580)
-0.256
(14.780)
-0.254
(15.040)
Log Likelihood 
Inverse Mills
-573608
0.033
-573587
0.034
-376362
0.007
-375863
0.002
-199070
0.013
-199048
0.017
Wald Test 45.44
(0.000)
46.36
(0.000)
0.98
(0.322)
0.05
(0.820)
0.30
0.5870
0.55
(0.457)
Uncensored
Obs
212854 212854 118520 118520 45114 45114
Notes: Z-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state- 
level in parenthesis. All estimates include the full-set of explanatory variables and 
occupation, year and state dummies. Total sample size is 600618.
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Chapter 4
Alcohol Prohibition and the 
Negative Effects of Alcohol Use
4.1 Introduction
The negative effects of alcohol use have been a key argument of anti-liquor movements for 
the prohibition of alcohol. Temperance groups since the 19th century have claimed that 
alcohol availability promotes immorality, domestic violence, and criminal behaviour, in ad­
dition to increasing the rate of alcohol-related disease and death (Thornton (1991)). In the 
case of India, the Constitution emphasizes the need for state prohibition of alcohol as a 
precursor for alleviating hunger and poverty1. This underlies the arguments of many pro­
hibitionists, particularly in low-income countries, that alcohol consumption diverts scarce 
resources from more essential expenditures such as food, fuel, health care and education2. 
This chapter examines the effect of alcohol prohibition in India on the intrahousehold allo­
cation of resources and indicators of negative private and social effects of alcohol use. In 
doing so, it goes some way to test prohibitionist’s claims regarding the relative benefits of
^ e e  Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1.
2Women’s movements have argued that alcohol prohibition alone is not sufficient to stop ‘wastage’ of 
household resources and have also advocated bans on single number games, drugs, and matka (a form of 
gambling) - vices which poorer households are assumed to be highly vulnerable to. On this basis alone, 
it is not obvious why alcohol should be the only candidate for prohibition as one could equally argue that 
expenditure on other “non-essentials” such as entertainment or make-up should also be constrained.
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alcohol prohibition3.
That alcohol use is related to a wide variety of physical, mental, and social harms 
has been widely documented4. Private effects, which are suffered directly by the consumer, 
include higher rates of alcohol-related illnesses, deaths from liver failure, cancer, and poison­
ing, and mental and social problems associated with alcoholism. Social negative externalities 
associated with alcohol use are higher rates of fatalities and injuries due to drink-driving 
and industrial accidents, higher crimes rates, and increased incidence of domestic violence 
and aggravated assault. In addition to these, there are effects borne by the drinker’s family 
which cannot be easily categorised as private or social effects as they incorporate elements 
of both. They include mental harm induced by living with alcoholics and negative effects 
of constraints on consumption due to a large part of the family’s income being spent on 
alcohol. The consequences of this can be particularly acute in developing countries where 
the budget constraint is often binding at unsustainable levels of consumption for human 
well-being.
There has been limited econometric work on the effects of alcohol consumption and 
policy on negative private and social harm, in the context of India’s experience with alco­
hol. The main studies which exist are specialised, small-scale analyses focused on specific 
local areas5. As with the literature in developed countries, alcohol use is associated with 
greater incidence of crime, violence against women, and aggravated assault. This chapter 
builds on this literature by undertaking an econometric analysis of the effects of prohibition 
on the negative consequences of alcohol use. The analysis first examines detailed house­
hold level information on the intrahousehold allocation of resources to ascertain whether 
prohibition resulted in an increase in the consumption of all other goods, and if so which 
particular groups of items. In particular, it further explores the issue of underreporting 
and whether the effects of prohibition on the household consumption bundle are consistent 
with systematic underreporting and the changes in alcohol price due to prohibition. The
3 The analysis does not attempt to prove that prohibition results in an increase in social welfare. Rather 
it provides empirical evidence to examine the prohibitionists’ claims regarding prohibition policy.
4 See WHO (2001) for a detailed survey of the medical research on alcohol consumption and private 
harm; Cook and Moore (1999) for an overview of the econometric literature of negative effects associated 
with alcohol; Miczek et al (1994) for a review of the link between alcohol and violence.
5 See for example, AIIMS (1978).
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basic presumption here is that if prohibition actually decreased alcohol consumption then 
one can predict from the basic theory of the consumer, that there should be changes in the 
budget share of all other items taken as a composite and at least one subgroup within it.
The results indicate that complete and partial prohibition lead to a significant increase 
in food and fuel budget shares, in particular the consumption of pulses, fruits and vegeta­
bles, and dairy products. It also increased outlays on amusement services but decreased 
expenditures on educational items, household appliances, and toiletries. The reallocation of 
resources favoured child food items such as baby food and milk, but did not follow specific 
sex lines. The nature of these findings indicate strong support that the estimated reduction 
in alcohol demand is not solely due to underreporting which increases our confidence in the 
results from Chapter 3. The analysis also suggests that households which experienced the 
greatest fall in alcohol consumption were also those who experienced the greatest realloca­
tion of expenditures. This is observed most acutely for households with a large proportion of 
adult males who tend to have significantly higher levels of alcohol participation and expen­
ditures. The implication is that the direction of causation is from prohibition to household 
outlays and not vice versa.
The chapter then focuses on the private and social negative effects of alcohol by ex­
amining state-level time series data for the sixteen major Indian states over 1957-20016. 
Indicators of private harm studied include treatment rates of liver-diseases and rates of 
alcohol-related deaths including deaths from liver-disease, liver cirrhosis, spurious liquor, 
poisoning, and general accidents. Social externalities examined include road accident fatal­
ities and crime rates by type of crime including murder, rape, burglary, robbery, theft and 
dacoity.
The analysis finds that prohibition is associated with a significant increase in liver disease 
deaths but a significant decrease in spurious liquor and liver cirrhosis deaths. The divergence 
in the effect on health indicators may be due to differences in time frame or differences in 
the channels through which prohibition affects these diseases. With regards to social effects, 
prohibition was found not to have any impact on road accident fatalities, perhaps due to the 
low rate of motor vehicle usage. Prohibition reduced total crime by reducing the number of
6This data is as used in Chapter 2.
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burglaries. There is also some evidence of a decline in the number of rapes which together 
with results on expenditures on female clothing, suggest that prohibition may have improved 
female mobility. In spite of these positive trends in crime rates, prohibition policy is also 
associated with a significant increase in the homicide rate. This is most likely due to an 
increase in organised crime and illegal activity associated with black markets in alcohol.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 discusses the arguments for prohibition 
with regards to the negative effects of alcohol use. The analysis then focuses on assessing 
the impact of prohibition on intrahousehold allocation of resources. To this end, Section
4.3 outlines a framework for analysing the effect of prohibition on consumption of other 
household items given the estimated change in alcohol consumption and unit values. Section
4.4 discusses the empirical specification and data and highlights possible problems with the 
approach. Results of changes in broad consumption goods are discussed in Section 4.5 which 
is followed by an analysis of the effects of alcohol prohibition by household characteristic in 
Section 4.6. Section 4.7 analyses the impact of prohibition on private and social negative 
effects of alcohol use. The main findings of the chapter are analysed in Section 4.8 which 
concludes.
4.2 Background
The traditional argument for prohibition versus other policy tools with regards to the neg­
ative effects of alcohol use are based on three main factors: the preferences for eliminating 
alcohol consumption, the relative efficacy of prohibition policy, and the positive effects of 
prohibition.
Prohibition may be the most suitable policy lever if the primary objective of policy is to 
eliminate alcohol consumption due to moral or religious considerations, or if preferences for 
paternalism are extremely high. These tendencies may also arise if the negative externalities 
associated with alcohol consumption are large in scale, regarded as more detrimental, or 
harder to contain. This may be a primary reason as to why alcohol is subject to greater calls 
for prohibition relative to other addictive goods such as cigarettes7. The main externalities
7 Cigarette use is also associated with significant private harm although the negative social effects, aside
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associated with excessive alcohol use are motor vehicle accidents and first-degree crimes 
such as murder, assault and rape, which tend to be regarded as significant negative effects.
The second set of arguments for prohibition focus on the relative efficacy of prohibition 
in reducing alcohol consumption. The traditional method for curtailing alcohol consump­
tion, in part to reduce the negative effects of alcohol use, is taxation combined with age 
restrictions and regulations on licensing hours. The argument for prohibition versus other 
policy levels is therefore not clear cut, particularly as there is substantial evidence linking 
alcohol taxation and price with the negative private and social effects of alcohol8. Prohibi­
tion may be a more suitable instrument for controlling alcohol consumption when demand 
is inelastic or when tax systems are under-developed such that higher taxes do not translate 
into higher effective prices.
As discussed previously, the econometric evidence on the elasticity of alcohol demand in 
India is mixed with some studies finding elastic, and others inelastic, consumption functions. 
The qualitative evidence9 suggests that aside from a minority of users, alcohol consump­
tion tends to be concentrated among heavy users suggesting an inelastic demand function. 
Furthermore, it is associated with a culture of intoxication, the implication being that the 
adverse effects of consumption are accentuated resulting in a higher incidence of drunken­
ness. In this instance, prohibition may be more effective in controlling consumption relative 
to taxation or other direct price measures.
While these arguments for prohibition versus taxation are attractive on theoretical 
grounds, it is not clear whether prohibition has the desired effect on the negative con­
sequences of alcohol use. The analyses in Chapter 3 and the available literature on the 
effects of alcohol prohibition in the US suggests that prohibition results in a significant 
reduction in participation in alcohol consumption10. The expected fall in the negative ef­
fects of alcohol use is corroborated partly for alcohol-related diseases by Miron (1991) who 
finds that US prohibition significantly decreased rates of liver cirrhosis and alcoholism, in 
fine with the estimated mean fall in consumption. However, the qualitative literature for
from health-effects of secondary smoke, can be argued to be lower than for alcohol.
8See for example, Chaploupka et al (1993); Dave and Kaestner (2001); Grossman and Markowitz (1999); 
and Markowitz (1999, 2000a).
9See for example, AIIMS (1978) and Government of Maharashtra (1986).
10See Warburton (1932) and Thornton (1991) for literature on the impact of the US Prohibition of Alcohol.
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the US also documents an increase in alcohol consumption amongst certain groups due to 
the glamorization of illicit drinking and the culture of speakeasies. In addition, in India, 
alcohol consumption and participation did not fall to zero during prohibition periods. This 
indicates that although consumption declined at the mean, for the alcohol consuming pop­
ulation there was a higher probability of consuming spurious liquor together with its higher 
associated health risk. Prohibition may therefore, result in an increase the incidence of 
alcohol-related death and disease.
Proponents of prohibition have argued that, aside from its direct effects on alcohol con­
sumption, prohibition is also associated with several positive effects. Specifically, prohibition 
reduces the ‘wastage’ of resources and redirects limited resources to more productive uses. 
This may shift the power balance within the household by enabling women to have greater 
say in the allocation of household resources. Women generally tend to have less bargaining 
power in Indian households, and given the substantial evidence against the unitary model of 
household decision-making11, this would be a positive end in itself. Furthermore, as greater 
resources controlled by women have been found to be related to higher expenditures on 
child-related items, this may have a positive impact on child welfare.
Prohibitionists have also claimed that prohibition policy reduces crime by lowering the 
incidence of alcohol-related criminal behaviour such as violent assault and rape. In addition, 
the policy is assumed to limit the power of the local mafia by curtailing the income of liquor 
barons, who are finked with the criminal underworld and organised crime. Aside from the 
effect on crime, prohibition is claimed to improve labour productivity and reduce the extent 
of absenteeism, thereby increasing output and growth.
Given that these purported benefits of prohibition are mainly a function of the policy’s 
ability to reduce alcohol consumption, they could theoretically be achieved using alternative 
policy levers. The argument of these associated positive effects are therefore not sufficient 
grounds for prohibition policy. Counter to the claim of temperance groups, prohibition 
itself may be associated with particular negative effects that are not a feature of other 
policies such as taxation. Specifically, prohibition may increase overall crime rates by raising 
the price of alcohol for users and encouraging the growth of criminal activity by alcohol
11 See Doss (1994) for a survey of the empirical literature.
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suppliers. By creating a regulatory vacuum and incentives for the creation of black markets, 
prohibition may induce economic agents to use criminal methods to enforce contracts where 
state intervention is restricted. Furthermore, illicit methods are more likely to be used to 
retain and expand market shares of illegal sales. There is also the risk of organised criminal 
activity strengthening as they expand to control alcohol black markets12. This is supported 
by the available empirical research for the US which finds that prohibition resulted in a 
significant increase in the aggravated assault and the homicide rate, with much of this 
associated with organised crime and gang warfare (Warburton (1932); Thornton (1991); 
Miron (1999a)).
The evidence for prohibition reducing the incidence of industrial absenteeism and in­
creasing productivity is also limited. Some studies (Bureau of Prohibition (1930)) claim 
that prohibition resulted in a decrease in absenteeism and lowered the incidence of "Blue 
Monday", while others (Warburton (1932)) find no effects on industrial productivity, ab­
senteeism, or the rate of industrial accidents.
Taken together, the arguments for alcohol prohibition, with respect to alternative policy 
tools and the negative effects of alcohol consumption, are not clear cut. The main aim 
of the analysis in this chapter is to contribute to this debate by estimating the effect of 
prohibition on intrahousehold allocations, and on selected indicators of private and social 
harm. In doing so, it provides an empirical basis for assessing the validity of prohibitionists’ 
claims regarding the effects of prohibition policy.
4.3 Basic M odel
Prohibitionists, particularly in low-income countries, have long claimed that alcohol con­
sumption diverts scarce resources from otherwise useful expenditures. Central to this ar­
gument is that alcohol is consumed mainly by men who are the primary breadwinners and 
have a greater say in the intrahousehold allocation of resources. For households whose con­
sumption levels are already constrained, as in the case in much of India, such "wasteful"
12The growth of organised crime associated with bootlegging in the 1920s in the US has been attributed 
to this. In fact, Al Capone originally was involved in gambling and vice and then expanded into bootlegging 
during Prohibition.
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expenditures can have severe and permanent effects on the well-being of household mem­
bers. In particular, it is argued that women and children bare the true economic cost of 
alcohol use as limited household resources are reallocated from them. Even in the absence 
of direct discrimination, if the primary bread winner spends a large portion of their daily 
wage on alcohol before coming home, they limit the availability of funds for other items13.
This section examines whether prohibition affects the intrahousehold allocation of re­
sources by examining its impact on demand for other items in the household consumption 
bundle. In particular it focuses on the direction of change, if any, and which types of goods 
are particularly affected. While this does not allow inferences regarding changes in the level 
of household welfare, it does offer suggestive evidence to test the claim of prohibitionists 
that prohibition leads to an increase in expenditures on household essentials.
The analysis proceeds by assuming the household maximizes a weakly separable utility 
function subject to a standard budget constraint:
n
M axXu.,.yXnU (x u x 2,.. . ,xn) s.t. ^ p i X i  = M  -  c = I  (4.1)
* = i
Xi > 0 i = 1,2, ...,n
c
=  0 £ 1 = 0
if
> 0  x \  > 0
where x\  is alcohol, £2, •••> %n are all other commodities in the household consumption 
bundle, pi is the price of good z, M  is household income, and c is a fixed cost of consuming 
alcohol. First-order conditions are:
Ui — Xpi =  0 (z =  1,2, ...,n) (4.2)
13 This has led to many women’s groups lobbying for liquor shops to be closed on payday or for bars to be 
located a long distance from centre of employment such as local factories or village centres.
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These imply:
n
- 7  =  0
i=i
(4.3)
x ' = D i(pi,...,pn,I )  = D i(p,M ,c) (4.4)
and
Ox? dDi >  / v
a /  =  a r ? 0 (< =  2 . - . » )  (4-5)
dx* dDi dHi dDid^=d^=d^-Xl~ar (* =  2- ••••») (4 -6)
where Di and Hi are the Marshallian and Hicksian demand functions respectively.
Within this framework, the effect of prohibition on consumption can be analysed if 
we assume that prohibition increases the effective fixed cost of alcohol consumption and 
affects the alcohol price faced by the household. As discussed in Chapter 3, prohibition 
may increase the fixed cost of alcohol due to difficulties associated in acquiring liquor, 
the penalties associated with prohibition, and the imputed costs that arise from a higher 
probability of drinking spurious liquor. The increase the fixed cost of participating in 
alcohol consumption, c, should therefore induce households at the margin to drop out of 
the alcohol market, and induce a pure income effect on demand for all other goods. If the 
good in question is a normal good, an increase in c will decrease total income and decrease 
demand. On the other hand, if the good is inferior then demand will increase or remain the 
at the same level. While a given consumption bundle can contain any mix of inferior and 
normal goods, the properties of the utility function predicts that at least one good will be 
normal i.e. the demand for at least one good will decrease when income falls. We should 
therefore expect the pure income effect of prohibition to decrease consumption of normal 
goods and increase consumption of inferior goods.
The Slutsky decomposition in Equation 4.6 denotes the substitution and income effects 
of a change in the price of alcohol on all other goods. If alcohol and the good in question
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are Hicksian substitutes, then > 0; if they are Hicksian complements < 0. The 
overall change in demand will therefore depend on whether the income effect of the price 
change reinforces or offsets the substitute effect. The results in Chapter 3 indicate that 
complete prohibition lead to a significant decrease, and partial prohibition a significant 
increase, in the unit value of total alcohol. If one assumes no differences in the quality of 
alcohol consumed before and after prohibition periods (admittedly a strong assumption to 
make given the nature of illicit brewing and that alcohol transported illegally from other 
states is likely to be produced differently), unit values tend towards the price of alcohol. The 
substitution effect arising from the decrease in the price of alcohol would therefore decrease 
the consumption of goods which are Hicksian substitutes and increase the consumption 
of Hicksian complements. The income effect would increase consumption of normal goods 
and reduce those of inferior goods. The overall effect on demand due to the price change 
therefore depends on the characteristics of the good in question. The effects of the price 
increase during partial prohibition will work in the opposite directions.
Overall, the effect of alcohol prohibition on the demand for other items in the households 
consumption bundle works through two main channels. The higher fixed costs of acquiring 
alcohol acts as a negative income effect, while the change in price of alcohol due to falls in 
supply of alcohol and changes in market demand, induce substitution and income effects. 
The expected direction of demand for non-alcohol items together with the breakdown into 
the pure income effect and price effect is listed in Box 1. Given that all other items in the 
household budget (aside from other addictive goods) are likely to be substitutes for alcohol, 
the substitution effect of the price change is given only for Hicksian substitutes. As can be 
inferred from the Box, the effect of prohibition on the demand for other goods is ambiguous, 
aside for inferior goods during partial prohibition, and a matter for empirical estimation 
which is what we turn to next.
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Box 1: Effect of Prohibition on Demand for Household Goods
Complete Prohibition Partial Prohibition
Type of Good Normal Inferior Normal Inferior
Change in alcohol price Decrease Decrease Increase Increase
Pure Income Effect Negative Positive Negative Positive
Price Effect Ambiguous Negative Ambiguous Positive
Substitution Effect Negative Negative Positive Positive
Income Effect Positive Negative Negative Positive
O verall Effect A m biguous A m biguous A m biguous Positive
Notes: Alcohol price is proxied by alcohol unit values
4.4 Estim ation and D ata
4.4.1 Econom etric Specification
The econometric strategy is to estimate Engel curves of the following form for disaggregated 
household expenditure items:
Wist =  ot +  In X iat +  iJj In X fat +  7  In Nist +  AZist +  CRiat +  flPat +  <f>Oat +  Ps +  &t +  £iat
(4.7)
w is the budget share of expenditure items in the household consumption bundle for house­
hold i in state s and year t, X is per capita real monthly household expenditure, N is 
household size, Z is a vector of household characteristics, R is a dummy for the rural sector, 
P and O are complete and partial prohibition policy variables as described in Chapter 3, 
p and 8 are state and year dummies, and e is the error term. Household characteristics 
included are household caste (scheduled caste/tribe or general caste) and the sex, literacy, 
land ownership, age, marital status and occupation of the household head. Controls for 
household composition were also included in the following disaggregated age groups for
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both sexes: less than two years, two to four years, five to nine years, ten to fourteen years, 
fifteen to nineteen years, twenty to twenty nine years, thirty to fifty four years, and fifty 
five years and above. The state effects control for state-specific variables which may affect 
consumption patterns, such as a high preference for specific types of goods, and which if not 
controlled for may result in serial correlation in the error terms. The year effects control 
for year-specific shocks at the All-India level which may affect household budget shares14.
The inclusion of the squared per capita expenditure term requires further discussion, 
particularly as the literature on food Engel curves has found food shares to be linear with 
respect to expenditure in countries such as the US and UK15. However, for poorer countries, 
where consumption is constrained at low levels of food intake, there is evidence of a non­
linear relationship. Specifically, Bhalotra and Attfield (1998) find that household food Engel 
curves are quadratic logarithmic in rural Pakistan. In addition, Deaton (1997) reports 
non-parametric estimates of Indian food budgetshares which are nonlinear with respect to 
expenditure. The assumption of a non-linear relationship is therefore carried over to the 
present analysis given that India is a low-income country and exhibits similar patterns in 
household consumption given the cultural similarity to Pakistan. The quadratic logarithmic 
form is relevant given Bhalotra and Attfield’s finding that the parametric quadratic model 
is a good approximation to the true functional form as estimated using semi-parametric 
methods.
4.4.2 D ataset
The dataset used is compiled from thirteen cross sections of the National Sample Survey 
between 1983-2000 which covers over 60 broad item groups and within them, over 800 
narrowly defined categories. The analysis in this chapter focuses on the following aggregate 
item groupings - total food expenditures and sub-categories including grains and cereals, 
pulses, meat and fish, fruits and vegetables, and dairy products; fuel, clothing and footwear, 
amusement services, educational goods and services, health goods and services, toiletries, 
general consumer services, and miscellaneous goods; and durable goods such as furniture,
14 State-specific, year trends were also included in the specification as a robustness check of the results. 
The main results were found to hold and hence these estimates are not reported.
15See for example, Banks et al (1997) and Lewbel (1991).
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recreational goods, and household utensils and appliances. As with the data in Chapter 3, 
all expenditures are recorded at the household level and based on 30-day recall. In order 
to ensure comparability of goods classifications over time, some categories are not included 
in all years as there are occasional changes in definition of items or coverage of the survey 
period (annual versus monthly). Details of these, and the actual items included in each 
group, are given in the Data Appendix for this Chapter.
4.4 .3  Estim ation Issues
Equation 4.7 was estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with Huber-White standard 
errors clustered at the state level. This estimator was used as opposed to a GLS estimator 
with a state-specific error structure as used in Chapter 2, as its asymptotic properties are 
better suited for cross-sectional time series data where the number of periods is small. In 
addition, the OLS estimator is consistent, although not necessarily the most efficient16.
There are several estimation issues which arise in estimating Equation 4.7. One set 
of issues concern the limitations of household Engel curves to infer the welfare of individ­
uals within the household and to make welfare comparisons across households17. While 
households are the primary unit of observation particularly for consumption and expen­
diture decisions, the intrahousehold allocation of resources across individual members is 
an important determinant of individual welfare. If women or children are systematically 
discriminated against in receiving household resources, then a mean estimate of house­
hold welfare overstates their true well-being. This feature of intrahousehold allocation of 
resources is not accounted for in the Engel curve approach which treats each individual 
equally with respect to per capita expenditure and the distribution of household welfare.
Even if welfare is equally distributed across individuals within a household, it is not 
clear that per capita consumption measures provide an accurate ranking of welfare across 
different households or of the members within them. The equivalence scale literature em­
phasizes that per capita expenditure measures may not be accurate estimators of welfare 
as household members often require different types and levels of consumption to attain a
16 The Heckman estimator was not used in this case as there was no censoring for most of the consumption 
items examined.
17 See Deaton (1997) for a detailed discussion of the main issues.
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given level of welfare. For example, children require less than adults, while the elderly may 
require specific items, such as health care versus food, to attain the same level of welfare as 
prime-age adults. The presence of economies of scale in consumption further complicates 
inter-household comparisons. Economics of scale may arise due to the presence of house­
hold public goods or if household members have interdependent utility functions. Ignoring 
household composition and assuming that households with similar total expenditures and 
household sizes are comparable therefore masks importance differences in welfare across 
households. In particular, it understates the true welfare of larger households relative to 
smaller households at the same level of per capita expenditure.
Deaton (1997) notes that the obvious solution to the problem of equivalence is a system 
of weights where individuals are counted in terms of adult equivalents. This approach 
also allows for economies of scale by converting adult equivalents into "effective" adult 
equivalents such that households containing four adults could be directly compared with 
2 households containing 2 adults each. However, the calculation of adult equivalent scales 
has been a matter of intense debate, particularly in reference to the nature and source of 
the weight variables, and there is no consensus in the literature as to the correct approach 
to take.
The Working-Lesser Engel curves estimated in this chapter allow the examination of 
household expenditures conditional on total outlay and household structure. While this 
approach does not fully compensate for the differing needs of individuals to attain a given 
level of welfare, it goes some way for controlling for household demographic structure. The 
implication is that households of similar size and composition, whose outlays on a given item 
are equal are equivalent with respect to welfare. Given the difficulties in using equivalence 
scales and the lack of consensus in the literature, this approach has been the standard 
method for analysing household consumption patterns. The impact of prohibition on the 
household consumption bundle therefore is estimated for the average household assuming 
welfare is equally distributed across all members. The analysis therefore does not make any 
inferences regarding the welfare of particular groups within the household, or whether the 
policy change affects the nature in which household resources get allocated18.
18 This may occur, if prohibition gives women greater control of household resources which in turn reflect
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An attractive feature of this approach is that it allows examination of difference in 
household outlays according to the demographic composition of the household. Although 
household size and composition cannot be assumed to be entirely exogenous, F-tests of 
equality of the disaggregated age-sex coefficients allows the detection of differential house­
hold allocations by gender. While this is a necessary condition for discrimination, it is not 
sufficient as differences in allocation may arise for other reasons such as preferences or need. 
However, for certain groups of items, for example education, differential boy-girl spending 
maybe strongly indicative of discrimination.
Empirically, the impact of prohibition on household expenditure shares is difficult to 
estimate for several reasons. First, average alcohol budget shares are small (approximately 
4% on average) and therefore even a 100 percent decrease would constitute a small change in 
the budget share of all other items. This is compounded if the extra available expenditure is 
distributed across consumption groups. The large sample size of the National Sample Survey 
data increases the degrees of freedom in the econometric analysis which improves the chances 
of finding any such effect, although the potential problem of insufficient variation remains. 
The approach taken in this chapter is to examine sufficiently broad groups, such as total 
food outlays, so that the effects, if any should exist, are more easily detected statistically. 
However, as aggregation can disguise important shifts within groups, for example due to 
quality upgrading, the analysis also focused on sub-groups such as grains and cereals, meat 
and fish, fuel, household utensils, and services. Examining detailed item groups raises the 
problem of small budget shares which is a characteristic of many essential items such as 
household toiletries but also of others of particular interest such as education and health. In 
addition, certain consumption items, for example furniture and household appliances, are 
lumpy and require large increases in expenditures to increase consumption of one more unit. 
Given the small budget share of alcohol, the increase in expenditure may not be sufficient 
to detect any effects of prohibition on the budget shares of these items.
their preferences more.
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4.5 Alcohol Prohibition and Household Consum ption
4.5.1 Food and General G oods 
Food Items
Expenditure on food items comprises the largest share of the Indian household budget 
and is approximately 60% of total expenditures for the average household19. Of this, the 
largest proportion of expenditures are on cereals and grains which comprise 25% of total 
outlay, followed by vegetables and dairy products which are approximately 7% each of 
the average household budget (Table 4.1). Parametric estimates of food Engel curves are 
reported in Table 4.2 and confirm patterns found in similar analysis by other researchers 
(Deaton & Subramaniam (1994); Deaton (1997); Bhalotra and Attfield (1998)). At mean 
levels of household expenditure, food is an inferior good given that increases in per capita 
expenditures result in decreases in budget shares. Furthermore, the decline is non-linear 
as reflected by the negative and significant log per capita expenditure term, which implies 
that foodshares fall less rapidly for poorer households relative to rich ones.
However, examining aggregates can mask important differences within broad groups. 
The remaining columns of Table 4.2 disaggregates total food into grains and cereals, pulses, 
meat and fish, fruits and vegetables, and dairy products. The Engel curve estimates suggest 
that, aside from grains and cereals, all food groups are normal goods displaying increases 
in budget shares as expenditure increases. The fall in grain and cereal budget shares as 
household per capita expenditure increases corroborate Subramaniam and Deaton’s (1996) 
findings of quality-upgrading between food groups. The negative squared per capita ex­
penditure term suggests this occurs at a decreasing rate implying some quality-upgrading 
within the grains and cereals sub-group also occurs.
For food budget shares as a whole, there are significant economies of scale in consumption 
as increases in household size reduce budget shares, presumably as larger households have 
more children. This pattern is mixed for the remaining food items with pulses and fruits 
and vegetable expenditures exhibiting economies of scale but cereals and grains, meat and
19 Food budget shares are 64% of total expenditures for the median household.
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fish, and dairy products diseconomies of scale. This may be due to composition effects 
of larger households in that more children result in increases in expenditures of specific 
items like dairy and high protein foods. There are also important differences by household 
demographic composition -  households with a higher proportion of males, aged 5 and above, 
tend to have higher budget shares of all food items. The evidence for differences by age-sex 
for children is weak but suggestive of boy-girl discrimination for children younger than 2 
for grains and cereals, meat and fish, and dairy products20.
Rural households tend to have a lower food budget share relative to urban households, 
possibly to due to lower prices and/or computation of home grown consumption. Female 
headed households, older and educated household heads tend to have higher food budget 
shares, while married heads and schedule castes and tribes have lower food budget shares. 
These patterns do not extend to all food sub-items which exhibit significant differences 
according to household characteristics. For example, landed households consume relatively 
less grains and cereals compared to land-less households as one would expect given their 
higher per capita expenditures. SC/ST households consume less pulses and more meat and 
fish relative to general caste households, while households with literate heads allocate more 
of their budget towards fruits and vegetables and pulses relative to illiterate households. 
There are also significant differences by occupation with labourers and farmers consuming 
more grains and cereals as expected given the physical nature of their work and lower income 
class.
Given the large budget share of food items, one would expect to best detect the effect of 
prohibition on budget shares for this group. Table 4.3 shows that prohibition had significant 
positive effects on aggregate food budget shares although its effects differed significantly 
across food groups. Complete prohibition periods saw an increase in food budget shares of 
0.5 percentage points on average but had no significant effect on the consumption of grains 
and cereal, or meat and fish. The insignificant effect on grains and cereals may be due to 
quality upgrading between and within groups resulting in offsetting effects21. The result for
20 F-tests for the effect of age-sex composition of the household on budget shares were carried out following 
Deaton (1997). A significant difference at the 5% (strong) or 10% (weak) level was taken as evidence of 
discrimination. This is bearing in mind the caveat that other factors may be driving the differences such as 
preferences or need.
21 It is unlikely to be due to insufficient variation as grains and cereals constitute 26 percent of the household
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meat and fish may be due to their relatively high per unit price which may require large 
decreases in other budget shares for significant increases in demand. Complete prohibition 
did significantly increase budget shares of fruits and vegetables, pulses, and dairy products 
which are the main components contributing to the total increase in food outlays.
As food is an inferior good, the increase in fixed costs of consuming alcohol during pro­
hibition induces a pure positive income effect on total food demand. In addition, unit values 
fell during complete prohibition (Tables 3.10 and 3.11) which imply that the substitution 
and income effects from the change in alcohol price are negative and reinforce one another 
(See Box 1). Together, the theory is ambiguous regarding the effect of prohibition on food. 
The estimated positive effect of prohibition on food budget shares therefore suggests the 
positive pure income effect dominated any changes induced by the price effect.
Partial prohibition also had a significant and positive affect on food budget shares, 
which increased by 1.4 percentage points. The overall positive effect of partial prohibition 
is as predicted by theory; given the rise in alcohol prices during partial prohibition, the 
substitution and income effects are positive and reinforce the positive pure income effect. 
The increase in food shares is partly due to increases in expenditures on grains and cereals, 
pulses and dairy products. Similar to complete prohibition, partial prohibition had no effect 
on meat and fish budget shares and actually reduced fruit and vegetable outlays. Overall, 
arrack prohibition increased food shares by 1.1 percentage points with the main increases 
coming from grains and cereals, dairy products and pulses.
General Items
Expenditures on general items constitute approximately 35% of the household budget and 
range from 8% for fuel to 0.5% for amusement services (See Table 4.1 for summary statistics). 
Engel curve estimates of general goods demands are given in Table 4.4. Aside from health 
goods and services, clothing and footwear, toiletries, and amusement services, all general 
items are inferior goods with respect to per capita expenditure. In addition, there are 
strong non-linear effects in all estimations. Outlays on certain goods exhibit economies of 
scale with respect to household size including consumption of fuel, household toiletries, and
budget on average and effects of prohibition have been found for items with much lower expenditure shares.
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consumer services such as maid services.
There are significant differences in resource allocations by household characteristics. 
It is interesting to note that households with literate heads spend significantly more on 
educational materials, while rural and SC/ST households spend significantly less. On the 
other hand, rural and SC/ST households spend significantly more on health goods and 
services whilst households with female and literate heads spend significantly less. It is 
difficult to attribute any one reason for the cause of the differences in expenditure patterns, 
but it is plausible to assume that they are driven by preferences, need or availability of 
alternate facilities. For example, rural households may spend less on education due to lower 
rates of schooling, fewer facilities or more free schooling. In addition they may spend more 
on health due to higher prevalence of disease and lack of access to free health care.
Prohibition had a significant and varied estimated effect on the general goods examined 
(Table 4.5). This is in spite of their relatively small magnitude which make it difficult to 
detect any causal changes. Similar to food, fuel budget shares increased during complete 
prohibition suggesting the pure income effect dominated the effect of alcohol price on de­
mand. Complete prohibition increased budget shares of clothing and footwear, consumer 
services, and amusement services, which includes visits to the cinema or theatre. However 
prohibition shifted resources away from expenditures on recreational goods such as musi­
cal instruments, household items such as utensils and toiletries, and furniture and fixtures. 
There was no effect on the budget shares of educational materials such as books, periodicals 
and newspapers, or on health goods and services22.
Partial prohibition significantly increase allocation of resources towards fuel, education, 
health, and furniture and fixtures which is as expected given their inferior good properties. 
The only exception to this rule is household utensils and appliances whose budget shares 
actually declined. In addition it decreases budget shares of household toiletries. There were 
no effects on clothing and footwear, amusement services, or general consumer services.
22 This is also observed for health goods and health services when analysed separately.
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4.5 .2  Child G oods
One of the main arguments of the anti-liquor movement for prohibition is that alcohol 
consumption reallocates resources from productive uses such as expenditure on child-specific 
goods. While it is difficult to argue that increased expenditure on such items improves 
household welfare without specifying a particular welfare function and sharing rule, it is 
interesting to examine whether prohibition results in increases of expenditures for goods 
which are key inputs for the welfare of specific household members. In doing so, it should 
be noted that the analysis does not attempt to trace the mechanism by which any such effect 
would operate, for example through greater bargaining power of women or children, but 
simply aims to detect the reduced-form nature of the effect of prohibition on intrahousehold 
resources.
The NSS includes information on three child-specific expenditure items - baby food, milk 
(liquid, powder and condensed), and expenditure on books, fees and other school-related 
educational items. The choice of milk requires some discussion as it can be argued that 
dairy products, in general constitute an important part of the Indian diet so is not correctly 
specified as a child good. While this is accurate, milk compromises a large portion of 
children’s diets and as such changes in milk budget shares affect children disproportionately 
relative to adults.
Engel curves for the child-specific items are estimated in Table 4.6. The estimates 
suggest that all child goods examined are normal goods and are non-linear with respect to 
per capita expenditure. There are some differences in the budget share of these items by 
age and sex. In particular, milk consumption is significantly higher in households with boys 
under the age of 2 relative to similar households with females aged 2 and lower. A similar 
result is observed for the 5-9 and 10-14 age groups. Expenditure on education goods is 
also significantly higher for households with older boys between the ages of 5-19. Across all 
three child goods budget shares increase with higher proportion of adult (child bearing age) 
females. This suggests that women may have greater preference for child-goods relative to 
men, a pattern which has also been found in other studies23.
23Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) find that higher female income shares increase household expenditures on 
child-related goods. Lundberg et al (1997) study the effects of a policy change in the UK transfer payments
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The results on the effect of prohibition on child-goods axe consistent with the findings 
for food, dairy products and educational materials as a whole (Table 4.7). The impact of 
prohibition on budget shares of baby food and milk is positive and significant but small 
which is expected given their small budget shares. On the other hand, complete and partial 
prohibition significantly decreased expenditure on child education items such as books and 
school fees. These effects are consistent with the theoretical predictions which are ambiguous 
for normal goods for both complete and partial prohibition (Box 1). The results therefore 
indicate that the income effect due to the price change of alcohol dominated both the 
substitution effect and the pure income effect24.
4.5.3 Sex-specific G oods
Given that alcohol is mainly consumed by men and that the anti-liquor movement was 
spear-headed by women, it is natural to examine the effect of prohibition on sex-specific 
goods25. The NSS includes information on a number of sex-specific items such as male and 
female clothing, toiletries, and jewellery (considered to be mostly female-owned). Table 
4.8 shows Engel curve estimates for identifiable male and female goods respectively. All 
clothing items examined are normal goods, while household toiletries are normal goods, 
male and female toiletries exhibit inferior good properties. One would therefore expect the 
pure income effect due to prohibition to be negative for clothing and positive for sex-specific 
toiletries.
Complete prohibition increased expenditures on both male and female clothing. It is 
interesting to note the difference in the impact across male clothing items by prohibition 
type26 which may be related to the type of alcohol consumed by groups wearing dhotis and 
lungis respectively. Dhotis tend to be worn mainly by Hindu men and the data indicates
system which transferred child allowance to women. They find that this contributed to a significant increase 
in female and child-specific goods. Quisumbing and Maluccio (2000) examine intrahousehold allocations in 
four developing countries and find that higher relative resources controlled by women increase budget shares 
spent on child education.
24 Note that the effect is positive for complete prohibition and negative for partial prohibition.
25 It was not possible to identify other age-specific goods to examine the effects of prohibition on older- 
household members.
26 Complete prohibition significantly increased budget shares of lungis but not of dhotis, while partial 
prohibition increased dhoti budget shares but not of lungis.
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that arrack budget shares are significantly higher and statistically different for households 
spending money on dhotis relative to lungis.
Complete and partial prohibition significantly increased sari budget shares but decreased 
chaddor budget shares. The difference in result between saris and chaddors is interesting 
given that chaddors are typically worn by women to conceal their figures when venturing 
outside the home. The implication is therefore that prohibition and lower alcohol consump­
tion -  perhaps due to effects on crime or perceived safety -  increased female mobility27. The 
alleged decrease in crime, particularly the molestation of females by drunks, has been a key 
argument of women’s welfare groups against liquor. While the evidence linking crime and 
alcohol is very strong, it is interesting to observe that alcohol policy is associated strongly 
with changes in expenditures which reflects the greater mobility of women.
The effect of complete prohibition on sex-specific toiletries is negative for complete 
prohibition periods. There was no effect on budget shares of jewellery which is plausible 
given their high per unit cost and as they are traditionally purchased for special occasions 
such as weddings and births. Partial prohibition also increased saree and dhoti budget 
shares but had a significant negative effect on chaddors and toiletries. For all sex-specific 
goods examined the effect of prohibition on budget shares was small.
4.5 .4  R obustness Checks 
U nderreporting
The results above suggest that prohibition had significant effects on the intrahousehold 
allocation of resources. However, whether this is an actual change in outlays as opposed to a 
statistical one warrants further discussion. It can be argued that if underreporting exists and 
is correlated with prohibition, then respondents simply exclude alcohol expenditures from 
the survey during prohibition periods or report alcohol expenditures under different heads. 
In other words, when alcohol consumption is illegal, alcohol expenditures are frequently 
reported as zeros or missing observations.
The implications of systematic underreporting on the effects of prohibition on alcohol
2 7 In fact results on the effects of prohibition on crime suggest that prohibition may have resulted in a fall 
in rape cases.
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consumption have been discussed in Chapter 328. For the analysis in this Chapter, the 
nature of underreporting and the method by which total expenditure is calculated is key in 
determining whether the budget shares of all other items are being correctly captured, in 
spite of underreporting. If underreporting takes the form of omitted alcohol expenditures 
and total expenditure is aggregated from all expenditures, then underreporting will lower 
reported total expenditures and artificially increase the budget shares of all other items. 
On the other hand, if total expenditure is reported separately, for example under a separate 
question heading, then it is likely that total household outlays are recorded correctly and 
the budget shares of non-alcohol items are calculated accurately. Alternately, underreport­
ing may take the form of respondents inputting alcohol expenditures onto other households 
items such as toiletries or food. This form of underreporting, while possible, is extremely 
unlikely in recall surveys as it requires a high level of technical sophistication. This is corrob­
orated by studies of underreporting which have found that for UK consumption expenditure 
surveys, underreporting of this nature is very rare (Kemsley et al (1980)).
There is some uncertainty as to how the National Sample Survey Organization, which 
is the body who administers and computerises the NSS, actually collects and calculates 
total expenditure figures. From the author’s investigations it appears that their approach, 
at least with respect to the issue at hand, does not offer conclusive guidance. In general, 
interviewers begin the expenditure survey by asking households their total expenditure and 
then work backwards to each broad item group and then to the subgroups within them. 
Total expenditure is therefore a separate question in the consumer-expenditure survey. 
This approach would suggest that even if alcohol consumption was not reported accurately 
during prohibition, total expenditures would be correctly measured and by design so would 
budget shares of all other goods. However, at the data processing and cleaning stage, 
total expenditures are also calculated by summing across all consumption items and some 
attempts are made to cross-check with totals from the originally stated expenditure and 
correct inconsistent figures. Furthermore, it is not clear to what extent the final total 
expenditure figure given in the dataset is the initial reported total expenditure or the 
corrected sum. Response from the National Sample Survey Organization on this issue is
28 See Section 3.6.4 for the discussion on underreporting.
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limited29 and to the author’s knowledge there have been no systematic studies of this in 
the past.
The view taken here is that there is limited scope for truly knowing the extent and 
nature of underreporting and its effect on the budget shares of other items. Chapter 3 noted 
that the incentives for consumers to underreport during prohibition are very low given the 
penalties involved, the limited effective enforcement on consumers, and the nature of the 
NSS household survey. In addition, the finding that reported consumption for some types 
of prohibited alcohol (which are all subject to the same fines) actually increased during 
prohibition lends some support against the severity of underreporting. With respect to the 
analysis in this chapter, underreporting resulting from items being dropped from the survey 
and total expenditures calculated from the sum of all items, would result in an upwards 
bias on the effect of prohibition on all budget shares in the household consumption bundle. 
The results indicate significant negative effects of prohibition for several item groups. In 
the absence of systematic factors which affect both underreporting and prohibition, it can 
therefore be argued that underreporting does not appear to be prevalent in the data. There 
is therefore a strong case that the estimated effects of prohibition of household budget share 
patterns are real changes and not simply statistical.
Endogeneity
The specification in Equation 4.7 assumes that prohibition is exogenous to household con­
sumption patterns, that is there are no problems of simultaneity or spurious correlation. 
However, it could be argued that the direction of causation runs from the left-hand side 
to the right such that the pattern of household expenditure shares determine prohibition 
policy. This may be if, for example, states or periods with high budget shares of food (indi­
cating relative poverty) are correlated with preferences for alcohol and prohibition. There 
is also the potential problem of spurious correlation which implies that any detected effect 
of prohibition is actually capturing the effect of a latent variable which affects both prohi­
29 The NSSO is extremely reluctant to discuss the potential discrepancies in the total expenditure figures 
and were vague regarding extent of cleaning of the expenditure data series. It is therefore not possible to 
ascertain to what extent to variable in the datasets are from calculated total expenditures from summing up 
the outlays for each item versus the actual response from the household to the total expenditure question.
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bition policy and the nature of household consumption bundles. For example, if particular 
political parties are associated with prohibition policy as well as policies which may affect 
household expenditures such as through higher government spending on welfare or food 
distribution programs.
The case for simultaneity requires plausible arguments for why state-wide, yearly changes 
in household allocation patterns would be correlated with prohibition policy30. A leading 
explanation may be shocks to food availability in the form of floods, droughts, and other 
factors causing a drop in food production which may precipitate political action in the form 
of prohibition policies. The effect of adverse shocks on policy was examined in Chapter 
2 which found that shocks to food availability, measured by the occurrence of floods and 
drought, falls in food grain production, and value of flood damage, did not determine 
prohibition policy. There was also no effect of real per capita state income, poverty or income 
inequality which are the most plausible indicators of differences in household allocation 
patterns across states and over time.
Aside from simultaneity, an additional concern is that of spurious correlation such that 
the estimated observed effects on consumption are not due to prohibition but of a latent 
omitted variable which affects both. Chapter 2 found prohibition policy to be enacted 
during election years in predominantly rural states with a low concentration of alcohol fac­
tories and a high share of central union excise. Inclusion of these variables in Equation 4.7 
does not change the main effect of prohibition on household resource allocations. Neverthe­
less, given that the enactment of, prohibition is driven by political economy considerations 
there is the argument that regulating governments are also more active in other spheres 
affecting constituents welfare such as their consumption levels and bundles. The analysis 
in Chapter 2 does not suggest that any particular political party, or grouping of parties 
(left/centre/right), are more prone to prohibition policy. Despite this there is the possibil­
ity that parties which have enacted prohibition have certain unobserved properties which 
we have not accounted for and which may also determine policies in other spheres which 
may affect the household consumption bundle.
30 This is because the specification already controls for state and year effects which may determine prohi­
bition policy.
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The approach taken in this chapter to ameliorate potential endogeneity concerns is to 
analyse the incidence of prohibition on alcohol consumption and non-alcohol expenditure 
patterns by household characteristics. It is illustrated that the effects of prohibition on 
household consumption are strongest for households who decreased consumption of alcohol 
most during prohibition periods. Unless, one can find reasons why such households are 
more influential in determining legislation we can deduce that the direction of causation 
runs from prohibition policy to the left-hand side and not vice versa. It is argued that, 
while imperfect, the suggestive evidence is strong that the changes in consumption patterns 
are not driving the changes in legislation at the state-level, but are driven by changes in 
alcohol demand at the household level resulting from prohibition.
4.6 Alcohol Prohibition and Household Characteristics
The basic results indicate that prohibition periods are associated with changes in household 
consumption patterns. However, it may be the case that periods of restrictive alcohol 
policy are correlated with distinct patterns of household consumption at the aggregate - i.e. 
the direction of causation runs from the left-hand-side to the right rather than vice versa. 
Alternately the same factors driving prohibition at the state level may also be driving 
changes in the pattern of household expenditures. To the extent that these may be state- 
level or year fixed variables, the state and year fixed effects control partly for this. However, 
state-year changes are not controlled for and may be driving both prohibition and changes 
in the household consumption bundle.
One way to investigate this further is to examine characteristics of households consuming 
alcohol and most affected by prohibition, and then examine whether the same households 
exhibit significantly different effects on budget shares due to prohibition policy. The analysis 
in Chapter 3 found the following household characteristics to be correlated with alcohol 
consumption: household demographic composition, SC/ST status of the household, sex 
and literacy of the household head, and the rural/urban location of the household. In 
addition, each characteristic was estimated to respond differentially to prohibition policy.
Household composition is an intuitive choice as male adults comprise the majority of
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alcohol consumers in India. This is examined in Table 4.10 which reports F-Tests of the 
effect of disaggregated household sex-age groups on alcohol consumption based on estimates 
of Equation 4.7 with alcohol on the left-hand side31. The test results corroborate the 
qualitative evidence that alcohol is consumed predominantly by adult males - households 
with a higher proportion of males in the 30-54 age group spend a significantly higher budget 
share on alcohol relative to households with higher proportion of females in the same age 
category. In addition, households with more female children tend to have higher alcohol 
budget shares particularly in the 2-4, 5-9 and 15-19 age groups lending support to the 
argument that gender discrimination may manifest itself by adults reducing consumption 
of adult goods more for male children relative to female.
Given that household demographic composition and alcohol consumption are related, 
we would expect prohibition policy to have a differential impact on alcohol budget shares 
by the age-sex characteristics of the household. In particular we would expect consumption 
of alcohol to decrease more significantly in households with a high proportion of adult 
males. Part B of Table 6 reports F-tests for the interaction effects of prohibition with broad 
age-sex groups. The results indicate that prohibition did indeed have differential effects 
by household age-sex groups. In general, alcohol budget shares reduced significantly more 
in households with more adult males during prohibition periods. During periods when 
consumption of certain alcohol types increased e.g. IMFL during periods of only arrack 
prohibition and toddy during complete prohibition, we see that the consumption response 
during prohibition increased significantly more in households with a higher proportion of 
adult males. There is also some weak evidence of a greater response in households with 
more female children as one would expect given that these households tend to have higher 
alcohol consumption as reflected in Part A of Table 6.
The interaction effects between prohibition policy and household age-sex groups on 
consumption budget shares are reported in Table 4.11. Given that alcohol consumption 
decreased more in households with a higher proportion of adult males we would expect the 
effects on budget shares to be greater (either positive or negative) in households with more 
adult males relative to adult females. F-tests of equality of interactions across the expen­
31 All coefficients for all alcohol types are positive.
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diture groups analysed above suggest the following: for sex and age neutral consumption 
groups such as food and fuel, prohibition had a larger impact on households with dispropor­
tionately more males. On sex-specific items, the effect on budget shares due to prohibition 
differed according to household composition, being significant and positive in households 
with relatively more adult males for male goods and vice versa. For child goods, the interac­
tion effects were also significant i.e. households with more adult males had a greater impact 
on consumption bundles with the direction of the change being mixed but significant - for 
example, the impact on baby food was positive and the impact on milk negative.
The broad pattern found for the effect of prohibition, demographic composition and the 
intrahousehold allocation of resources is also found for other household characteristics with 
different preferences for alcohol. Chapter 3 found several other household characteristics 
to be correlated with alcohol consumption. In particular, the Engel curve estimates in 
Table 3.3 show that SC/ST members consumed significantly more alcohol than General 
Caste households, and rural households consume more relative to urban households. On 
the other hand, female headed households and literate households consume significantly less 
alcohol relative to male-headed and illiterate households. Furthermore, Table 3.9 showed 
that the incidence of prohibition differed by SC/ST status, rural/urban location, literacy of 
household head and sex of the household head. Given these differential effects, prohibition 
should also have differential effects on household resource allocation by characteristic. This 
is shown in Table 4.12 which reports the interaction of complete and partial prohibition with 
household characteristics on household consumption budget shares. It can be seen that for 
all groups prohibition, on the whole, had significantly different effects on the budget shares 
of the household consumption bundle32 even for small expenditure items such as amusement 
services.
Overall these results suggest that the estimates are correctly picking up causal effect 
of prohibition on the budget shares of other goods i.e. households which experienced the 
greatest change in alcohol consumption due to prohibition policy, are also the households 
where we observe greater changes in the pattern of consumption. It is difficult to argue that
32 The insignificant effects for total food shares mask important differences within food sub-groups as 
highlighted by the results for grains and cereals and milk items.
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the estimates are picking up the effect that these particular households differentially affect 
the probability of prohibition. It is also hard to make the case that they are all affected by 
underlying latent variables which also drive prohibition. For example, it can be argued that 
rural and urban constituents or SC/ST households have differential preferences for both 
policy and household consumption, but it is harder to make the same case for household 
composition, or the literacy and sex of the household head. The latter is particularly difficult 
given that state income per capita, poverty, and inequality were found not to be correlated 
with prohibition legislation.
4.7 Private and Social Effects o f Prohibition
A key argument of temperance groups for prohibition has been the negative private and 
social effects of alcohol use. This section examines the effect of prohibition on specific 
indicators of alcohol-related negative effects using states-level data for India over 1957- 
2001. The analysis starts by examining private effects of alcohol use, such as disease and 
death rates, and then proceeds to examine associated social effects, including road accident 
fatalities and crime rates.
4.7.1 Private Harm
Private effects associated with alcohol comprise the various medical conditions directly 
caused by alcohol consumption, and others for which alcohol is attributed as the primary 
determinant. Overall, causal relationships have been identified between average consump­
tion of alcohol and more than 60 types of diseases and injury including alcoholic psychosis, 
alcohol dependence syndrome, alcohol abuse, alcoholic polyneuropathy, alcohol cardiomy­
opathy, alcoholic gastritis, alcoholic liver cirrhosis, and ethanol toxicity and methanol tox­
icity (WHO (2001)). Alcohol consumption is also associated with higher death rates from 
injuries, suicide, poisoning, haemorrhagic stroke, pancreatitis, as well as cancers of the oral 
cavity, pharynx, larynx, oesophagus, liver, and breast33. The extent and nature of alcohol
33See Andreasson et al (1988) for literature on higher death rates; Anderson (1995) for research on poi­
sonings; Donahue et al (1986) and Klatsky (1989) for studies on haemorrhagic strokes; Singh and Simsek 
(1990) on pancreatitis; and IARC (1988) on cancers associated with alcohol consumption.
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problems is associated both with the level of consumption and patterns of drinking (Edwards 
et al (1994)). It should be noted that the medical literature has found moderate-to-light 
alcohol consumption to have a protective effect against specific illnesses such as coronary 
heart disease, ischemic stroke, cholelithiasis, and non-insulin dependent diabetes mellitus34. 
However, these positive effects do not ameliorate the other risks associated with excessive 
alcohol consumption.
Identifying meaningful indicators for monitoring alcohol-related harm is important in 
order to accurately estimate the effect of alcohol prohibition on the private negative effects 
of alcohol use. For most alcohol-related problems, drinking is not the sole determinant of 
disease or death, but part of a group of factors that lead to an increased risk of harm, and 
ultimately to the condition itself. The available data on diseases and deaths directly caused 
by alcohol in India is limited to reported incidence of deaths due to spurious liquor. This 
includes any illegally available liquor which cannot be safely consumed without a high risk 
of poisoning or other health risks such as blinding or liver failure. Deaths from spurious 
liquor may arise if legally produced35 liquor is adulterated with drugs such as diazepam 
or chemicals like chloralhydrate to give them an extra kick, or if illegally brewed alcohol 
is non-potable (Manor (1993)). In addition to spurious liquor deaths, the analysis in this 
chapter focuses on diseases and death for which alcohol is attributed as the major cause, 
or as one of the significant causal factors. These include incidence of liver cirrhosis, liver- 
related diseases and deaths, and deaths from poisoning. For all indicators, the WHO (2001) 
has estimated that alcohol has contributed to at least 30% of cases worldwide36.
The effect of prohibition on indicators of private harm was inferred by estimating 
reduced-form models of the following form:
34See Doll et al (1994); Thun et al (1997); Jackson et al (1991) for results on alcohol consumption and 
coronary heart disease. See Rodgers et al (1993); Palomaki and Kaste (1993); and Bogoussalavsky et al 
(1990) for details on ischemic strokes. See Thornton et al (1986); English et al (1994) for information on 
cholelithiasis. See Rimm et al (1995) and Kiechl et al (1996) for research on diabetes mellitus.
35 This may be smuggled from non-prohibition states or liquor which is not subject to prohibition such as 
toddy during periods of arrack prohibition.
36For example, in non-tropical developed countries with substantial alcohol consumption, alcohol is at­
tributed to cause more than 80 % of liver cirrhosis cases, although hepatitis B and C are also significant 
determinants in some parts of the world (Edwards et al (1994)).
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where N  is the measure of private harm in state s and year i, X  is a set of state-level 
controls including real state income per capita and log total population, P  is the proportion 
of population under prohibition as described in Chapter 237, p and 8 are state and year 
effects, and e is the error term. The approach is reduced-form as alcohol prohibition is 
linked to alcohol consumption, which in turn, is linked to greater incidence of private harm. 
Equation 4.8 is estimated using the GLS estimator allowing for heteroskedasticity with each 
state having its own error variance. In particular, the error term est is modelled as an AR(1) 
disturbance term with state-specific autocorrelation i.e. est = pe8t-1 +  ust-
The data series used for each indicator is compiled from state-level sources for a  long a 
time-series as was available. Full details for each variable are given in the Data Appendix. 
While there are several variables which may also determine the incidence of private harm and 
hence should be included in the specification in Equation 4.8, data availability on relevant 
indicators was poor. In so far as they are state and year specific they are controlled for 
by the fixed effects included. For the measures of liver disease and deaths, the annual lag 
was included to control for any systematic factors driving incidence. For example, given the 
long-term nature of fiver disease, high past levels of treatment are likely to be related to high 
present levels of treatment. Lags were not included for the measures of accidental deaths, 
poisoning and spurious liquor deaths as these are more likely to be random in any given 
state and year and thus unlikely to be affected by systematic factors. Given that the effect 
of alcohol consumption on alcohol-related diseases is likely to ensue over several years, and 
due to potential simultaneity concerns (despite the results in Chapter 2 suggesting that the 
negative effects of alcohol are not significant determinants of prohibition policy), prohibition 
was lagged 1 election period. In addition, the analyses were repeated for lags of 1-4 years 
for the prohibition variable.
The results in Table 4.13 indicate that complete prohibition did not have any impact 
on the rate of accidental deaths and poisoning. There was a significant decrease in spu­
37 The proportion was used as opposed to the dummy variable as the time period for the variables is from 
1957-2001.
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rious liquor poisoning and deaths from liver cirrhosis. The latter result confirms previous 
findings38 that cirrhosis-death rates are sensitive to alcohol availability, and suggests that 
even for heavy-drinkers (the group at most risk from alcohol-related cirrhosis) alcohol con­
sumption may be somewhat price sensitive. However, complete prohibition significantly 
increased the incidence of liver disease deaths, a finding which is difficult to reconcile with 
the negative effects found for spurious liquor and cirrhosis. One explanation may be that 
consumption of illegal liquor during prohibition periods has such severe effects so as to in­
duce liver disease deaths aside from those caused by liver cirrhosis, which are associated with 
long-term accumulated high alcohol consumption. However, aside from alcohol poisoning 
due to overconsumption, it is difficult to find explanations for liver failure outside of spurious 
liquor poisoning which has been shown to decrease during prohibition. Alternately, it may 
be due to the differing time period of coverage of the variables -  fiver disease deaths (and 
treatment) are available over 1957-1985, while fiver cirrhosis and spurious liquor deaths are 
available over 1973-1993 and 1984-1999. This argument is strengthened given that periods 
of prohibition across the whole state, which become common after the late 1960s, are not 
associated with increases in the rate of fiver disease deaths.
4.7.2 Social Externalities
Aside from the private effects of alcohol use, excessive alcohol consumption leading to 
intoxication is also associated with several negative externalities. Levitt and Porter (2001) 
find that in the United States drunk drivers are involved in 30% of all fatal accidents on 
the road, a proportion which increases to 60% in periods when alcohol consumption is 
greatest. There is also significant evidence that alcohol use is finked to criminal and violent 
behaviour39. The Bureau of Justice Statistics (1988) reports that in the United States 
approximately 60% of all persons convicted of assault and 30% of convicted burglars had 
been drinking just prior to the crime. This is further corroborated by Markowitz (2000a; 
2000b), who finds that alcohol consumption across a group of countries is finked to a higher 
incidence of assault, robbery, and rape; and Grossman and Markowitz (1999) who find that
38See Cook and Moor (1999).
39 See Miczek et al (1994) for a review of the literature.
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violence in US campus is negatively linked to alcohol prices. There is also a well-established 
link between excessive alcohol use and family violence -  in reviews of the literature, Gelles 
and Cornell (1990) and Leonard (1993) note that in almost every study of family aggression 
alcohol is found to be a strong correlate of violence40. In addition to these more direct 
social externalities, there are indirect effects of excessive alcohol use, such as increases in 
tax burdens due to higher costs of treating alcohol-related diseases and increases in insurance 
premiums due to increased incidence of motor vehicle accidents.
The link between prohibition and social externalities was examined by estimating reduced- 
form equations similar to Equation 4.8 using measures of social externalities on the left-hand 
side41. These include deaths from motor vehicle accidents and crime rates by crime group 
such as rapes, burglaries, robberies, theft, murders, and dacoity. Information on domestic 
violence was limited and therefore excluded. The crime data are based on reported cases 
compiled by local police officers and, together with the data on number of police officers, 
are available over 1965-200142. Road accident fatalities are available over 1970-1999 and are 
compiled from Accidental Deaths and Suicides in India. Full details of the dataset and vari­
ables are in the Data Appendix. As with private effects, Equation 4.8 was estimated using 
the GLS estimator corrected for panel-level heteroskedasticity and an AR(1) state-specific 
error term.
The approach requires two assumptions to hold -  first that alcohol consumption leads 
to greater incidence of the negative externality and second that prohibition reduces alcohol 
consumption. In addition, prohibition itself should not contribute to crime, a fairly strong 
assumption discussed below. The link between alcohol and motor vehicle fatalities and 
crime have been fairly well established in the literature and reviewed above. Furthermore, 
the analysis in Chapter 3 has shown that alcohol prohibition significantly reduced alcohol 
participation and consumption. This, together with the observation that similar reduced-
40 See also Markowitz (1999) who finds a direct relationship between alcohol price and spousal violence; 
Markowitz and Grossman (1999b) who find a similar relationship for violence towards children.
41 In addition to the present state controls, proportion of urbanization, literacy rates and proportion SCST 
population were also analysed. Similar to Dreze and Khera (2000) I find limited effects of urbanization 
(contrary to the popular association of crime with cities), negative significant effects of literacy and positive 
effects of the proportion of SC/STs. Results were not reported for these specifications as data are available 
only up to 1991.
42 The only exception is rape which is available for 1983-2001.
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form analyses have found significant effects of alcohol policy, suggests that the approach 
taken is suitable to infer the effect of prohibition on externalities. It should be noted that 
the analysis examines the effects of intoxication of both the perpetrator and victim, in that 
alcohol use may induce criminal behaviour but also increases the probability of being a 
victim.
The assumption that prohibition does not perpetuate crime requires further discussion. 
The regulatory vacuum caused by prohibition may result in the expansion of certain types 
of criminal activity. In particular, organized crime may expand into supplying black market 
liquor or offer protection services to suppliers to maintain or expand liquor market sales. 
The large rents available for extraction are also associated higher incentives for the corrup­
tion of the police, public officials (such as prohibition enforcement agents), and politicians. 
Thornton (1991) reports that in the US, corruption of law enforcement agencies was a ma­
jor feature of Prohibition. For example, the Wickersham Report (1931) which reviewed the 
first 10 years of Prohibition notes that by June 1930 more than 1600 civil servant employees 
had been dismissed for causes related to corruption or dereliction of duty.
Prohibition may also increase criminal behaviour in individuals consuming alcohol by 
increasing the cost of consumption. As the effective price of alcohol increases, the risk 
of criminal activity falls resulting in a higher probability of petty and property crime. 
While, this assumes a particular view of the determinants of crime43 and may hold mainly 
for heavy consumers of alcohol, studies of heroin addicts have found that price increases 
leads to increased criminal behaviour (Thornton (1991)). In addition, the enforcement of 
prohibition may divert limited police resources from monitoring other crime, causing an 
increase in their incidence. Benson et al (1990) find this effect for drugs, particularly that 
increased enforcement of illegal drugs have decreased enforcement against property crimes 
thereby increasing the rate of their occurrence.
Table 4.14 contain the estimates of the effects of prohibition on crime rates and road 
accident fatalities. The results suggest that contemporaneous complete prohibition had 
a significant negative effect on total number of crime cases44, driven mainly by a fall in
43 The assumption here is that crime is driven by environmental and economic factors as opposed to genetic 
ones such as tendencies for aggression. See Thornton (1991) for a discussion of the various theories of crime.
44 Note the result in Chapter 2 crime was not found to be significant in determining prohibition.
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burglary cases. When annual lags are examined to ameliorate simultaneity concerns, pro­
hibition is found to significantly increase the incidence of murders and decrease burglaries. 
However, these effects offset one another resulting in an insignificant overall effect on total 
crime cases. There does not appear to be any further effect on the other types of crime 
examined, although there is a negative effect of prohibition on the number of rape cases in 
some specifications45. The main results for complete prohibition hold for periods of arrack 
prohibition and for alternately defined crime variables for example, crime per thousand 
population and proportion of each crime sub-group of total crime46.
The negative effects of prohibition on total crime and burglary follow from the discussion 
of alcohol consumption and criminal behaviour. If prohibition reduces consumption then 
tendencies for criminal behaviour are reduced causing a fall in crime rates47. On the other 
hand, prohibition may itself induce criminal behaviour through the creation of black markets 
and regulatory vacuums leading market participants to use violence to solve commercial 
disputes. This may explain the significant increase in murder rates due to prohibition, a 
result which Miron (1999a) also finds for the US prohibition of alcohol. Conlin and et al 
(2001) find that country-level prohibition of alcohol in the US is related to higher illicit 
drug related crimes lending further support to this hypothesis.
The analysis finds no significant effect of alcohol prohibition on road accident fatalities 
(Table 4.14). The result is surprising given the significant decline in consumption due 
to prohibition, and the findings of several studies that stricter alcohol policy, including 
prohibition, reduces the rate of motor vehicle fatalities. For example, Brown et al (1996) 
show that county-level prohibition in Texas reduces the rate of fatal alcohol-related motor 
vehicle accidents, and Wim and Giacopassi (1993) show that country-level prohibition in 
Kentucky is associated with lower alcohol-related road accidents48. However, replicating 
these findings for India may be difficult given the low incidence of motor vehicle ownership
45The results axe for numbers of rape cases.
46 The log of crime cases was reported as this was the more relevant indicator given that population is 
controlled for in the regressions. In addition, crimes per thousand population and the proportion of each 
crime group in total crime resulted in very small coefficients for some of the categories.
47 A priori, there is no reason why alcohol consumption should cause a fall in burglaries as opposed to 
other types of crime. However, given there was no data on assaults a strict comparison cannot be made as 
to which type of crime is affected by prohibition the most.
48See also Saffer and Grossman (1987); Chaloupka et al (1993); and Wilkinson (1987).
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which was approximately 0.063 per thousand population in 2001. This makes it harder to 
infer a decrease in alcohol-related motor vehicle accident fatalities from prohibition due to 
a lack of variation in the data and because the level of such accidents is small to begin with.
4.8 Conclusion
The negative effects of alcohol use have been at the forefront of arguments for the prohibition 
of alcohol. Alcohol use, particularly in low-income countries, has been argued to divert 
limited resources from more productive household expenditures and differentially affect 
the welfare of women and children. Alcohol consumption has also been associated with 
significant private and social detrimental effects. This chapter examined the effect of alcohol 
prohibition on these negative effects by examining the changes in the pattern of demand 
for household items, alcohol-related disease and death, and disaggregated crime rates.
The main results from the econometric analysis on intrahousehold allocations are that 
prohibition had significant effects on household expenditure patterns. Specifically, prohibi­
tion increased food and fuel budget shares, the former mainly due to increases in consump­
tion of pulses, fruits and vegetables, and dairy products. It also shifted resources towards 
amusement services, perhaps as a substitution for alcohol. On the other hand, prohibition 
decreased budget shares of education goods, household appliances and utensils, and house­
hold toiletries. These effects also hold for child-specific goods with prohibition increasing 
shares of baby food and milk but decreasing child education expenditures. The allocation of 
resources does not appear to follow sex-lines with both male and female clothing increasing 
and sex-specific toiletries decreasing.
The analysis of household expenditures by household characteristics show that intra­
household resource reallocations were greatest in households who consumed significantly 
more alcohol. These effects are particularly significant for households with a large propor­
tion of male adults, who have a high rate of alcohol consumption which was differentially 
affected by prohibition policy. Similar patterns are also observed for SC/ST households, 
rural households, and female and literate household heads.
Given the significant negative effects on budget shares of some household items due to
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prohibition, underreporting, in the sense that items are declared missing or less than actually 
spend, is not endemic in driving the results. The incentive for underreporting related to 
prohibition in household consumption-expenditure surveys is limited but its absence cannot 
be guaranteed. With respect to the endogeneity of prohibition policy, the interactions with 
household characteristics indicate that the estimated changes in the consumption bundle 
are being driven by changes in alcohol consumption due to prohibition rather than vice 
versa. In addition, they lend support to the argument of limited spurious correlation as 
prohibition policy appears to have impacted household expenditures most in households 
consuming alcohol. Since these households do not significantly affect policy-making and are 
not necessarily the same households most likely to benefit from government spending plans, 
the argument that latent political variables are driving the observed results is weak.
Overall the estimated effects of prohibition on intrahousehold resource allocations are 
small which is expected given that alcohol is only 4% in the household budget of the house­
hold budget. This is not to say, however, that the associated welfare effects, at the household 
and societal level, are also small. While the analysis cannot infer whether household wel­
fare increased or decreased due to the changes in the household bundle, the implication is 
that the welfare effects on other individuals within the household could be significant. This 
is particularly important if consumption was constrained at unsustainable levels prior to 
prohibition.
In addition to the intrahousehold effect of prohibition, the effect of prohibition on the 
other negative effects of alcohol use may be substantial. The analysis on alcohol related 
deaths and disease found prohibition to have a significant negative effect on spurious liquor 
and liver cirrhosis deaths. Prohibition had an estimated effect on alcohol-related social 
externalities by decreasing burglaries and total crime rates in turn. However, prohibition 
is associated with higher liver disease deaths, perhaps due a greater incidence of poisoning. 
There was also an increase in homicide rates similar to increases found for the US dur­
ing prohibition. These effects suggest that while prohibition may have significant positive 
effects, it may itself cause detrimental side-effects and should therefore not be seen as a 
panacea.
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4.9 Appendix 1: D ata Appendix
The data for the analysis in this chapter come from several sources. The household  level 
dataset used in the analysis of intrahousehold resource allocation is the same dataset used 
in Chapter 3 (See Appendix 1, Chapter 3 for further details). Specifically the data are from 
the National Sample Survey and household controls are as in Chapter 3. The list below 
indicates the consumption items in each broad group.
The state-level dataset used for the analysis of private and social negative effects of 
alcohol use is the same dataset used in Chapter 2 (See Appendix 2, Chapter 2 for further 
details).
T otal Food: Grains and cereals, pulses, meat and fish, fruits and vegetables, dairy prod­
ucts, beverages, edible oils and spices, processed foods.
G rains and  Cereals: Paddy, rice, chira, khoi/lawa, muri, other rice products, wheat, 
atta, maida, suji/rawa, sewai/noodles, bread/bakery, other wheat products, jowar, jowar 
products, bajra, bajra products, maize, ,aize products, barley, barley products, small mil­
lets, small millets products, ragi, ragi products, gram, gram products, tapioca/sago, tapioca 
(green), mahua, jack fruit seed, other cereal substitutes.
Pulses: Arhar/tur, gram (split gram), moong, urd, khesari, peas, soyabean, other pulses, 
basan, other pulse products.
M eat an d  Fish: Goat meat, mutton, beef, pork, buffalo meat, other meat, chicken, other 
birds, eggs, egg products, fresh fish, dry fish, canned fish, other fish/meat products.
F ru its  and  Vegetables: Potato, onion, radish, carrot, turnip, beat, sweet potato, arum, 
other root vegetables, pumpkin, gourd, bitter gourd, cucumber, parwal/patal, jhinga/torai, 
snake, other gourd, cauliflower, cabbage, brinjal, lady’s finger, palak, other leafy vegeta­
bles, French beans and barbuti, tomato, peas, chillis, capsicum, plantain (green), jackfruit 
(green), lemon, other vegetables, banana, jack fruit, water melon, pine apple, coconut, 
guava, singara, orange/ mausami, mango, kharbooza, pears/naspati, berries, leechi, apple, 
grapes, other fresh fruits, coconut/copra, groundnut, dates, cashew nut, walnut, other nuts, 
raisin, other dry fruits.
D airy  P ro d u cts : Liquid milk, baby food, condensed/powder milk, curd, ghee, butter, 
ice-cream, other milk products.
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Fuel a n d  light: Coke, firewood and chips, electricity, dung cake, kerosene, matches (box), 
coal, coal gas, l.p.g., charcoal, other oils used for lighting, candle, methylated spirit, gobar 
gas, other fuel and light.
E d u ca tio n a l M ateria ls : Books/journals, newspapers/periodicals, library charges, sta­
tionary articles, tuition fees (school, colleges), other educational expenses.
H e a lth  G oods an d  Services: Allopathic medicine, homeopathic medicine, ayurvaidic 
medicine, unani medicine, family planning appliances, pathological test, other medical ex­
penses.
C lo th ing  an d  Footw ear: Dhoti, sari, cloth for shirt/pyjama/salwar, cloth for trousers or 
overcoat, cloth for dupatta/wrapper/shawl, lungi, gamcha/towel/handkerchief, hosiery arti­
cles/stockings or undergarments, ready made garments, headwear, knitted garments/sweater 
or pullover/cardigan or muffler/scarf, bedsheet/bedcover, rug/blanket, pillow or quilt/mattress, 
cloth for upholstery/curtain or tablecloth, mosquito net, mats and matting, cotton/cotton 
yean, knitting wool, other clothing, leather boots/sandals/shoes/chappals, other leather 
footwear, rubber/PVC footwear, other footwear.
Toiletries: Toilet soap, tooth paste/tooth powder/tooth brush, powder/snow/cream/flower, 
hairoil/lotion/shampoo/haircream, comb, shaving blades, shaving stick and shaving cream, 
other shaving requisites, other toilet articles.
A m usem ent Services: Cinema/theatre, fair/picnic, sports/goods/toys, club fees, goods 
for recreation and hobbies, photography, video cassette/VCR or VCP, other amusement. 
R ecrea tio n a l G oods: Gramophone and record player, radio, radiogram, television/VCR/VCP, 
camera and other photographic equipment, tape recorder, harmonium, piano, record cas­
sette/audio cassette, video cassette, other musical instruments, other goods for recreation 
and entertainment and hobbies.
F u rn itu re : Bed stead, almirah, dressing table, chair, coach/sofa, table/desk, stool/bench, 
suitcase/trunks/box/hand bag/other travel goods, foam/rubber cushion, carpet/daree/ 
other floor matting, paintings/drawings/engravings, other furniture and fixtures.
H ousehold  U tensils: Stainless steel utensils, bell metal utensils, copper utensils, alu­
minium utensils, iron utensils, brass utensils, enamel utensils, crockery utensils, other uten­
sils, electric fan, stove, pressure cooker/pan, non-sticking pan, sewing machine, washing
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machine, refrigerator, air conditionaer/cooler, lantern/lamp/tube light, electric iron/heater 
or toaster or other electric heating appliances, thermos/thermoware, ovens/other cooking 
and household appliances/equipment.
G eneral Services: Private tutor, domestic servant/cook, sweeper, barber/beautician, 
washerman/launder, tailor, priest, legal expenses, postage/telephone/telegram, repair charges, 
miscellaneous expenses, pet animals, other consumer services, railway fare, bus fare, taxi/auto­
rickshaw fare, bullock cart fare, airways fare, porter charges, steamer boat fare, rickshaw 
fare, horse cart fare, hand operated cart fare, petrol, diesel, lubricating oil, other imputed 
value of owned conveyance, school bus/van, other hired conveyance.
B aby Food: Baby food
M ilk: Liquid milk, baby food, condensed/powder milk
C hild  E ducational G oods: Books/journals, tuition fees (school, colleges).
Sari: Sari.
C haddor: Cloth for dupatta/wrapper/shawl.
Fem ale Toiletries: Powder/snow/cream/flower, hairoil/lotion/shampoo/haircream. 
Jew ellery: Gold ornaments, silver ornaments, jewels/pearls, other ornaments.
D hoti: Dhoti.
Lungi: Lungi.
M ale Toiletries: shaving blades, shaving stick and shaving cream, other shaving requisites.
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Table 4.1: Summary of Main Variables
Variables Mean S.d.
Complete Prohibition Dummy 
Arrack Prohibition Dummy 
Partial Prohibition Dummy 
Log P. C. Household Expenditure 
Log Household Size 
Sex of Head 
Age of Head 
Literacy of Head 
Marital Status of Head 
Land Ownership 
Scheduled Caste/Tribe 
Rural Sector Dummy 
Proportion Females <2 
Proportion Females 2-4 
Proportion Females 5-9 
Proportion Females 10-14 
Proportion Females 15-19 
Proportion Females 20-29 
Proportion Females 30-54 
Proportion Males <2 
Proportion Males 2-4 
Proportion Males 5-9 
Proportion Males 10-14 
Proportion Males 15-19 
Proportion Males 20-29 
Proportion Males 30-54 
Proportion Males >55 
Professional
Administrative/Executive/Managerial 
Clerical
Sales Professionals 
Service Professionals 
Farmers
Production Workers 
Labourers
0.079 0.270
0.193 0.395
0.115 0.318
5.633 0.780
1.501 0.558
0.080 0.272
44.155 13.313
2.201 2.111
2.072 0.378
0.602 0.489
0.243 0.429
0.628 0.483
0.017 0.056
0.032 0.077
0.050 0.097
0.047 0.095
0.042 0.095
0.088 0.128
0.142 0.146
0.018 0.058
0.035 0.081
0.058 0.104
0.057 0.105
0.051 0.110
0.096 0.168
0.160 0.170
0.055 0.126
0.064 0.245
0.033 0.178
0.056 0.230
0.099 0.299
0.044 0.205
0.492 0.500
0.182 0.385
0.030 0.171
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Table 4.1 Cont: Summary of Main Variables
V ariables M ean S.d.
Food Budget Share 0.595 0.244
Grains and Cereals Budget Share 0.251 0.187
Pulses Budget Share 0.034 0.026
Meat and Fish Budget Share 0.030 0.040
Vegetables Budget Share 0.070 0.040
Dairy Budget Share 0.073 0.083
Baby Food Budget Share 0.0004 0.005
Milk Budget Share 0.063 0.073
All Milk Products Budget Share 0.064 0.072
Child Education Goods Budget Share 0.012 0.038
Female Toiletries Budget Share 0.009 0.008
Powder Budget Share 0.002 0.004
Hair Oil Budget Share 0.007 0.006
Saree Budget Share 0.021 0.070
Chaddor Budget Share 0.002 0.014
Lungi Budget Share 0.003 0.015
Dhoti Budget Share 0.005 0.023
Male Toiletries Budget Share 0.001 0.003
Jewelry Budget Share 0.001 0.017
Fuel Budget Share 0.076 0.042
Clothing and Footwear Budget Share 0.046 0.089
Amusement Services Budget Share 0.005 0.011
Education Budget Share 0.035 0.096
Health Budget Share 0.039 0.081
Toiletries Budget Share 0.023 0.015
General Services Budget Share 0.059 0.071
Furniture and Fixtures Budget Share 0.002 0.023
Recreational Goods Budget Share 0.002 0.026
Utensils and Appliances Budget Share 0.004 0.026
Medicine Budget Share 0.037 0.074
Miscellaneous Goods Budget Share 0.021 0.015
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Table 4.2: Engel Curves of Selected Food Budget Shares
Food G rains
&
Cereals
(2)
Pulses M eat & F ru it & D airy
(1) (3)
Fish
(4)
V egetable P ro d u c ts
(5) (6)
Log P. C. 
Expenditure
-11.995
(19.284)
-48.187
(91.655)
1.637
(20.750)
4.661
(49.296)
3.832
(33.056)
16.985
(92.558)
Log P. C. Exp 
Squared
-0.511
(9.880)
2.931
(68.235)
-0.254
(38.982)
-0.361
(44.840)
-0.472
(47.810)
-1.316
(85.575)
Log Household 
Size
-3.535
(41.901)
0.614
(10.693)
-0.280
(26.041)
0.530
(33.834)
-0.887
(51.022)
1.205
(41.252)
Sex of Head 1.716
(11.819)
-1.341
(13.507)
-0.013
(0.739)
-0.235
(8.172)
-0.090
(3.065)
-0.124
(2.511)
Age of Head 0.041
(12.314)
-0.015
(6.311)
0.002
(5.754)
-0.010
(16.264)
0.004
(5.667)
0.019
(16.123)
Education of Head 0.235
(12.806)
-0.413
(33.349)
0.045
(20.623)
-0.114
(31.710)
0.156
(43.942)
0.413
(60.392)
Marital Status 
of Head
-1.242
(13.642)
0.567
(9.067)
0.127
(10.937)
0.086
(5.112)
0.404
(21.007)
0.057
(1.827)
Land Ownership 0.113
(1.311)
-0.108
(1.829)
0.113
(11.344)
0.001
(0.055)
0.094
(5.727)
0.544
(20.762)
Scheduled
Caste/Tribe
-1.481
(16.921)
1.566
(23.797)
-0.176
(15.507)
0.470
(27.441)
-0.287
(16.850)
-2.002
(72.441)
Rural Dummy -0.852
(7.551)
1.508
(20.758)
-0.030
(2.272)
-0.236
(10.631)
-0.483
(21.446)
-0.423
Constant 158.263
(81.167)
211.835
(129.672)
2.809
(11.490)
-9.467
(32.279)
4.840
(13.702)
-53.770
(93.597)
R-squared 0.368 0.494 0.225 0.221 0.176 0.324
Notes: T-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state level 
in parenthesis. All estimates include occupation, year and state dummies. Other 
explanatory variables include controls for household demographic structure as noted 
in the text. Total sample size is 600618.
Table 4.3: Effect of Prohibition on Food Budget Shares
Total Food G rains & C ereals Pulses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Complete Prohibition 0.117 0.831 -0.376 -0.012 0.068 0.204
(0.343) (2.406) (2.005) (0.062) (2.199) (6.349)
Partial Prohibition 2.325 1.185 0.442
(11.015) (7.489) (16.477)
Arrack Prohibition 1.798 0.762 0.358
(9.126) (5.477) (15.481)
Log P. C. -11.995 -11.831 -11.868 -48.187 -48.104 -48.134 1.637 1.668 1.662
Expenditure (19.284) (19.033) (19.100) (91.654) (91.523) (91.621) (20.753) (21.245) (21.161)
R-Squared 0.368 0.368 0.368 0.494 0.494 0.494 0.225 0.226 0.226
M eat & Fish F ru its  & V egetables D airy  P ro d u c ts
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Complete Prohibition -0.049 -0.049 0.334 0.295 0.014 0.182
(1.079) (1.021) (5.615) (4.755) (0.160) (1.965)
Partial Prohibition 0.001 -0.126 0.548
(0.025) (2.832) (9.352)
Arrack Prohibition -0.017 0.023 0.419
Log P. C. 4.661 4.661 4.659 3.832 3.823 3.833 16.985 17.024 17.014
Expenditure (49.295) (49.249) (49.237) (33.068) (33.010) (33.070) (92.557) (92.694) (92.653)
R-Squared 0.221 0.221 0.221 0.176 0.176 0.176 0.324 0.324 0.324
Notes: T-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis. All estimates 
include occupation, year and state dummies. Other explanatory variables include controls for household characteristics, 
characteristics of the household head, and household composition as in Table 4.2. Total sample size is 600618.
Table 4.4: Engel Curves of Selected Household Goods Budget Shares
Fuel Education Health Furniture Utensils Consumer 
Items Items & & Services
Fixtures Appliances 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log P. C. 
Expenditure
-5.311
(42.540)
-6.873
(18.098)
5.310
(15.906)
-1.480
(8.499)
-0.692
(3.748)
-11.123
(54.072)
Log P. C. Exp 
Squared
0.159
(15.281)
0.794
(22.752)
-0.166
(5.541)
0.171
(10.430)
0.115
(6.580)
1.269
(67.463)
Log Household 
Size
-2.013
(107.483)
1.668
(37.685)
1.360
(32.303)
0.161
(11.334)
0.146
(9.332)
-0.009
(0.329)
Sex of Head -0.351
(11.576)
0.054
(0.674)
-0.637
(8.826)
-0.075
(3.464)
-0.080
(3.431)
0.294
(6.445)
Age of Head 0.001
(0.184)
0.011
(6.555)
-0.010
(5.859)
-0.002
(4.514)
-0.004
(6.582)
0.005
(5.090)
Education 
of Head
0.047
(12.853)
0.438
(44.563)
-0.278
(29.567)
-0.015
(5.287)
-0.031
(9.718)
0.417
(75.370)
Marital Status 
of Head
0.503
(24.288)
0.195
(4.487)
0.183
(4.165)
0.053
(3.983)
0.064
(4.854)
-0.215
(7.067)
Land
Ownership
0.026
(1.546)
0.016
(0.358)
-0.268
(7.216)
0.009
(0.797)
-0.007
(0.562)
-0.946
(38.099)
Scheduled
Caste/Tribe
-0.118
(6.295)
-0.074
(2.186)
0.196
(5.366)
0.041
(4.295)
0.057
(5.140)
-0.307
(15.851)
Rural Dummy -0.661
(30.357)
-0.888
(16.699)
0.998
(21.172)
0.083
(5.994)
0.138
(9.372)
-1.802
(58.593)
Constant 36.164
(93.241)
10.171
(9.763)
-19.766
(20.679)
2.736
(5.897)
5.113
(10.380)
25.383
(43.686)
R-squared 0.231 0.177 0.058 0.020 0.081 0.351
Notes: T-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state level 
in parenthesis. All estimates include occupation, year and state dummies. Other 
explanatory variables include controls for household demographic structure as noted 
in the text. Total sample size is 600618.
Table 4.4 C ont: Engel C urves o f Selected H ousehold G oods B udget 
Shares
C loth ing
&
Footw ear
(7)
H ousehold
Toiletries
(8)
A m usem ent R ecrea tional 
Services G oods
(9) (10)
Log P. C. 10.742 1.360 0.777 -1.999
Expenditure (28.756) (34.824) (18.674) (10.513)
Log P. C. Exp -0.311 -0.173 -0.044 0.226
Squared (9.219) (52.738) (12.165) (12.540)
Log Household 2.353 -0.461 0.083 0.231
Size (43.579) (68.703) (14.628) (14.255)
Sex of Head -0.166 0.355 0.106 -0.067
(1.806) (31.720) (12.543) (2.526)
Age of Head -0.023 0.005 -0.001 -0.003
(11.700) (23.438) (0.832) (4.397)
Education -0.341 0.125 0.024 -0.025
of Head (29.507) (92.880) (22.147) (6.998)
Marital Status 0.193 -0.113 -0.064 0.078
of Head (3.434) (15.012) (10.889) (5.546)
Land 0.096 -0.025 -0.031 -0.030
Ownership (2.124) (4.241) (6.534) (2.257)
Scheduled 0.508 -0.178 0.021 0.049
Caste/Tribe (10.975) (30.090) (5.105) (4.308)
Rural Dummy 1.721 -0.338 -0.257 0.107
(28.626) (42.821) (41.834) (6.638)
Constant -48.915 -0.061 -2.803 3.798
(44.800) (0.502) (22.684) (7.546)
R-squared 0.152 0.233 0.132 0.016
Notes: T-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state level 
in parenthesis. All estimates include occupation, year and state dummies. Other 
explanatory variables include controls for household demographic structure as noted 
in the text. Total sample size is 600618.
Table 4.5: Effect of Prohibition on Household Goods Budget Shares
Fuel E ducation  Item s H ealth  Item s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Complete Prohibition 0.551 0.586 -0.079 0.028 -0.134 0.037
(10.379) (10.383) (0.503) (0.177) (1.174) (0.309)
Partial Prohibition 0.110 0.379 0.587
(2.538) (2.654) (4.230)
Arrack Prohibition 0.279 0.204 0.295
(6.964) (1.716) (2.885)
Log P. C. -5.309 -5.301 -5.289 -6.872 -6.855 -6.866 5.312 5.332 5.317
Expenditure (42.548) (42.496) (42.378) (18.094) (18.056) (18.083) (15.911) (15.970) (15.928)
R-Squared 0.231 0.231 0.231 0.177 0.177 0.177 0.058 0.058 0.058
F u rn itu re  & F ix tu res U tensils & A ppliances C onsum er Services
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Complete Prohibition -0.106 -0.089 -0.026 -0.083 0.154 0.180
(3.258) (2.685) (1.106) (2.944) (2.015) (2.339)
Partial Prohibition 0.066 -0.219 0.080
(2.273) (4.558) (1.168)
Arrack Prohibition -0.007 -0.155 0.116
(0.301) (4.458) (2.080)
Log P. C. -1.472 -1.474 -1.479 -0.690 -0.682 -0.677 -11.122 -11.116 -11.114
Expenditure (8.459) (8.469) (8.494) (3.733) (3.692) (3.667) (54.073) (54.066) (54.052)
R-Squared 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.351 0.351 0.351
Notes: T-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis. All estimates 
include occupation, year and state dummies. Other explanatory variables include controls for household characteristics, 
characteristics of the household head, and household composition as in Table 4.2. Total sample size is 600618 for fuel 
and consumer services, 375970 for education and health items, and 298200 for furniture and utensils.
Table 4.5 Cont: Effect of Prohibition on Household Goods Budget Shares
C loth ing  & Footw ear 
(19) (20) (21)
H ousehold  T oiletries 
(22) (23) (24)
Complete
Prohibition
0.255
(1.864)
0.341
(2.351)
-0.135
(7.391)
-0.181
(9.499)
Partial
Prohibition
0.275
(1.825)
-0.143
(8.657)
Arrack
Prohibition
0.296
(2.342)
-0.157
(11.099)
Log P. C. 
Expenditure
10.729
(28.724)
10.725
(28.706)
10.728
(28.697)
1.359
(34.823)
1.349
(34.606)
1.348
(34.592)
R-Squared 0.152 0.152 0.152 0.233 0.233 0.233
A m usem ent Services 
(25) (26) (27)
R ecrea tional G oods 
(28) (29) (30)
Complete
Prohibition
0.070
(5.640)
0.067
(5.197)
-0.072
(2.132)
-0.069
(1.963)
Partial
Prohibition
-0.009
(0.613)
0.011
(0.314)
Arrack
Prohibition
0.018
(1.547)
-0.027
(0.931)
Log P. C. 
Expenditure
0.777
(18.681)
0.776
(18.614)
0.778
(18.664)
-1.993
(10.472)
-1.994
(10.471)
-1.997
(10.489)
R-Squared 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.016 0.016 0.016
Notes: T-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state level 
in parenthesis. All estimates include occupation, year and state dummies. Other 
explanatory variables include controls for household characteristics, characteristics 
of the household head, and household composition as in Table 4.2. Total sample size 
is 600618 for toiletries and amusement services, 313470 for clothing and footwear, 
and 298200 for recreational goods.
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Table 4.6: Engel Curves of Child Goods Budget Shares
Baby Food 
(1)
Total Milk 
(2)
Child Education
Items
(3)
Log P. C. 0.182 12.947 -0.806
Expenditure (15.311) (80.757) (7.013)
Log P. C. Exp -0.013 -1.035 0.161
Squared (13.432) (76.753) (14.873)
Log Household 0.011 1.042 0.850
Size (5.386) (39.988) (46.630)
Sex of Head 0.007 -0.162 0.020
(1.856) (3.675) (0.604)
Age of Head 0.001 0.017 0.005
(2.227) (16.174) (7.103)
Education 0.005 0.344 0.211
of Head (11.575) (56.419) (50.563)
Marital Status 0.009 0.031 0.120
of Head (4.912) (1.121) (6.791)
Land 0.001 0.482 -0.001
Ownership (0.421) (20.388) (0.060)
Scheduled -0.008 -1.719 -0.027
Caste/Tribe (4.972) (69.452) (1.827)
Rural Dummy -0.017 -0.443 -0.408
(7.160) (13.986) (18.437)
Constant -0.512 -38.977 -1.986
(13.986) (77.654) (6.262)
R-squared 0.019 0.277 0.186
Notes: T-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state level 
in parenthesis. All estimates include occupation, year and state dummies. Other 
explanatory variables include controls for household demographic structure as noted 
in the text. Total sample size is 600618.
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Table 4.7: Effect of Prohibition on Child Goods Budget Shares
B aby Food 
(1) (2) (3)
T otal Milk 
(4) (5) (6)
C hild  E duca tion  Item s 
(7) (8 ) (9)
Complete Prohibition 0.012
(2.163)
0.014
(2.374)
0.204
(2.751)
0.383
(4.981)
-0.147
(2.281)
-0.188
(2.870)
Partial Prohibition 0.006
(1.582)
0.584
(11.043)
-0.162
(3.885)
Arrack Prohibition 0.009
(2.344)
0.513
(10.486)
-0.172
(4.400)
Log P. C. 
Expenditure
0.182
(15.311)
0.182
(15.360)
0.183
(15.384)
12.947
(80.735)
12.988
(81.005)
12.983
(80.956)
-0.804
(6.987)
-0.808
(7.029)
-0.809
(7.037)
R-Squared 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.277 0.277 0.277 0.186 0.186 0.186
Notes: T-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis. All estimates 
include occupation, year and state dummies. Other explanatory variables include controls for household characteristics, 
characteristics of the household head, and household composition as in Table 4.2. Total sample size is 600618 for baby 
food and milk, and 452853 for education items.
Table 4.8: Engel Curves of Sex-Specific Goods Budget Shares
Sari
(1)
Fem ale G oods 
C haddor Toiletries 
(2) (3)
Jew ellery
(4)
Log P. C. 2.313 0.073 -0.029 -0.851
Expenditure (11.099) (1.729) (1.263) (5.831)
Log P. C. Exp -0.014 0.010 -0.022 0.107
Squared (0.710) (2.600) (11.572) (7.753)
Log Household 0.690 0.068 -0.213 0.141
Size (17.962) (9.115) (61.928) (11.516)
Sex of Head -0.081 -0.009 0.098 -0.026
(1.166) (0.654) (15.814) (1.490)
Age of Head -0.008 -0.001 0.002 -0.002
(5.179) (0.615) (15.709) (4.236)
Education -0.126 -0.014 0.035 -0.025
of Head (15.710) (7.629) (49.671) (9.584)
Marital Status 0.077 -0.006 -0.013 0.013
of Head (1.873) (0.663) (3.342) (1.393)
Land 0.128 0.028 0.005 0.006
Ownership (3.483) (4.018) (1.608) (0.717)
Scheduled 0.173 0.036 -0.057 0.059
Caste/Tribe (5.375) (4.768) (17.291) (6.885)
Rural Dummy 0.426 0.059 -0.020 0.068
(9.426) (6.806) (4.723) (6.990)
Constant -10.287 -0.821 2.072 1.385
(17.594) (6.906) (29.566) (3.549)
R-squared 0.179 0.048 0.136 0.014
Notes: T-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state level 
in parenthesis. All estimates include occupation, year and state dummies. Other 
explanatory variables include controls for household demographic structure as noted 
in the text. Sample size is 600618 for toiletries, 313470 for sari and chaddor, and 
298200 for jewelry.
Table 4.8 Cont: Engel Curves of Sex-Specific Goods Budget Shares
Dhoti
(1)
Male Goods 
Lungi 
(2)
Toiletries
(3)
Log P. C. 1.558 0.648 -0.089
Expenditure (27.157) (17.552) (14.693)
Log P. C. Exp -0.108 -0.046 0.006
Squared (20.838) (13.470) (11.641)
Log Household 0.106 0.071 -0.002
Size (7.737) (8.351) (2.125)
Sex of Head -0.267 -0.055 -0.012
(13.222) (4.098) (6.878)
Age of Head 0.001 -0.002 0.001
(1.037) (7.183) (13.700)
Education -0.067 -0.030 0.016
of Head (25.361) (15.965) (69.126)
Marital Status 0.037 0.012 -0.005
of Head (2.297) (1.206) (3.654)
Land 0.123 0.013 -0.003
Ownership (10.722) (1.625) (2.875)
Scheduled 0.043 -0.005 0.009
Caste/Tribe (3.551) (0.616) (9.269)
Rural Dummy 0.208 0.068 -0.037
(15.571) (6.709) (28.018)
Constant -5.653 -1.874 0.321
(31.786) (16.943) (17.786)
R-squared 0.081 0.122 0.127
Notes: T-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state level 
in parenthesis. All estimates include occupation, year and state dummies. Other 
explanatory variables include controls for household demographic structure as noted 
in the text. Sample size is 600618 for toiletries, and 313470 for dhoti, and lungi.
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Table 4.9: Effect of Prohibition on Sex-Specific Goods Budget Shares
(1)
Sari
(2) (3) (4)
Chaddor
(5) (6)
Complete
Prohibition
1.528
(6.605)
1.609
(7.045)
-0.226
(7.171)
-0.233
(7.256)
Partial
Prohibition
0.282
(3.548)
-0.024
(2.591)
Arrack
Prohibition
0.716
(8.122)
-0.092
(6.841)
Log P. C. 
Expenditure
2.229
(10.671)
2.224
(10.649)
2.272
(10.901)
0.086
(2.029)
0.086
(2.040)
0.078
(1.857)
R-Squared 0.180 0.180 0.179 0.048 0.048 0.048
Female Toiletries 
(7) (8) (9) (10)
Jewellery
(11) (12)
Complete
Prohibition
-0.070
(6.746)
-0.112
(10.366)
0.026
(1.797)
0.015
(0.878)
Partial
Prohibition
-0.138
(13.836)
-0.041
(1.464)
Arrack
Prohibition
-0.129
(15.440)
-0.015
(0.713)
Log P. C. 
Expenditure
-0.029
(1.263)
-0.038
(1.702)
-0.038
(1.673)
-0.853
(5.841)
-0.852
(5.832)
-0.850
(5.820)
R-Squared 0.137 0.138 0.138 0.014 0.014 0.014
Notes: T-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state level 
in parenthesis. All estimates include occupation, year and state dummies. Other 
explanatory variables include controls for household characteristics, characteristics 
of the household head, and household composition as in Table 4.2. Total sample 
size is 600618 for toiletries, 313470 for sari and chaddor, and 298200 for jewelry.
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Table 4.9 Cont: Effect of Prohibition on Sex-Specific Goods Budget
Shares
(13)
Dhoti
(14) (15) (16)
Lungi
(17) (18)
Complete
Prohibition
0.069
(1.015)
0.095
(1.426)
0.186
(3.768)
0.189
(3.817)
Partial
Prohibition
0.092
(3.572)
0.012
(0.795)
Arrack
Prohibition
0.093
(3.509)
0.070
(3.529)
Log P. C. 
Expenditure
1.554
(27.074)
1.553
(27.038)
1.553
(27.046)
0.638
(17.325)
0.638
(17.314)
0.644
(17.452)
R-Squaxed 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.122 0.122 0.122
Male Toiletries 
(19) (20) (21)
Complete
Prohibition
-0.014
(5.029)
-0.019
(6.979)
Partial
Prohibition
-0.018
(7.839)
Arrack
Prohibition
-0.018
(9.671)
Log P. C. 
Expenditure
-0.089
(14.695)
-0.090
(14.903)
-0.090
(14.911)
R-Squared 0.127 0.127 0.127
Notes: T-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state level 
in parenthesis. All estimates include occupation, year and state dummies. Other 
explanatory variables include controls for household characteristics, characteristics 
of the household head, and household composition as in Table 4.2. Total sample 
size is 600618 for toiletries, 313470 for dhoti and lungi.
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Table 4.10: F-Tests of Effects of Household Composition and Prohibition Inter­
acted with Household Composition on Alcohol Budget Shares
Part A: Household Composition Level Effects 
Age-Group Total Arrack Toddy IMFL Beer
Alcohol
0-2 0.69 0.30 0.03 0.45 0.51
(0.41) (0.59) (0.87) (0.50) (0.48)
2-4 5.53 2.03 6.56 0.17 0.92
(0 .02) (0.15) (0 .01) (0.68) (0.34)
5-9 6.80 2.08 2.91 1.20 5.33
(0 .01) (0.15) (0.09) (0.28) (0 .02)
10-14 0.70 0.01 2.71* 0.11 2.72
(0.40) (0.94) (0 .10) (0.74) (0 .10)
15-19 3.10 1.39 6.29 1.56 1.02
(0.08) (0.24) (0 .01) (0.21) (0.31)
20-29 2.29 2.00 2.97 0.01 3.06
(0.13) (0.16) (0.09) (0.92) (0.08)
30-54 111.21* 83.07* 10.47* 8.96* 12.37*
(0 .00) (0 .00) (0 .00) (0 .00) (0 .00)
Notes: Probability F>0 in parenthesis. Bold denotes significance over the 10% 
level. * denotes male coefficient greater than female; bold with no star implies 
female coefficient is greater than male.
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Table 4.10 C ont: F -T ests o f Effects o f H ousehold C om position  and  P ro h i­
b itio n  In te rac ted  w ith  H ousehold C om position on A lcohol B udget Shares
P a r t  B: H ousehold C om position and  P ro h ib itio n  In te rac tio n  Effects
Total A rrack  Toddy IM FL  B eer 
Alcohol
C om plete  P ro h ib itio n
Female/Male Child 5.57
(0 .02)
1.34
(0.25)
8.15*
(0 .00)
0.01
(0.91)
0.90
(0.34)
Female/Male Adult 3.03*
(0 .00)
5.32*
(0 .00)
3.77*
(0 .00)
1.60
(0.11)
1.41
(0.16)
P a rtia l P ro h ib itio n
Female/Male Child 0.09
(0.77)
0.00
(0.95)
0.67
(0.41)
0.40
(0.53)
0.72
(0.40)
Female/Male Adult 1.09
(0.28)
2 .00*
(0.05)
1.93*
(0.05)
2.26*
(0 .02)
1.32
(0.19)
Notes: Probability F>0 in parenthesis. Bold denotes significance over the 10% 
level. * denotes male coefficient greater than female; bold with no star implies 
female coefficient is greater than male.
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Table 4.11: F-Tests of Prohibition Interacted with Household Composition on
Household Goods Budget Shares
Food G rains
&
C ereals
Pulses M eat 
& F ish
F ru it 
& Veg
D airy
C om plete  P ro h ib itio n
Female/Male 1.80 
Child (0.18)
2.63
(0.11)
1.54
(0.22)
0.76
(0.38)
0.61
(0.43)
1.22
(0.27)
Female/Male
Adult
0.79
(0.43)
6 .20*
(0 .00)
0.79
(0.43)
4.53*
(0 .00)
0.78
(0.44)
4.11
(0 .00)
P a r tia l P ro h ib itio n
Female/Male 0.01 
Child (0.92)
1.32
(0.25)
0.42
(0.52)
4.09
(0.04)
3.75*
(0.05)
3.60
(0.06)
Female/Male
Adult
1.47
(0.14)
2.41*
(0 .02)
2.80
(0 .01)
5.77
(0 .00)
4.03
(0 .00)
3.32
(0 .00)
Fuel H ealth
Item s
EducationT oiletries A m use- 
Item s m en t
F u rn itu re
C om plete  P ro h ib itio n
Female/Male 1.62 
Child (0.20)
0.00
(0.94)
0.29
(0.59)
0.15
(0.70)
0.07
(0.79)
2.76
(0 .10)
Female/Male
Adult
2.55*
(0 .01)
0.26
(0.80)
1.56
(0.12)
2.12*
(0.03)
0.36
(0.72)
0.48
(0.63)
P a r tia l P ro h ib itio n
Female/Male 2.31 
Child (0.13)
1.82
(0.18)
8.14
(0 .00)
0.63
(0.43)
2.35
(0.13)
1.32
(0.25)
Female/Male
Adult
4.44*
(0 .00)
0.98
(0.33)
1.97
(0.05)
1.13
(0.26)
5.37*
(0 .00 )
0.14
(0.89)
Notes: Probability F>0 in parenthesis. Bold denotes significance over the 10% 
level. * denotes male coefficient greater than female; bold with no star implies 
female coefficient is greater than male.
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Table 4.11 Cont: F-Tests of Effects of Prohibition Interacted with House­
hold Composition on Household Goods Budget Shares
U tensils B aby
Food
M ilk C hild M ale Fem ale 
E ducationT oiletries Toiletries
C om plete  P ro h ib itio n
Female/Male 0.45 
Child (0.50)
4.61*
(0.03)
1.33
(0.25)
0.16
(0.69)
0.60
(0.44)
0.10
(0.76)
Female/Male
Adult
1.66*
(0 .10)
3.26*
(0 .00)
2.88
(0 .00)
0.01
(0.99)
4.88*
(0 .00)
2.37*
(0 .02)
P a rtia l P ro h ib itio n
Female/Male 0.88 
Child (0.35)
2.47
(0.12)
4.14*
(0.04)
2.89
(0.09)
0.02
(0.90)
0.12
(0.73)
Female/Male
Adult
0.56
(0.58)
2.93*
(0 .00)
4.22*
(0 .00)
1.35
(0.18)
4.91*
(0 .00 )
0.61
(0.54)
D hoti Lungi Sari C haddor Jew elry
C om plete  P ro h ib itio n
Female/Male 1.95 
Child (0.16)
3.10*
(0.08)
0.57
(0.45)
0.32
(0.57)
1.39
(0.24)
Female/Male
Adult
0.82
(0.41)
4.38*
(0 .00)
3.47
(0 .00)
2.24*
(0.03)
1.04
(0.30)
P a r tia l P ro h ib itio n
Female/Male 0.27 
Child (0.60)
0.01
(0.96)
0.04
(0.84)
4.07*
(0.04)
2.59
(0.11)
Female/Male
Adult
2.55*
(0 .01)
1.54
(0.12)
0.89
(0.37)
5.74
(0 .00)
1.19
(0.23)
Notes: Probability F>0 in parenthesis. Bold denotes significance over the 10% 
level. * denotes male coefficient greater than female; bold with no star implies 
female coefficient is greater than male.
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Table 4.12: Prohibition Interaction Effects on Broad Group Budget Shares
Food G rains
&
C ereals
M ilk Fuel E du ca tio n  H ealth  
Item s Item s
C lo th ing
&
Footw ear
A m use­
m en t
Complete* -1.192 -1.877 -0.523 -0.350 -0.007 -0.266 -0.419 -0.187
SC/ST Dummy (3.461) (8.084) (5.067) (5.497) (0.040) (2.108) (2.518) (8.798)
Partial* 0.921 -1.813 0.595 -0.400 0.797 0.201 -0.355 0.042
SC/ST Dummy (3.642) (10.628) (8.822) (8.281) (6.402) (1.852) (1.972) (2.441)
Complete* -0.275 -0.732 0.196 -0.373 -0.306 0.361 -0.037 0.008
Female Head (0.644) (2.953) (1.563) (4.349) (1.335) (1.591) (0.188) (0.357)
Partial* -0.120 -0.470 -0.178 -0.439 -0.043 0.080 0.283 -0.060
Female Head (0.475) (2.946) (2.599) (8.260) (0.301) (0.530) (1.509) (3.993)
Notes: T-statistics in parenthesis
Table 4.12 Cont: Prohibition Interaction Effects on Broad Group Budget Shares
Food G rains
&
C ereals
M ilk Fuel E ducation  H ea lth  
Item s Item s
C lo th ing
&
Footw ear
Am use­
m en t
Complete* 0.050 -1.482 0.397 -0.350 -0.007 -0.266 -0.419 -0.187
Rural Dummy (0.135) (7.225) (3.372) (5.497) (0.040) (2.108) (2.518) (8.798)
Partial* 1.550 -0.309 -0.526 -0.400 0.797 0.201 -0.355 0.042
Rural Dummy (6.048) (2.118) (7.460) (8.281) (6.402) (1.852) (1.972) (2.441)
Complete* 0.003 1.268 -0.448 0.582 0.457 0.012 0.193 0.125
Literacy Dummy (0.012) (8.004) (5.177) (12.012) (3.185) (0.114) (1.477) (8.049)
Partial* -0.226 1.098 0.210 0.588 -0.402 0.163 0.132 -0.056
Literacy Dummy (1.257) (10.150) (4.022) (16.841) (3.759) (1.689) (0.956) (4.244)
Notes: T-statistic in parenthesis
Table 4.13: GLS AR(1) Estimates of Prohibition on Private Negative Effects
Cause of Death Treated
Accidents Poisoning Spurious Liver Liver Liver
Liquor Disease Cirrho- Disease
sis
(1) (2) O) (4) (5) (6)
Complete
Prohibition
-0.045
(1.017)
0.088
(1.178)
-1.278
(2.257)
0.172
(1.972)
-0.191
(2.223)
-0.041
(0.400)
Lag Liver Disease 
Deaths
0.454
(8.325)
Lag Liver Cirrhosis 
Deaths
1.039
(29.762)
Lag Treated Liver 
Disease
0.581
(11.922)
Proportion Urban 
Population
7.533
(8.140)
6.338
(1.703)
5.203
(0.776)
0.666
(0.117)
9.140
(3.002)
-17.896
(3.162)
Constant 7.457
(29.863)
4.356
(5.274)
2.882
(1.648)
2.400
(1.665)
-2.493
(3.162)
8.591
(5.386)
Observations 480 480 237 311 173 311
Notes: Z-statistics in parenthesis. All estimates include year and state fixed effects.
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Table 4.14: GLS AR(1) Estimates of Prohibition on Social Negative Effects
Log Total Cases of:
Total Rape Murder Thefts BurglaryRobberyDacoity Kidnaps Road 
Crime Acci­
dent 
Deaths
(1) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Complete
Prohibition
-0.042
(2.516)
0.017
(0.237)
0.045
(2.099)
-0.002
(0.111)
-0.053
(1.857)
0.010
(0.163)
0.060
(0.899)
0.036
(1.116)
0.001
(0.025)
Log Real Net State 
Domestic Product
0.034
(0.913)
-0.130
(0.577)
-0.127
(2.366)
0.062
(1.485)
0.132
(2.150)
0.134
(0.906)
-0.006
(0.042)
-0.053
(0.821)
Log Total 
Population
1.284
(5.137)
-0.832
(0.877)
1.110
(4.437)
2.421
(9.312)
1.252
(3.426)
-1.336
(2.023)
-1.026
(1.547)
-0.309
(0.766)
Police per 000 
Population
-0.041
(1.729)
0.053
(0.388)
0.010
(0.287)
-0.022
(0.888)
-0.023
(0.674)
0.114
(1.327)
0.149
(1.779)
-0.035
(0.908)
Proportion Urban 
Population
1.980
(0.894)
Constant -3.008
(1.121)
-3.742
(1.386)
-16.654
(5.951)
-5.499
(1.398)
19.071
(2.662)
16.686
(2.379)
9.354
(2.163)
-2.415
(0.893)
8.383
(13.629)
Observations 564 564 564 564 564 564 564 564 480
Notes: Z-statistics in parenthesis. All estimates include year and state fixed effects.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis has contributed to the understanding of prohibition policy by examining the 
determinants and effects of prohibition in Indian states over 1957-2001.
Prohibition of alcohol has been a contentious policy tool in many countries, yet there has 
been limited research on what drives prohibition and the what the consequences of policy 
are, both on alcohol demand and on other markets. The analysis in Chapter 2 examined the 
causes of alcohol prohibition and, in doing so, attempted to add to the empirical literature 
on the economics of government regulation. The determinants of prohibition were estimated 
as a function of political economy variables, the negative effects associated with alcohol use, 
the extent of prohibition policies in other states, and the composition of state finances. The 
results indicate limited support for the helping hand view of government which assumes 
regulation occurs to correct market failures or errors in individual decision-making. The 
analysis provides strong evidence that prohibition policies are not systematically related to 
the negative effects of alcohol consumption, or other systemic variables which would suggest 
prohibition to be the most effective policy handle to curtail alcohol demand.
On the other hand, there is some evidence for the grabbing hand view of government 
regulation. Prohibition is found to be related positively with the electoral cycle and appears 
to be driven less by the preferences of the electorate and more of specific groups as in the 
tollbooth view of the state. Nevertheless, it is not easy to distinguish between the latter 
and the theory of regulatory capture based on the analysis presented. What can be deduced 
is that the alcohol industry has significant influence in deterring prohibition whose effect is
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difficult to counteract by other groups, such as NGOs or anti-alcohol movements.
Complete prohibition, partial prohibition, and the prohibition of any alcohol type ap­
pears to be determined by similar factors. In particular, the results provide strong support 
that prohibition is used strategically by non-alcohol producing states to elicit central trans­
fers. The impetus for this is politically motivated as politicians win votes by coalescing 
rural constituencies for prohibition with the promise of lower negative effects of alcohol 
and higher central finance. There is also strong indication that inter-state competition for 
central rents results in prohibition as states attempt to maintain existing central excise 
shares.
Chapter 3 addressed the issue of the effectiveness of alcohol prohibition in reducing 
alcohol consumption. It overcomes the data limitations of previous studies on prohibition 
by analysing alcohol consumption data from a series of household consumer-expenditure 
surveys. The analysis found that alcohol prohibition had differential effects on alcohol by 
type of prohibition enacted and liquor group. Complete prohibition reduced participation 
and consumption of arrack, IMFL and beer, although it increased consumption of toddy 
- the local home brew. While supply shifts resulted from complete prohibition, the main 
mechanism through which demand decreased was through demand shifts resulting from the 
higher fixed costs of consumption. On the other hand, during partial prohibition supply 
shifts dominated any decrease in demand due to fixed costs. In particular, partial pro­
hibition decreased arrack, toddy and beer participation and led to an increase in IMFL 
demand as consumers substituted away from arrack towards its nearest substitute. This 
suggests that both complete and partial prohibition have important spillover effects on the 
consumption of other liquor types which may have to be controlled using alternative policy 
measures.
There are strong associations between alcohol and the addictive goods examined in 
Chapter 3. Estimates using prohibition as an instrument for alcohol consumption suggest 
that overall alcohol and tobacco, and alcohol and pan are complements. However, the 
direction of the relationship differs by alcohol type and tobacco item. In particular, bidis 
and leaf tobacco are a complement to arrack and toddy and a substitute to IMFL in both 
sectors. On the other hand, cigarettes are a strong substitute for all alcohol items in both
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sectors. Pan appears to be complementary to arrack, toddy and beer but a substitute for 
IMFL. Consequently, as shown by the reduced-form estimates, prohibition had significant 
spill-over effects on the consumption of these items and is associated with a decrease in 
overall demand for tobacco and pan. Amongst tobacco items, prohibition decreased leaf 
tobacco consumption and increased cigarette and bidi consumption - the latter being a 
substitute for IMFL and complementary to toddy.
Chapter 4 examined the effect of alcohol prohibition on the negative effects associated 
with alcohol use by examining the changes in the intrahousehold allocation of resources, 
alcohol-related disease and death, and disaggregated crime rates. In doing so, it provides 
an empirical basis for assessing the claims of prohibitionists that alcohol prohibition has 
significant positive spillover effects. Prohibition was found to have a significant re-allocative 
effect on household expenditure patterns indicating, that the results on alcohol consump­
tion were not due to underreporting1. In particular, prohibition increased food and fuel 
budget shares, the former mainly due to increases in consumption of pulses, fruits and veg­
etables, and dairy products. It also shifted resources towards amusement services, perhaps 
as a substitution for alcohol. On the other hand, prohibition decreased budget shares of 
education goods, household appliances and utensils, and household toiletries. These broad 
effects also hold for child goods where prohibition increased shares of baby food and milk 
but decreased child education expenditures. The reallocation of resources due to prohibition 
does not follow sex-lines, with both male and female clothing increasing and sex-specific 
toiletries decreasing. For most goods, the direction of change was in fine with that predicted 
by theory.
Overall the estimated effects of prohibition on intrahousehold resource allocations are 
small on average, as expected given the small share of alcohol in the household budget. 
This is not to say, however, that the associated welfare effects, at the household and societal 
level, are also small. While the analysis cannot infer whether household welfare increased 
or decreased due to the changes in the household bundle, the implication is that the welfare
1 Given the significant negative effects on budget shares of some household items due to prohibition, 
underreporting, in the sense that items are declared missing or less than actually spend, is not endemic 
in driving the results. As discussed, the incentive for underreporting related to prohibition in household 
consumption-expenditure surveys is limited but its absence cannot be guaranteed.
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effects on other individuals within the household could be significant. This is particularly 
important if consumption is constrained at unsustainable levels prior to prohibition.
The analysis on alcohol related deaths and disease found prohibition to have a signifi­
cant negative effect on spurious liquor and liver cirrhosis deaths. Prohibition also had an 
estimated effect on alcohol-related social externalities by decreasing the incidence of crime 
in general, and burglaries in particular. However, prohibition is associated with higher liver 
disease deaths, perhaps due a greater incidence of poisoning. There was also an increase in 
homicide rates similar to increases found for the US during prohibition.
The finding that prohibition is enacted not with the explicit view to curtail alcohol de­
mand for efficiency reasons but to fulfil the objectives of politicians and bureaucrats, raises 
serious questions regarding the role of the state in the economy. Given that paternalistic 
policies in general, and prohibition policies in particular, limit individual freedom by con­
straining individual choice, the above analysis provides good reasons to support a more 
limited role of government regulation. The observation that prohibition policies are not 
without their costs, such as greatly depleted state finances or larger bureaucracies, lends 
further credence to this view.
On the other hand, prohibition did significantly decrease alcohol consumption by ap­
proximately 26% for participation in alcohol. The finding that demand decreases, not only 
due to the increase in price resulting from the reduction in supply, but due to a deterrent 
effect of prohibition has several implications. First, it indicates that very high taxes would 
need to be implemented on production in order to achieve similar decreases in consumption 
via taxation. Secondly, it suggests that the design of alternative policies to prohibition 
should also focus on increasing the fixed costs of consumption, in addition to factors which 
affect price. These could include requiring consumers to purchase a liquor license, regu­
lating the location of bars to be a suitable distance from the village/community centre, 
or limiting the number of retailers within a given area. Finally, the result indicates that 
prohibition causes a greater effect on consumption than estimated from the supply effect 
alone. The implication for the consumption of other prohibited goods such as drugs, is that 
lifting prohibition may result in a greater change in demand than expected from the price 
effect in isolation.
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Aside from its effect on alcohol demand, prohibition had several spillover effects on the 
demand for other goods and the negative effects of alcohol use. As noted above prohibi­
tion decreased demand for complements to alcohol such as tobacco and pan, but increased 
consumption of substitutes such as bidis and cigarettes. Given that bidi and cigarette con­
sumption is already high in India and that the associated negative health effects of increased 
tobacco consumption are substantial, this is a worrying side-effect. It also highlights the 
dangers of undertaking isolated policies to curtail alcohol demand, which exhibits strong 
associations with other harmful addictive goods, without incorporating measures to counter 
the unintended negative spillover effects of policy.
Prohibition, by inducing a decrease in alcohol consumption, also changed intrahousehold 
resource allocations by increasing outlays on food and fuel. In addition, there is evidence 
of positive private health effects and social effects due to the decrease in total crime. Given 
that the positive effects are a function of alcohol consumption, the implication is that 
alternative alcohol policies which bring about similar decreases in alcohol demand will have 
similar side-effects. This is corroborated by the evidence on the relationship between alcohol 
taxes and the negative effects of alcohol use for developed countries. Nevertheless, it can be 
argued that prohibition may be more effective in curtailing consumption in some instances, 
such as inelastic alcohol demands and poor taxation systems.
Aside from effects induced by a fall in alcohol consumption, prohibition is also associated 
with other spillover-effects arising from the nature of the policy itself. In particular, the 
growth of black markets in liquor and the lack of legal channels for the enforcement of 
contract results in an increase in organised crime and associated violence. The supply 
of illegal liquor also increases the probability of alcohol poisoning and may result in a 
glamorization of alcohol consumption. There may also be wider effects on society such 
as a disregard for the law and a culture of hypocrisy as observed during the US National 
Prohibition.
Overall, prohibition is therefore not a panacea to the negative effects of alcohol use. 
Given the significant effects on the demand for other goods and associated health and crime 
effects, prohibition should not be viewed solely with respect to its impact on alcohol demand. 
Instead a more integrated approach is needed which incorporates alcohol policy with other
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measures to control addictive consumption and the spillover effects on private health and 
criminal behaviour.
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Chapter 6
Glossary
A lcohol card iom ypopathy: A type of heart disease in which the heart muscle is abnor­
mally enlarged, thickened and/or stiffened. As a result, the heart muscle’s ability to pump 
blood is impaired. When induced by excessive alcohol consumption the disease is called 
alcohol cardiomypopathy.
Alcoholic gastritis : A group of disorders that induce inflammatory changes in the gastric 
channels. Alcohol is one of its several determinants.
A lcoholic liver cirrhosis: Liver cirrhosis is scarring of the liver that involves the formation 
of fibrous tissue associated with the destruction of the normal architecture of the organ. It 
is the result of long-standing injuries to the liver, most commonly due to alcohol use and/or 
particular types of hepatitis.
A lcohol po lyneuropathy : A group of conditions which affect the functioning of the 
nervous system often induced by excessive alcohol consumption.
A rrack: Also known as country liquor. An unrefined distilled spirit, generally made from 
locally available raw materials such as sugarcane, molasses, rice, or coconuts.
B eer: any alcoholic drink fermented from grain.
B hang: A drug similar to hash
Bidi: Bidis are an indigenous variation on cigarettes and comprise of a tendu leaf to contain 
the tobacco.
Block: See also taluk. For some Indian states blocks are synonymous with thaluks, in 
others it is an administrative division below the thaluk.
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C haddor: A cloth used as a head covering (and veil and shawl) by Muslim and Hindu 
women
C o u n try  liquor: See arrack
D acoity: A form of robbery by groups of bandits (similar to highway robberies).
D hoti: A long loincloth worn by Hindu men.
E th an o l toxicity: Poisoning due to overconsumption of ethanol.
H aem orrhag ic  stroke: The breakage or blow-out of a blood vessel in the brain resulting 
in high blood pressure and bleeding within the brain.
In d ian  M ade Foreign L iquor (IM FL): Alcohol items such as whisky, gin and rum,
formally produced in large distilleries
L eaf Tobacco: Shredded tobacco, usually untreated.
Lungi: A long piece of brightly coloured cloth (cotton or silk) used as clothing (a skirt or 
loincloth or sash etc.) by men in India.
M eth an o l toxicity: Poisoning due to overconsumption of methanol.
N eera: See toddy
P an : Pan is the indigenous term for betel leaf.
P an c rea titis : Inflammation of the pancreas resulting in malfunction.
Sari: a dress worn by women consisting of several yards of light material that is draped 
around the body
T a h s il/T a lu k / Tehsil: An administrative division in India below a district; called tah- 
sil/tehsil in northern India.
Toddy: Fermented palm liquor generally home-brewed. Also known as neera.
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